Vladimir Ivanovich ORLYANSKIY was born on April 14, 1948, in the village of Divnoye, Stavropol Territory. V.l. Orlyanskiy graduated from Ordzhonikidze Higher General Military Command School named after Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Yeremenko (1971), Frunze Military Academy (1982), Post-Graduate

School (1987) and Doctorate School (1996) of Frunze Military Academy. Afterwards V.I. Orlyanskiy served in the Soviet Military Group in Germany, in Siberian and Central Asian Military Districts as motorized rifle platoon commander, motorized rifle company commander, divisional commandant's service company commander; senior assistant to the chief of training department of the training motorized rifle division headquarters; chief of staff of the training motorized rifle regiment; senior officer of operations section of the army corps staff.

From 1987 to 1998 he occupied the position of senior teacher at the Tactics Faculty of the Frunze Military Academy. After his transfer to reserve, V.I. Orlyanskiy continued working in the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as senior teacher (from September 1998) and professor (from July 2000) of the Chair of Operative Art.

V.I. Orlyanskiy defended his candidate degree thesis (1987) and his doctor degree thesis (1996) devoted to the problem of offensive tactics development in the conditions of advance warfare asset application. V.I. Orlyanskiy is a Full Member of the Academy of Military Sciences and the Academy of Security, Defense and Law Enforcement Problems.

Today, almost in each publication and discussion one can read or hear phrases containing such words as "information" or "informational." In fact, everything has now become of information character: objects, processes, phenomena. In our everyday activity we encounter such terms as information technologies and information support; information environment, sphere and space; information weapon, information struggle or warfare, etc.

Actually, we are now witnessing a real information boom. Indeed, the word "information" and all its derivatives are used so frequently that at times it is even difficult to catch the sense of what was said, or to understand whether we are dealing with urgent scientific problems, or are concerned only with superficial estimations of new phenomena or slight generalizations which are often accompanied by a plenty of "new" concepts and ideas.

This conceptual rush tends to occur due to different reasons which do not always seem to be quite objective; therefore, most of the obviously erroneous theses could be simply ignored. However, some abstract assessments of new developments may be easily brought into the sphere of military activity, thus making a negative impact on the defense capacity of the state. In particular, absolutization of information and its role in present-day war conflicts leads to situations when their essence and their basic contents--the armed struggle or warfare--get distorted. And since this has a direct relationship with military staff training, in particular, with the preparation of future generals and marshals capable of orienting themselves in new conditions as easily as A.V. Suvorov and G.K. Zhukov, such theoretical conclusions are far from being harmless. So we believe that in this connection it is very important to gain a good understanding of the situation related to new opportunities in using information and some new terms which can render negative influence on military, and, in particular, operative art. These terms include, for example, "information weapon" and "information warfare."

It is a well-known fact that the Russian Federation Military Doctrine establishes the following primary objectives to be achieved during a period of threat and shortly after the beginning of a new war (armed conflict) for military security purposes: organization and coordination of armed, political, diplomatic, information, economic and other kinds of struggle. (1) This provision implies, among other things, that armed hostilities, information warfare and other kinds of struggle are thought to be quite different structural elements of a military conflict, and they are considerably distinguished each from other. In fact, they have their own goals, essence and contents, and they are maintained by own forces and assets. Therefore, the statement that in the future "armed struggle will be penetrated with ramified informational confrontation"2 is thought to be inconsistent not only with the Military Doctrine of the state, but also with the objective reality. The dialectic interrelation of phenomena does not at all assume their abstract interpenetration leading to deformation or full denial of their essence, to the formation of certain derivative forms lacking any specific features.

