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No military R&D effort received a higher priority in the postwar years than that to defend the continent against a nuclear air strike. No military weapons systems called for greater advances of technology. No group of scientists and engineers received stronger support

Simon Ramo, former employee of Hughes Aircraft and co-founder of TRW (1)

That man was Howard Hughes and the organization described by Simon Ramo was the Hughes Aircraft Company, then a division of the Hughes Tool Company. How Hughes' lifelong interest in radio electronics and the establishment of a highly specialized laboratory transformed Hughes Aircraft Company from a third rate airframe manufacturer into the Air Force's premier supplier of airborne guided missiles, electronic fire control systems, and radar is the subject of this article.

When Howard Hughes returned to Culver City in the Fall of 1945, after an eleven-month hiatus dealing with the after effects of a nervous breakdown, his dream of turning Hughes Aircraft into a major manufacturer was in ruins. Production contracts for both of the company's major projects had been cancelled; no production runs would be ordered for either the HK-1 flying boat or the F-11 reconnaissance plane. Aside from completing prototypes for each of the aforementioned aircraft, the only ongoing project was a relatively small ($500,000) research and development contract issued by the Army Air Forces (AAF) for work on an experimental air-to-air missile designated as the JB-3.

The award was one of several dozen R&D contracts for guided missile research issued by the Air Technical Service Command (ATSC) during the last 12 months of World War II. The JB-3 project, which was first proposed in October 1944, was started because of the need for a "weapon to combat high speed enemy aircraft under adverse weather conditions." (2) It was officially established as R&D Project MX-570 on November 13, 1944. (3)

Initial design parameters were worked out during the joint industry conference sponsored by the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) and the AAF in December 1944. The conference was held in great secrecy at the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, at Langley Field, in Hampton, Virginia. The lab had already begun to work on the project, having conducted preliminary wind tunnel tests a month earlier. (4) The missile, named "Tiamet," after the goddess in Assyrian-Babylonian mythology whose emblem was a winged dragon, would be guided by control equipment adapted from the Radar Homing Bomb (RHB) developed earlier in the war. (5) The rocket propelled air-to-air missile was designed to attack aircraft at altitudes up to 50,000 ft. with a 100-lb warhead. It would accelerate to a top speed of 600 mph and had a range of 5-9 miles. (6)

Hughes Aircraft was selected as the prime contractor and given an order to produce twenty-five JB-3s. In addition to the airframe, the company was also responsible for coordinating the activities of the other suppliers that provided the aerodynamic configuration (NACA), the radar seeker (Belmont Radio Corp.), and the control system (Lear-Avis, Inc.). (7) Hughes began working on the contract on January 15, 1945, and was ready to begin testing the first missiles in the early part of August. The first JB-3 was fired from underneath the wing of an A-26 aircraft at Wendell Field, Utah, on August 6, 1945. (8) Three more missiles were fired during the course of the next ten days to test the aerodynamic configuration of the missile. None of the missiles fired carried a radar seeker as it had already been determined that the RHB was not suited to the task. Instead, Hughes negotiated with Belmont to buy 20 frequency-modulated (FM) radar seekers from the company to be used in the missile (Belmont was soon taken over by Raytheon, which assumed responsibility for developing the seeker). (9)

Hughes Aircraft continued to work on the development of the JB-3 until the contract was terminated in September 1946. Of the twenty-five missiles contracted for, only fourteen had been tested fired. The remaining missiles were transferred to another new Hughes missile project for use in developing a control system for high-speed homing devices. Before terminating the JB-3 contract, the ATSC began negotiations with Hughes Aircraft on the design of a "practical" air-to-air missile that could be developed within two years. (10)

In the spring of 1947, Simon Ramo, one of the pioneers of microwave research then working for the General Electric Company, visited Hughes Aircraft Company. Ramo, a graduate of the California Institute of Technology, was eager to return to California where he planned to establish his own high-technology venture to exploit the military's growing interest in electronics. (11) While visiting the company, he was offered the position of director of research by Dave H. Evans, who then headed the Electronics Division of Hughes Aircraft. Ramo accepted the position and started work in October of that year.

