MOST people talk about the European Union based on their preconceived notions about it. It is rare to get an insight into that body unclouded by platitudes and the obfuscation of Euro-speech. I was fortunate to have an interview with a man who has both exceptional knowledge of the EU but who speaks

in a plain language, Frits Bolkestein, the former European Commissioner for the internal market, taxation and the customs union (1999-2004). Born in 1933, he had had a distinguished career before he entered politics. From 1960 to 1976 he worked in different international capacities for Shell, lastly as Director of Shell Chimie in Paris. His aversion to the most left-wing government the Netherlands had ever had led him to pursue a new career in politics. In those days, the socialist government of Joop den Uyl (1973-1977) tried to create a new society by 'social engineering'. The redistribution of power, wealth and income was a central theme in its approach. Mr Bolkestein entered Parliament in 1978 for the Dutch Liberal-Democrats (VVD), became Minister for Foreign Trade (1982-1986), Minister of Defence (1988-1989) and was a highly successful Chairman of the VVD Parliamentary Group from 1990 to 1998.

Mr Bolkestein, currently Visiting Professor of Intellectual History at the Universities of Leiden and Delft, is a unique politician. Unlike many of his colleagues, he publishes articles and books on a wide variety of subjects. [1] He is not afraid to speak his mind, even if it goes against his party's policies. Mr Bolkestein was the first politician who dared to put the issue of multiculturalism on the agenda, contributing to a more businesslike approach when it came to the treatment of ethnic minorities. His views over the years on European integration have been varied but rather consistent. Mr Bolkestein has never been in favour of a federal Europe, which placed him, in the eyes of his critics, in the eurosceptic corner. As a liberal politician, he sees the European Union mainly as a large internal market, free from the constraints of state interference.

His and my native country, the Netherlands, has always played an ambivalent role in Europe. Until the Second World War, the country pursued a foreign policy that was based on neutrality and free trade. A small nation with the crucially important Netherlands Indies, the Netherlands was ranked as an important power in the world. The Second World War ended this perception. The exiled government in London realized the impossibility of continuing foreign policy along neutral lines. The first steps were taken in 1944, when Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg signed the so-called Benelux treaties. Their aim was to create a customs union, which came into force in 1948. The post-war conflict in the East Indies resulted in the creation of the independent Republic of Indonesia, effectively reducing the Netherlands to a second-rate power. It took some time before new policies were set in motion, but the Cold War made clear that choices had to be made. The European Recovery Programme or Marshall Plan provided economic assistance to European countries under the condition of mutual economic coordination. The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was set up for this goal. In the same year negotiations were started which led to the Brussels Pact, a defence organisation, overshadowed by the foundation of NATO in 1949. The Netherlands and the other Benelux countries responded positively and signed the respective treaties. Cooperation, in economic and military matters, had now replaced neutrality.

The Schuman plan (1950), leading to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was initially received with caution. The Dutch were not keen on handing over sovereignty to a supranational authority, which could interfere with their policies and thus decrease competitiveness. The Dutch government got its way with the creation of a Council of Ministers as a link between the High Authority and the nation states, limiting the possibility of supranational intervention. In October 1950, the French Prime Minister Rene Pleven announced plans to create a European Defence Community (EDC) in which the German army could be incorporated. Once again, the Dutch government showed reluctance to accept the plans. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dirk Stikker (VVD) saw the EDC as unnecessarily undermining Atlantic unity. Besides, the Dutch would be bound to a federalist military construction dominated by the French, which, in turn, could put off the British. During the negotiations, the Dutch made every effort to minimize political and military integration whilst ensuring British and American cooperation. In the end, the EDC was turned down when it went before the French Assembly in 1954.

The Dutch approach to European integration appeared to change in the second half of the 1950s. During the negotiations which led to the Treaties of Rome of 1958, the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Authority (Euratom), the government pleaded for a common market overseen by a supranational European Commission. This was, obviously, for tactical reasons. As a small nation, the Netherlands would benefit more from a strong European Commission which could prevent the French from dominating the newly founded EEC.