I suppose there is no need in specifying what forces and assets are used in an armed struggle in the modern conditions. We should only note that efficient application of any most powerful and precise weapon depends on the information about enemy targets location, about own capabilities and potentialities, and about other conditions necessary to be taken into account, since they often play an important part in reaching success during struggle. Despite the fact that informational characteristics of an armed confrontation have always had a significant and sometimes even decisive impact on its outcome, it has never changed the armed struggle essence and has never transformed it into information warfare. The problem is that information has always played a certain role not per se, but only in connection and in combination with the processes, forces and assets in whose interests it was used. In other words, information has always played a supporting role, and it can be of crucial importance only under other equal or comparable conditions, such as availability of weapons and troops and their possession by contending parties capable of applying them in an armed struggle.

Today the situation actually remains the same. In spite of the fact that information is indeed very important, it does not replace and, probably, will never replace weapons, and it will never become the principal means of destructive struggle.

That is why the term "information weapon" is frequently interpreted very widely, and application of such a weapon is considered to be a factor of latent economic and military-political pressure. (3) At the same time however, the development of the so-called "uniting"4 concepts on the basis of excessively wide generalizations enables some researchers to insist that the term "information weapon" implies not only an aggregate of instruments allowing to carry out certain actions with information, but also information itself.5 Unfortunately, this position appeared to be rather long-standing, in spite of its vulnerability and obvious partiality.

A stereotyped view that a word can kill or, on the contrary, cure sounds rather tellingly at emotional perception. However, we cannot be guided by emotions when speaking about the efficiency of certain kinds of weapons while considering complicated issues of theory and practice, in particular, those of the armed struggle.

Despite all the power of word, carrying in itself either devastating or curing information, in our opinion, it would be wrong to speak today about information as a weapon. Information has not yet become a remedy capable of affecting a human being as effectively as some modern kinds of weapons. This hardly needs to be proved. The main question is whether information will ever become capable of rendering the same effective impact as other means of an armed struggle.

The problem is that the desire for global supremacy occasionally becomes an obsession for military-political figures in some states. With this purpose, the increasingly effective and sophisticated weapons, down to nuclear, capable of destroying all the living creatures on the planet, were developed and supplied to armies. Today, new technologies are opening up broad opportunities before the mankind, including those promoting the creation of essentially new destruction weapons or such assets the impact of which can ensure the achievement of the most arrogant objectives in interstate or internal military conflicts. And we tend to hear about the prospects of using information in these purposes more and more often.

In this connection, it is very important that people understand what the term "information" specifically means. Today some scientists interpret "information" as a fundamental, generalizingly uniform, eternal legal process involving the... relation, interaction, transmutation and inter-preservation of energy, movement, mass and anti-mass on the basis of materialization and dematerialization in micro- and macrostructures of the Universe.6 On the basis of such definitions it is argued that information is an element of the Universe and the world, the original cause, essence, source and carrier of all phenomena and processes, all material particles and objects. (7) It is highly probable that in case of rather deep substantiation of this definition and its recognition at the general scientific level, the issue of further development of science in general and military art in particular would be raised in quite a different subspace as compared to today's situation.

However, it should be kept in mind that such attitude towards information does not go beyond the limits of a scientific hypothesis which does not appear to be well-founded so far. The crucial importance of this problem has demanded not only specification of the term "information" in Russian explanatory dictionaries, but also decision-making on this occasion at the legislative level. For this very reason the law is seen as the basis for scientific and practical work in modern conditions, and in the law the information is defined as data about people, subjects, facts, events, phenomena and processes, in any form of presentation.8 This definition makes it possible to regard information as an ideal object which does not exist without a material carrier. As pure data (not a legal process and not an element of the Universe), information can render certain influence upon individual persons or targeted populations; however, the effectiveness of this influence is estimated today as rather low.

For example, according to scientists of the Russian Federation Academy of Military Sciences, "pursuance of a successful information war is thought to be a difficult task so far... At this point we are observing only the attempts of implanting guaranteed effect instruments on individual and mass consciousness ... " (9) It should be specified here that in this case the authors mean the information wars which have been conducted in the society during many millennia, and in which information has always served as the major influencing factor affecting the course and the outcome of events.