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Evans, who was hired in 1938 to support Hughes' around-the-world flight, was a member of the management team that had met at Eaton's Ranch during the evening of February 4, 1941, to discuss the establishment of a research, test, and development group for Hughes Aircraft. (12) The company was deeply involved in the design of the D-2 at the time, which included extensive development work on Duramold, a new composite material composed of wood and phenolic resin. There were other projects too that "Mr. Hughes" wanted them to work out. As Glenn Odekirk explained, "[The] company was primarily organized to work out ideas and special things that Mr. Hughes wanted." (13) Although Howard Hughes did not attend the meeting himself, there can be no doubt that it was called at his request. Hughes was intimately involved with the D-2 at the time and was micromanaging most aspects of the company. What effect this meeting had on the R&D activities of Hughes Aircraft is not known, but it does provide evidence of Howard Hughes's vision and his desire to take the company in directions far beyond the production of airframes.

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Sometime after Hughes' return to Culver City after the war, Dave Evens persuaded Hughes that the wave of the future lay in electronics. (14) Evans was already working on the JB-3 and may have been the one to suggest the idea of using radar to provide terrain avoidance for aircraft. Hughes had been interested in radio since his teenage years, when he built his first radio set and became a member of the Radio Relay League. (15) He always had the latest radio equipment installed in each of his airplanes and had the radio division of Hughes Aircraft construct a waterproof emergency radio for this around-the-world flight. Hughes instructed Evans to scour the country for the best electronics engineers. (16) Evans recruited Simon Ramo, who in turn brought in Dean Wooldridge. Together, Ramo and Wooldridge would build the staff of the Electronics Division of Hughes Aircraft into one of the most successful research and development teams in the burgeoning aerospace industry.

Howard Hughes' direct involvement in the activities of the Electronics Division continued into the following year. He personally demonstrated the Terrain Warning Indicator (TWI) developed by Dave Evans from surplus radar equipment during "three hair-raising Constellation flights" conducted during the week of April 27-May 3, 1947. (17) Hughes invited various members of the aviation press to join him on board a Trans World Airlines (TWA) Constellation equipped with the new safety device, which he demonstrated while flying in the canyons near Los Angeles. Robert W. Rummel, Hughes' personal consultant for eighteen years, described what happened as the Constellation approached the canyon walls a low level:

When the 2,000-foot alarm sounded, and the cliffs less than five seconds away, he [Hughes] rammed the throttles full forward and made abrupt, steep climbing turns, barely clearing the canyon walls. (18)

The flights garnered an enormous amount of extremely favorable publicity for Hughes personally, the Electronics Division, and TWA, which he owned.

That summer, while Hughes was in Washington testifying before the Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, he met again with Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker. As will be recalled from Part I, Hughes had contacted General Eaker earlier in the year in order to obtain permission to fly the second XF-11. At the meeting Hughes offered Eaker, who was about to retire from the Air Force, an executive position within the Hughes Tool Company organization. Hughes needed someone of Eaker's standing to help develop the electronics laboratory for experimental weaponry that Hughes wanted to establish. "I propose to take all of the funds, profits, from my enterprise," he told Eaker, "and found a great laboratory and attract the most eminent scientists in the world and give them ideal facilities with which to work." (19) Hughes continued:

I think that we are going to be in trouble again and I think the side that has the best weapons this time will win. I believe it will always be as it was in the years between World War I and World War II, that the Armed Services will have difficulty getting sufficient money for experimentation and research. If you will join me and help me found this laboratory, and I especially want you because you know who the people are that I should have join us because of your service for four years in Britain. You know also where the British scientists are and you probably can help me get them. You can tell your friends in the Army, Navy and Air Force, that if it ever develops that they can t get money for any weapon, they think is vital to the national security, we will take a crack at it. (20)

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Eaker took the job offered by Hughes in October 1947, and moved to Houston to become a vice president of Hughes Tool Company responsible for the aircraft division. As Hughes predicted, Eaker would play a leading role in acquiring a weapons contract that would eventually lead to hundreds of millions of dollars in profits for the nascent aerospace giant that Hughes Aircraft would become, but this was months away.