The early 1960s were dominated by French efforts to play a leading role in Europe, weakening the ties with the United States. The Dutch government observed this development with increasing anxiety. Britain's entry into the EEC was vetoed twice, as President Charles de Gaulle saw the British as a Trojan horse for American influence in the Community. De Gaulle's idea of a 'Europe of States', guided by the French and without the participation of the British, was rejected by the Dutch government. Supranational decision-making continued, in those days, to be of major importance for the Dutch. British accession to the Community would be very helpful as they could not only function as a counterweight to Franco-German dominance, a situation more likely after the latter two countries had concluded a treaty of friendship in 1963, but also because of their excellent relations with the US.

When de Gaulle resigned in 1969, negotiations for British entry were finally re-started. Britain together with Ireland and Denmark became members in January 1973. The Dutch attitude to Europe changed slightly, as they also became more critical towards US involvement in Vietnam. Plans for a political and monetary union, to be in place by 1980, were not vetoed by the government. They would continue to insist this union to be supranational and not intergovernmental. In the end, these plans came to nothing. Monetary instability within the EC in the 1970s made such moves impossible. Besides, the left-wing government of Joop den Uyl wanted to pursue major economic reforms, which would be hindered by a badly functioning monetary union. Plans for political unification shared the same fate. Despite acceptance of intergovernmental European Political Cooperation and the European Council, the balance continued to be tilted towards supranationalism.

In the 1980s, the Dutch government supported the European Act (1986), which determined the establishment of a free market within the Community by 1992. The limited competence of the intergovernmental organs, which by now were incorporated in the renewed Treaties of Rome, was acceptable to the Dutch.

In the 1990s, the process of European integration took another turn. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 paved the way for monetary union and further cooperation in different areas between the member states. The Dutch chairmanship of the European Council in the second half of 1991 was confronted with a plan, developed by Luxemburg, in which the European Commission and the European Parliament would lose authority to the European Council. They made every effort to avoid acceptance of the plan, but were defeated by the majority of the member states. Black Monday, as the day of defeat was soon thereafter named, called for a reorientation of European policy. At the end of the Cold War, the importance of NATO began to lessen. Now was the time to strengthen the EU, by cooperating more with France and Germany, the leading continental states. The first occasion to show a more intergovernmental approach was the Amsterdam conference of 1997. Although the Dutch government initially showed an inclination to include foreign and security policy, matters of national sovereignty, in the area of competence of the European Commission, they quickly withdrew this idea after strong resistance from other member states. [2]

After boom had turned to bust in the Dutch economy at the end of the 1990s, public enthusiasm for the EU went downhill. This coincided with a more nationalist approach by the Dutch government. They held on to the candidacy of Wim Duisenberg as the first president of the European Central Bank, after much diplomatic wrangling with the French. The government made an issue of the fact that the Netherlands was the largest per capita contributor to the European budget and pronouncements were made about strengthening the Dutch position in the EU.

In 2005, the rejection of the Constitution by Dutch voters with an overwhelming majority of 61.6 per cent made abundantly clear that any dreams about a federal Europe would have to be put on hold indefinitely especially as French voters also rejected the Constitution.

I spoke to Mr Bolkestein about the European Constitution and the possibility of a new referendum, tax harmonisation, the issue of globalism, and the current downturn of liberalism.

The first question I put to him was about the new treaty, formerly known as the European Constitution. Agreement was reached in Brussels in June about this treaty. The Dutch government presented the result as a victory. According to Prime Minister Balkenende, the Dutch have prevented the creation of a 'superstate'. A new referendum would not be necessary as the proposed changes do not imply serious implications for the Dutch constitution. The former chairman of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who was responsible for the drafting of the rejected Constitution, recently explained that the new treaty hardly differs from the old Constitution. 'As far as it concerns the content, the proposals have remained unchanged. The envelope has been renewed; the letter is still the same'. [3] If the Dutch government gets its way, the treaty will be ratified by Parliament. This will create a feeling of deception amongst those who voted no in the previous referendum. I asked Mr Bolkestein what his thoughts were on the matter.