With all this said, we do believe that it is too early to put on the agenda the issue related to the role and prospects of information in the foreseeable future, i.e. whether information can, as a major factor of influence, replace weapons that are used in modem warfare. All the ways are open here. Perhaps, the directionassociated with the development of the theory of conscionable war (a war of ideologies) (10) appears to be so promising that in the long run the application of the methods of individual and public consciousness manipulation becomes as simple as making rocket aviation attacks against the armies. However, it is probably too early to insist that such methods are really available. (11)

If such a theoretical opportunity ever becomes a reality we will not have to speak any more about any other kinds of weapon other than information, and about any other kinds of wars other than infonnation wars, and the prospects of further existence and development of the society will probably be examined and assessed from quite different positions.

Finally, for the time being it is too early to regard information as a tool that can be used instead of modern weaponry, but as the attention to this problem is not reducing, we shall leave it for future generations of researchers for consideration.

However, there is another problem, which appears to be even more urgent nowadays. It deals with the fact that information weapon is divided into technical (cybernetic, etc.) means of information influence and "purely informational tools associated with perception and influence on a human being and society."12 It is quite obvious that in this case we are referring to the infonnation weapon which only partly corresponds to traditional information wars, since technical tools of informational influence have never been applied in them. At this point, however, while speaking about information weapon, people frequently mean not only and not so much information but, first of all, technical, cybernetic and other instruments allowing to influence the information itself, i.e. the information which is being "transmitted, processed, generated, destroyed, perceived and stored" (13)

Such a position represents information warfare in a completely different subspace by opening broader opportunities for logic breach and numerous new concepts not corresponding to the essence of the phenomena. And though it is argued in the same source that instead of information weapon we should refer to "cybernetic weapon" as it more correctly reflects the essence of the current situation, (14) its authors, unfortunately, have decided that it was unnecessary to concretize certain basic aspects in relation to the present-day conceptual structure.

However, further abstract-oriented approach would hardly promote essential advancement to impartial assessment of the "information warfare" concept and its impact on the life of society. In this connection we should emphasize the basic aspect, which implies that information in itself cannot be the object of influence as it can be influenced only indirectly, through its carrier.

This is explained by the fact that information is an ideal object which does not exist in a material form. It can either be withdrawnyrom the carrier or together with the carrier, or destroyed (erased) from the carrier (for instance, magnetic carrier) or together with the carrier.

From here it follows that when we are insisting that information gets affected in the course of an information war, we first of all mean the impact on certain material objects. Therefore, depending on the goals in view, technical (cybernetic and other) influence on data carriers can lead to distortion (loss) of their functions in relation to the information (when a carrier becomes, either constantly or temporarily, unable to carry out those or other information processes with an appropriate quality) or to their destruction together with the information.

This is the way problems are solved in an armed struggle, i.e. when the troops are doing their best to eliminate the enemy's most crucial informatized targets they get influenced by various kinds of weapons. If it is required to influence only the information in these targets, it is necessary, first of all, to solve special tasks through intelligence support, radio-electronic warfare and other sorts of operations.

It would be expedient to say here a few words about the necessity to focus on further development of the ways of solving these tasks in new conditions so as to build up the potential of the troops. Indeed, it is the vagueness in the information war treatment and insufficient understanding of its interrelations with the armed struggle and their roles in a war conflict that represents one of the reasons why we are still lagging behind in this area.

It is quite remarkable that the application of technical and cybernetic instruments in information warfare with the purpose of rendering physical influence on the information (i.e. on its carriers) actually transforms this warfare into armed struggle; however, this struggle is waged by weapons other than the traditional ones and created on the basis of the most advanced, sophisticated technologies. This is also proved by unambiguous statements of some of the authors implying that in case of direct physical influence it would be not absolutely correct to speak about information weapon, as in this case an air bomb or an artillery shell should be also recognized an information weapon. (15) Naturally enough, such "generalizing" concept is objectively unacceptable for a modern weapon definition. And since influence on a material object (data carrier) by technical and cybernetic means always represents physical influence, it should be attributed not to information warfare, but to armed struggle, and these means themselves should be attributed to advanced weapons. This fully corresponds to the proposed version of classification of modern means of defeat. (16)

Certainly, in the course of reality perception and transformation we should take into consideration continuous integration and differentiation of different sciences and processes. But while doing so, we should not overemphasize each of these directions, but find their optimal combination for the given period of time.