In the meantime, the electronics engineers and scientists at Hughes Aircraft continued to work on the new air-to-air missile project (Air Force MX-798) as well as a study contract for the Navy to develop a ship launched anti-ship missile (Contract No. NOA(S)-8285).

In January 1947, Hughes Aircraft had requested to that the contract for Project MX-798 be modified to allow the development of a supersonic air-to-air guided missile to defend bombers. The change came as a result of severe budgetary cuts in the AAF's guided missile program brought about by the peacetime scarcity of dollars and the subsequent reevaluation of the entire missile program. Item three on the revised AAF priority list specified the need for "greatly improved defense armament for bombers," and that the bomber launched air-to-air missile should proceed on a high priority. (21)

In March, a new contract was issued to Hughes Aircraft under Project MX-904 for the design and development of a supersonic air-to-air launched guided missile to be utilized primarily for defense of bombers against hostile fighters and missiles flying at speeds equal to Mach 1.5. (22) The missile would have cruciform wings and be guided by means of a parasitic radar seeker. In June 1947, further cutbacks in the missile budget forced the AAF to reduce size of the contract from a complete missile to the development of a two-mile parasitic radar seeker and control. (23) In July the program was tied to General Electric's Dragonfly missile (later shelved).

In March 1948, the Air Force, which had been established in September 1947, revised Project MX-904 and the Hughes's contract to cover the development of a supersonic air-to-air missile designated as the XAAM-A-2 for use as an offensive weapon for interceptor aircraft and for defensive use by bombers. The design specifications called for a rocket that would be approximately .5 feet in diameter and 7.2 feet long, controlled by means of elevators and rudders mounted on the cruciform tail hydraulically activated by electrically controlled valves operated by the error signal from the target seeker. (24) The missile, which Hughes Aircraft had named the Falcon, was test fired for the first time in 1949. When the Air Force began to assign aircraft type designations to its guided missiles in 1951, interceptor missiles were designated as "Fighters," and the Falcon became the F-98. By the time the missile had entered service in 1955, the aircraft designation (X-98) had been replaced by the GAR-1 (Guided Air Rocket-1). In 1963, the GAR-1 and its variants GAR-2, -3, and -4 s were redesigated the AIM-4 series.

During its operational lifetime, which continued until the late 1980s, the Hughes AIM-4 Falcon was fielded on McDonnell's F-4D Phantom and F-101 Voodoo, Northrop's F-89 Scorpion, Convair's F-102 Delta Dagger and F-106 Delta Dart, SAAB's J-35 Draken and JA-37 Viggen, and Dassault's Mirage IIIS. It was tested for possible use on the F-94 Starfire, and was to have armed the F-12A Blackbird and Republic F-103 and F-108 Rapier fighters. It served with the air forces of Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Canada, Greece, and others. More than 60,200 Falcon missiles, representing an estimated $18 billion in sales for Hughes Aircraft, were built over the years, with 48,000 of them being delivered to the U.S. Air Force.

The year 1948 proved to be pivotal for Hughes Aircraft. In addition to its first contract for the Falcon missile, the company also received its first contracts for what would be the beginning of a series of sophisticated fire control systems for all-weather interceptors. During the early months of that year, the Armament Laboratory at Wright Field was testing an AN/APG-3 radar to determine its possible application to night fighters. (25) The feasibility of combining the A-1 lead computing sight with the radar to present computed course information directly to the pilot was also under consideration. In May, the Materiel Command issued a Request for Quotation (RFQ) for a radar fire control system for the F-89, a two-place, all-weather interceptor being built by Northrop. Hughes, along with several other bidders, responded with a proposal and cost estimate employing the AI-B sight and a modified AN/APG-3 with provisions for a dual display. All of the other bidders, except for Hughes, wanted several years for development. Hughes won the competition by promising to deliver it within a year. (26) On June 30, 1948, Hughes Aircraft was awarded a development contract for the E-1 fire control system. In November the contract was amended to extend the requirements to a second two-place all-weather interceptor, the Lockheed F-94 Starfire.