'Well, I agree with you that the differences between, how shall I put it, the 'reformed' treaty and the Constitution are not very big. Off the top of my head, there are the issues of voting rights. The Poles are acting difficult, as usual, and we also have the matter of the UK opt-out (from the charter of fundamental human rights). The European Minister of Foreign Affairs is supposed to be called High Representative. This is only a cosmetic change. So, yes, the differences are small. If Prime Minister Balkenende says he is not going to organise a referendum because of the major differences [between the treaty and the constitution], I think he is taking a political short-cut, the easy way out. If he would act in a logical and honest way, he should submit the reformed treaty to a referendum. He doesn't want that, the government doesn't want that, it's only the population that wants this referendum. I am against all referenda. For opportunistic reasons I therefore support Mr Balkenende. But it would be a logical step if a referendum is held'.

I asked Mr Bolkestein what he thought about the attitude of the government during the negotiations and the results they achieved in Brussels.

'I don't know how they worked there. I wasn't present during the negotiations. They appear to be satisfied with the results. One has to ask, though, who has achieved these results. Was it the Dutch government or the British government? I don't know. The United Kingdom is totally against a European federation or a superstate. I am against a federal European state as well. The Dutch have changed their opinion as far as that is concerned, but I don't know exactly what they have gained in Brussels'.

I confronted Mr Bolkestein with a remark made by the EU's former antiterrorism coordinator, Gijs de Vries, who said that Mr Balkenende misled the Dutch people. He reproached the government for propagating the myth of having prevented the creation of a superstate. [4]

'Well, this is not thanks to the Netherlands. Once again, the British do not want a superstate and that has always been clear. Since 1973 (when Britain joined the Common Market) we should not have spoken about a European federation. That is impossible. The only country that wants a federal Europe is Belgium. It would solve their problems (between Flanders and Walloon). Occasionally you hear stories about federalism from Germany. Joska Fischer, the former German Foreign Minister, has spoken about a federal Europe, but that's about it. The Poles, the Czechs, the British, and, when it comes to it, the French do not want a European federation'.

But the current treaty could lead to such a federation?

'I don't see why. Off the top of my head, I don't see it contains that much. The Charter of Fundamental Human Rights should not have been included, though. We have the European Convention on Human Rights (ECRM), which we had to sign. We don't need this charter. And Britain has an opt-out. I don't think the treaty resembles a superstate'.

Should the Netherlands government decide to hold a referendum after all, and the result would be negative again, what would be the consequences for the position of the Dutch in the EU?

'The treaty won't pass. We will be known as a difficult member state, but the Danes are difficult, so are the Irish and the French. All this talk about being thrown out is completely out of order'.

Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, former Minister of Economic Affairs, said during the campaign for the first referendum that 'the lights would go out in the Netherlands' if the electorate would vote against the Constitution. Frans Timmermans, Junior Minister for European affairs said the Netherlands would have to leave the European Union in the case of non-acceptance of the treaty.

'Ridiculous! Absolutely ridiculous! I do not understand how somebody can say things like that. He [Frans Timmermans] has civil servants working for him who can prevent him from making these kinds of pronouncements. He used to work in Brussels! It's all nonsense! The annoying thing about the European Union is that people who are supposed to know better or actually know better, are tempted to make silly remarks like that. There is no excuse to say the lights will go out in the Netherlands. How can he [Laurens Jan Brinkhorst] come up with a story like that?'

I also asked Mr Bolkestein what kind of strategy the Dutch government should have in case of a new referendum. The previous campaign slogan, 'Europe: Rather Important', was not exactly inspiring. A lot of mistakes were made, thinking the Dutch would understand the good intentions of the government. We had always been flexible.

'Well we used to be [flexible]. There is only one possibility. The government should tell the truth; the truth about what the Constitution said, and what is now in the reformed treaty. They shouldn't say there are big differences between these two. This is simply not true. Too much codswallop has been said about the European Union. In the end you will be called to account. This is what happened in 2005'.