Ignorance of such an approach leads to increased subjectivism and voluntarism in decision-making. This is obviously proved by overenthusiasm about integration processes, ungrounded generalizations and overestimated assumptions in analyzing new phenomena associated, in particular, with digital technology development.

In some cases it is quite obvious that excessive generalization and, on the other hand, slight distortion of new concepts and their meaning has led to negative consequences, which could hardly be eliminated. In fact, they are capable of bringing to a deadlock the most crucial science development trends, including those in the military art. In this respect it would be desirable that the attention of both the public and the scientific community be drawn to new information technologies. And we should unequivocally define them as digital, which to a larger degree corresponds to their essence. (17)

Then the word "information" would not have become nominal, which has caused many logical discrepancies during discussions, research activities in theory and practice, including military science.

In this connection, it would be somewhat incorrect to regard traditional mechanical, public and other systems as information systems. (18) If the modern world gets substantially changed as a result of development of digital technologies (which have been called "information technologies" on the basis of someone's subjective judgment), why should the names of traditional systems be also changed for this reason? The problem is that some day, in connection with nanotechnology development, the same systems (whose essence will not change) may be called nanosystems, and armed struggle (which is being transformed today into information warfare) may be called nanostruggle. Indeed, this position is believed to be quite far from the objective dialectic approach.

To the same extent, it is totally unacceptable when technical weapons and cybernetic weapons are attributed to information warfare assets. (19 ) Everything that concerns the use of these weapons, especially the psychotronic ones that are used to render forcible impact on individual persons or targeted populations, or on different material objects, (20) has no relationship to information warfare. For at the present stage, even the slightest attempts of using hi-tech (for example, in the computerized financial sphere) for criminal purposes create a huge resonance all over the world and cause dramatic response of the world community, politicians, statesmen and business circles.

The application of high technologies in aggressive purposes is beyond the limits of the international law. (21) And since they (proceeding from their potential capabilities) will be commensurable with the weapons of a bigger power, sooner or later it will be required to create a legislation either limiting or completely forbidding their use, at least in peacetime.

This is explained by the fact that when such assets are created on a mass basis, a collision of rival states' armed forces or other power structures equipped with such assets will represent nothing but a war conflict with the use of essendaily new weapons. Probably, such conflicts, depending on their scales, will essentially differ from the modern ones in terms of their character, contents and consequences.

All the above-stated allows us to make the following conclusion: only the influence through information--but in no way on information--can have information-related character. Influence through information can be rendered only on a human being since it can be perceived in the form of data only by a person (we shall not take fauna representatives into account here). From here it follows that the information warfare concept cannot imply any technical (power) aspect. In this kind of struggle information is used as a factor of influence on individual and public consciousness and simultaneously--as a means of protection against such influence (see Fig. 1). (22)

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Information warfare is conducted, first of all, through the mass media, which ensures the delivery of the information of each contending party to the selected targets. In this case, information superiority can be treated as a more effective influence through information. To gain such superiority, more qualitative information is required as well as more perfect ways of its delivery which should be associated with the development of global communication systems. For instance, nowadays some countries are widely using the Internet with a view of conducting information warfare. In particular, "nowadays, American experts working in the field of informational and psychological influence have certain operative experience in computer networks of the enemy." (23)

A different (forceful) approach to the "information warfare" concept interpretation leads to unsolvable contradictions between the views on information warfare and armed struggle being the subject of military and, in particular, operative art. Inclusion of a forceful aspect into information warfare would inevitably lead to deformation of the established provisions of operative art theory and practice, which could have a negative impact on military staff training, on mastering complex modern forms and contents of the armed struggle.