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That summer the Armament Laboratory became interested in a similar radar system for single-place aircraft. In July 1948, laboratory personnel visited North American Aviation to discuss the possibility of mounting a pod-contained radar fire control system in an F-86. (27) North American felt that pod mounting posed too much of a threat to aircraft performance and both sides agreed the equipment--designated the E-2 system--might be installed in the nose. Hughes soon agreed to see if the E-2 could be mounted internally in the F-86.

Though both E-1 and E-2 programs began with a high priority, the E-2 never reached the production stage. Production and development of the E-1 system started simultaneously with the design frozen in the early stages of the program to insure that the early delivery date would be met. (The first production unit was even fabricated prior to the completion of tests of the experimental models). A major facet of the development program was the conversion of the AN/APG-3 into the AN/APG-33.

By February 1950, twenty-five E-1 systems had been completed and were in various stages of installation, the 100-hour flight test program for the prototype radar in the F-94 had ended, and production systems were soon to be installed in the F-89. As the first F-94As were delivered, however, it soon became apparent that many of the E-1 fire control systems were out of calibration or not operating properly. Although Hughes had built the first production units in record time, the Air Force had requested that the system be developed by modifying equipment designed for other purposes and by taking shortcuts in the design. As reported in one official Air Force document, this resulted in a system that had operational limitations, marginal performance, and the need for many modifications. (28) In addition to its limited range, the inability of the A-1B and A-1C(M) sights, which were employed without modifications, were unable to measure accurately the angle of attack, true air speed and yaw of the interceptor, or the true air density at high altitudes. The foregoing were serious limitations for a fire control system designed for an all-weather interceptor.

In mid-1949, the U. S. Air Force was seeking to obtain a more advanced fire control system for its interceptors. Prime emphasis was placed on the need for a one-man, all-weather interceptor whose role was to be filled by the F-86D. Though the E-2 fire control system could have been fitted into this aircraft, the Air Force decided to increase the airplane's "kill" probability by using rockets. This created the need for a new fire control system designated the E-3, which would be designed around the E-2 system combined with a new rocket-firing computer. The E-3 fire control system [see Table I] would be an solution pending development of a high powered radar proposed by Hughes Aircraft that would form the basis for the more advanced E-4 fire control system [see Table I]. (29)

In April 1950 the AN/APG-33(XA-2) radar, initially developed for the E-2 fire control system and now destined for the E-3, was redesignated the AN/APG-36. At the same time, the AN/APG-33(XA-3)--first proposed by Hughes a year earlier--was redesignated as the AN/APG-37. The AN/APG-37 had the same tracking range as the AN/APG-36, but twice the range. Part of the improvement resulted from increasing the power of the magnetron transmitter tube to 250 kilowatts, with the rest from doubling the power of the receiver-transmitter and increasing the diameter of the antenna reflector by several inches. The AN/APG-40 was identical to the AN/APG-37, except for mounting provisions peculiar to the F-94C and the F-89D, which where equipped with the E-5 and E-6 fire control systems [see Table I].

By the time production of the E-Series fire control systems was terminated in 1957, Hughes Aircraft had shipped more than 5,600 units to the U.S. Air Force. These units were installed on the F-89A,B,C, D and H models; the F-94A, B, and C models, and the F86-D.