In the Netherlands and in Brussels Mr Bolkestein has the reputation of being a eurosceptic. I asked him if he agreed with that.

'What is a eurosceptic? When I was Chairman of the VVD Parliamentary Group, I criticised the Dutch government. When I worked in Brussels I criticised the European Commission. What is wrong with that? A eurosceptic! It is true that I don't belong to the 'euro church', but we have no use for europhile trains of thought only. One has to be sober and able to name and shame things. You have to tell the truth! I am sorry if I sound repetitive but that's what it's all about. The European Commission acts as if everything they do is successful. Take the conference on racism in Dorpen, Germany. The European Commission claimed it was a success. Israel and the United States walked out! That is wrong. In the past I pointed out my reservations about European Monetary Union. [5] Nicholas Sarkozy, the new French President, has asked for postponements of his obligations to balance the budget. Am I a eurosceptic because I point out these things? Anyway, I don't care whether people call me eurosceptic or not! And Brussels, what is that, Brussels! Is that Barroso, the Commission?'

In a speech in February 2007 Mr Bolkestein referred to Gordon Brown as not very interested in the European Union. I asked him whether that would change.

'Yes, your stand is where you sit. I think he will have to be more pro-European. I know him as a man who is rather impressed with American economic success, although less successful nowadays. I was not impressed by his interest in the European Union. I was supposed to see him every month at the ECOFIN (European Council of Finance Ministers) meetings in Brussels. He only turned up half of the time; at the rest of the meetings he was represented by a Junior Minister. As Prime Minister of a leading European member state, he has to show more interest'.

In a speech in London in January 2006, Mr Bolkestein spoke of monetary union as the natural component of the internal market as competitive devaluations are now impossible. I asked him whether harmonisation of taxes would be a logical next step in the process of monetary unification, referring to an interview with the Dutch former advocate-general at the European Court of Justice, Ad Geelhoed. In the Dutch daily newspaper NRC Handelsblad Mr Geelhoed expressed the opinion that national sovereignty in taxes could not be maintained as it would lead to a 'race to the bottom'. [6]

'I am against harmonisation of tax rates. The foundation, or as the French say l'assiette, should be harmonised. This will make it easier to compare companies internationally, using the same way of calculation. But harmonising tax rates, no. The Slovaks have a flat rate of 12 per cent. Should they adopt the Dutch top rate income tax of 52 per cent? What is wrong with tax competition? The French impose a 12.5 per cent company tax, the Dutch 25 per cent and the Germans 38 per cent. It's not all about taxes. The economy is much more important. And a race to the bottom? Well ... company taxes are getting lower and they represent only a small amount of income for the state. Income tax and v.a.t. bring in the bulk. Unfair competition is an expression used by those who have lost their competitive edge. Why is it unfair to collect less tax? European governments in general impose too much tax. They should spend less and levy less. Look at the debate about the Rhineland model and the Anglo-Saxon model. [7] Countries adhering to the Rhineland model have unemployment figures of about 10 per cent. Look at Germany and France'.

This brings us to globalisation. There is genuine fear of globalisation in the Netherlands. Worldwide, Dutch companies used to play an important role in shipping, industry and services. Fokker Aviation, KLM, Hoogovens (Steel) and ABN AMRO Bank are only a few examples of companies which have either gone bust or have been taken over by other (foreign) companies. In his last book Mr Bolkestein wrote: 'The anti-globalist movement is wrong. They are making the wrong analysis. They are the ignis fatuus of modern times'. [8] How can one counter the fear of globalisation?

'By explaining that protection is the opposite of globalisation. And that gets us nowhere. Admittedly, it is hard to explain as free trade has no constituency. However, governments should invest in this. Counting your profits with protectionism contradicts free trade. For example, KLM has merged with Air France, has been swallowed by Air France. You perhaps know that I am a member of the Board of Directors of Air France-KLM. Is it so terrible (that they have been taken over)? I think not. When ABN AMRO Bank disappears, is taken over by, for example Fortis Bank, the name could be changed. So what? It doesn't bother me at all. The thing is, we have to compete. We've always had to do that and we always will'.