Summarizing the aforementioned, we may make the following conclusions.

First. At this point, information weapon and information warfare are conditional categories, since information has not yet become an instrument comparable with the traditional weapon as far as its influential force is concerned, and information warfare is wrongly understood as confrontation where information is the influencing factor.

Second. In modern conditions, the mass media and the Internet are widely used in information warfare, with information being its factor of influence. This requires new views on the contents of such struggle and its maintenance on the basis of a corresponding conceptual framework.

* Third. Information warfare conducted only with the use of information to gain informational and psychological influence should be distinguished from psychological warfare, which uses an arsenal of various forceful methods and means having no relationship with information. Psychological warfare conducted with the use of these means, as opposed to information warfare, has a direct relation to armed struggle.

* Fourth. It appears to be theoretically wrong to include technical or cybernetic aspects in the information warfare contents, as in this case the contents of the struggle will not correspond to its name. In this case, the border between "information warfare" and "armed struggle" gets easily erased, and artificial contradictions in views on theoretical principles of both kinds of struggle tend to emerge.

* Fifth. The absence of distinct theoretically established boundaries between different kinds of struggle cannot be compensated by any teaching techniques in the educational process. Besides, it should be kept in mind that military training requires precise and clear instructions. Therefore, it is very important to develop military science and to build educational process on the objective basis only, thus reducing the subjective factor (in the negative sense of this word) to a minimum.

NOTES:

(1.) "Voennaia doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21 aprelia 2000 g., No. 706," Armeiskiy sbornik, No. 6, 2000, p. 7.

(2.) Vestnik akademii voennykh nauk, No. 4 (13), 2005, p. 13.

(3.) Vestnik akademii voennykh nauk, No. 4 (17), 2006, p. 22.

(4.) Ibidem

(5.) Ibid, p. 24.

(6.) LI. Yuzvishin. Informatsiologiya ili zakonomernosti informatsionnykh protsessov i tekhnologiy v mikro- i makromirakh Vselennoi, Monograph, 3rd edition, Radio i Svyaz Pub lishers, Moscow, 1996, p. 215; M.I. Poteev. Kontseptsii sovremennogo estestvoznaniya, Piter Publishers, 1999, p. 352 etc.

(7.) V.I. Tsyganov, V.L. Lopatin, Psikhotronnoye oruzhiye i bezopasnost'Rossii, SINTEG Publishers, Moscow, 1999, p. 40.

(8.) RFFederal Law No. 24-FZ of 20.02.95.

(9.) Vestnik akademii voennykh nauk, No. 4 (17), 2006, p. 24.

(10.) Ibid., pp. 26-27.

(11.) Ibid., p. 26.

(12.) Ibid., p. 25.

(13.) Vestnik akademii voennykh nauk, No. 4 (17), 2006, p. 24

(14.) Ibid.

(15.) Vestnik akademii voennykh nauk, No. 4 (17), 2006, p. 24.

(16.) Voennaia rnysl', No. 4, 2007, p. 60

(17.) Voennaia mysl', No. 9, 2006, pp. 76-80; Yu. A. Brammer, I.N. Pashchuk. Tsifrovye ustroist-va. "Vysshaya Shkola" Publishers, Moscow, 2004, p. 230.

(18.) Vestnik akademii voennykh nauk, No. 4 (17), 2006, p. 23.

(19.) Ibid., p. 25.

(20.) V.I Tsyganov, V.L. Lopatin, Psikhotronnoye oruzhiye i bezopasnost'Rossii. SINTEG Publishers, Moscow, 1999, p.17.

(21.) Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, No.l (507), 2007.

(22.) V.I. Tsyganov, V.L. Lopatin, Psikhotronnoye oruzhiye i bezopasnost'Rossii, SINTEG Publishers, Moscow, 1999, p. 14.

(23.) Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, No. 1 (507), 2007.

Col V.I. ORLYANSKIY (Res.) Doctor of Military Sciences