Entry barriers and evolution of banking systems: lessons from the 1980s Canadian western bank failures.
Public policy for financial institutions faces the challenge of reconciling competing interests: banks have an interest in promoting whatever allows them to pursue the most profitable strategies in order to satisfy their shareholders, while public policy often represents the reconciliation of conflicting goals (e.g., bank shareholders versus economic development,...

Greater international links in banking--challenges for banking regulation.
Some recent trends in bank regulation are examined, with particular focus upon the issues raised by multinational banking for collaboration between banking regulators. The experiences of the European Union and of Australian and New Zealand are outlined in order to illustrate the difficulties involved and prospects for harmonisation. ...

The macroeconomic implications of the new banking capital regulation in emerging markets: a duopoly model adapted to risk-averse banks.
Resumen. Con el propósito de analizar el impacto de la nueva regulación de capital de bancos (Basilea II) sobre el ciclo de una economía emergente, desarrolló un modelo de duopolio compuesto por bancos locales y extranjeros. Teniendo en cuenta esta nueva regulación, los principales resultados son: la evaluación del...

Banking stability and the Basel capital standards.
In thinking about bank stability and the Basel Accord, rather than concentrating on whether the Basel Committee has gotten every little detail of the new Accord right--a task that can greatly affect banks' bottom lines--it is more appropriate for our present purposes to concentrate on some more general--and perhaps...

What is systemic risk, and do bank regulators retard or contribute to it?
One of the most feared events in banking is the cry of systemic risk. It matches the fear of a cry of "fire!" in a crowded theater or other gatherings. But unlike fire, the term systemic risk is not clearly defined. Moreover, unlike firefighters, who rarely are accused of...

The Long and Bumpy Road to Glass-Steagall Reform: A Historical and Evolutionary Analysis of Banking Legislation. (Other Articles).
JILL M. HENDRICKSON (*) ABSTRACT. This paper focuses on understanding the role of interest groups and markets in influencing regulatory change. To that end, it first identifies the interest groups surrounding the creation of legislation that separated commercial and investment banking in the 1930s and then identifies...

Regulatory Moral Hazard: The Real Moral Hazard in Federal Deposit Insurance.
Many banking regulators, academics, and others hold that deposit insurance creates an undesirable moral hazard in banking. But the real moral hazard that federal deposit insurance creates is regulatory moral hazard. In this article I describe regulatory moral hazard, explain why depositor discipline of banks is highly undesirable, show...

Market discipline in bank regulation: panacea or paradox?
Central bankers speak of three pillars supporting the achievement of their objectives: regulation, supervision, and market discipline. Recently, the third pillar--market discipline--has received greater attention as the increasing size and complexity of financial services firms has placed strain on the other two pillars, raising concerns about systemic risk. The...

Financing entrepreneurs: better Canadian policy for venture capital.
The Study in Brief Innovation and growth depend in large part on entrepreneurship, which in turn may require financing in the form of venture capital investment. In Canada, Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) have become the dominant source of venture capital. There is reason for...

African Americans and mortgage lending discrimination.
Background The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975 made it easier to address the issue of discrimination by requiring lending institutions to document mortgage lending patterns. The concern, at the time, was that banks were not providing adequate credit in certain inner-city neighborhoods. Data was now...