I asked Mr Bolkestein what he thought about future expansion of the European Union.

'Once again, I am against the accession of Turkey. I will visit Istanbul to tell the government what I think about it. I will talk about the whole image of Turkey. The problem is we can't manage it. Wir konnen es nicht umfassen, as former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said. The borders with Iran, Iraq, Syria, we are talking about 70 to 90 million people living there. We simply can't deal with that. We also have the former member states of Yugoslavia. I don't know what should be done with them. But we should certainly say no to Ukraine, White Russia, Moldova and Turkey. Bulgaria and Romania have been admitted prematurely. That should have taken much longer. The Poles are acting really difficult at the moment. The Kaczynski-brothers are a bit unreasonable. [9] They will have to bend to the European average--and so do Hungary and Slovakia. We have enough on our plate integrating the new member states. That is our first challenge before we can think about further expansion. But I am against Turkish accession. The most recent election result in that country has only confirmed my thoughts on the matter'. [10]

My last question: The new treaty speaks of a High Representative for foreign policy of the Union. Will we ever have a common foreign policy and would the UK have to give up its seat in the Security Council?

'That will take a long time. It doesn't really exist, actually, this common foreign policy. The matter is very simple. When France, Germany and the United Kingdom agree, we will have a European foreign policy. Other member states would then have to comply with them. As long as they don't agree, we will not have a common foreign policy. I don't think the United Kingdom will give up its seat in the Security Council--and neither will France. I don't see it happening. Maybe my children will ...'

On that note, I said goodbye to Mr Bolkestein and thanked him for the interview. He is an exceptional and interesting man and, whether one agrees with him or not, he left his mark on Dutch as well as European politics.

Notes

[1] Most of Mr Bolkestein's books are available in Dutch only. An interesting exception is the book he wrote with one of his former associates in Brussels, Derk-Jan Eppink: Frits Bolkestein, The Limits of Europe (Tielt: 2004). It contains interviews with various European politicians from the past and the present, concentrating on the future of Europe.

[2] For the introduction to the Dutch attitude to European cooperation over the past fifty years, I have made use of, in my view, the best book on Dutch foreign policy: Duco Hellema, Neutraliteit & vrijheid. De geschiedenis van de Nederlandse buiten-landse betrekkingen (Utrecht: 2001).

[3] NRC.Next, 20 July 2007, p. 8.

[4] NRC.Next, 28 June 2007, p. 8.

151 Mr Bolkestein expressed doubts about the ability of countries like France and Germany to balance their budget: He was proved right.

[6] NRC Handelsblad, 30 September/1 October 2006, p. 41.

[7] These are two different models of employment and social welfare. Countries with 'Rhineland model' policies (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg) have certain characteristics: unemployment benefits and easy access to government payments; publicly-funded pensions; early retirement wages; high taxation; strong trade unions, leading to highly protective policies. The Anglo-Saxon model differs from the Rhineland model in the following aspects: means-tested social assistance policies (safety net only); redistributive cash transfers to the working population through a variety of means-tested measures; unregulated labour markets; weak unions; higher income differentiation (possibly without minimum wage); low ratios of public debt.

[8] Frits Bolkestein, De twee lampen van de staatsman. Beschouwingen over politiek (Amsterdam: 2006), p. 250-251.

[9] During the last European summit, Poland's president Lech Kaczynski and his twin brother Jaroslaw Kaczynski, then Polish prime minister, won substantial concessions on the introduction of new voting rights in the EU. These will now be postponed till 2017. The brothers objected to the so-called formula of 'double majority' voting in the EU's Council of Ministers, which, in their opinion is unfair as it gives too much power to the largest member states.

[10] Recep Tayyip Erdogan's 'Justice and Development' party (AKP) has won the election on 22 July 2007. This party, with Islamic roots, has a lot of support from the electorate outside the big cities. The victory provided a shock to the secular establishment and the military.

Peter C. Hylarides studied history and law at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands, and graduated with an MA degree in Contemporary History. He currently works for KLM and is a freelance political commentator.