On January 13, 1949, the Force announced an Advanced Development Objective (ADO), for a specially designed interceptor (dubbed the "1954 Interceptor" for the year it was expected to become operational) that could surpass the estimated speed and altitude of Soviet intercontinental jet bombers. (30) Recognizing that the increasing complexity of weapons no longer permitted the isolated development of equipment and components that went into a modern aircraft, the Air Force concluded that the new interceptor should be developed in conformity with the Weapon System Concept. This concept (as yet to be tried) was based on having an integrated the design in which each of the components was compatible with every other in the system. In keeping with this concept, the Air Force held a design competition for a fire control system (Air Force Project MX-1179) for the new interceptor that would insure the success of the interceptor's mission by putting the aircraft in the right place at the right time, pointed in the right direction, so that it's missiles could be launched automatically. Once the characteristics of the weapon system were determined, the Air Force felt confident that it could then go out to the airframe manufacturers and solicit bids for the new interceptor, which would be designed around the Project MX-1179 fire control system.

Research already conducted by the Air Force's Armament Laboratory had proven the feasibility of collision-course attack, using folding-fin, spin stabilized rockets, and the Air Force was anxious that the new supersonic interceptor should employ an air-to-air guided missile. In May 1949, the Air Force selected the Hughes Falcon to arm the new interceptor because it was the only missile suited to the task that could be readied in time for the 1954 deployment date. (31)

In October 1950, three months before bidding ended for the airframe (Project MX-1554), Hughes Aircraft was awarded a contract for the electronic control system around which the MX-1554 airframe would be built. As explained by Aviation Week: "Hughes's previous fire control experience and the fact that the advanced system was to fire Hughes-developed missiles undoubtedly played a part in the Air Force selection." (32) A contract for the airframe was not awarded until September 11, 1951, when Convair (Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation) received a contract authorizing the construction of the delta-wing XF-102.

Hughes began an extensive program to study what it would take to design and build the new system as soon as the award was announced. Progress was slow, and it soon became evident that Hughes would be unable to deliver the new system by the scheduled delivery date in 1954. To expedite delivery, the Air Materiel Command and the Air Research and Development Command, jointly recommended the development of an interim fire control system based on the two-man E-9 system that Hughes had developed for testing the Falcon missile. By the end of 1952 the Air Force had also decided to proceed with the F-102 on an interim basis. (33)

At the heart of the E-9 system was the AN/APA-84 computer, whose development dated back to 1950 and the decision to provide a rocket-firing computer for the E-3 system. At that time, the Armament Laboratory asked Hughes to study the design of a new computing mechanism which could direct a variety of weapons and permit variations in armament and attack mode in a given interceptor without extensive electronic changes. In October 1950, Hughes proposed the "universal computer" to satisfy this requirement designed to fit into the space required for the AN/APA-84 computer and to control air-to-air and air-to-ground rockets and guns. (34)

After the Air Force had decided to proceed with the interim F-102A interceptor and the modified E-9 fire control system, Hughes set out to determine just what had to be done to the E-9 to suit it for use in the one-man Convair aircraft. Investigation revealed that the changes required were quite extensive; consequently the new system was re-baptized as the MG-3. (35)

The Pentagon approved the project on April 2, 1953. By that time, Hughes had decided it was possible to obtain an integrated system of flight control, fire control, and control-surface-tie-in for the F-102A. A data link and automatic instrument landing system was added to the new system, which became the MG-10 Aircraft and Weapon Control System. Hughes Aircraft eventually received orders for 750 of these systems.

By 1953, Hughes Aircraft was ensconced as the sole source of fire control systems and air-to-air guided missiles for the Air Force's interceptor program. The company was in its fifth year of phenomenal growth. From a business grossing $1.5 million in 1947, it had grown into $200-million-a-year avionics concern with a $600 million backlog. (36) Annual earnings topped $5 million and the work force totaled more than seventeen thousand. But all was not well.

As sales and profits increased, the operations at Culver City came under increasing scrutiny of Hughes Tool Company's executive vice president, Noah Dietrich. Dietrich, characterized by Fortune magazine as "Hughes's major-domo in financial matters," began to take an ever increasing role in the management of Hughes Aircraft Company. (37) As the company's need for working capital soared, Dietrich continually clashed with Harold L. George and Charles B. Thorton--the two-man management team hand picked by Howard Hughes to run the company in 1948--over decisions regarding budgets and the need to expand facilities.

Like Ira Eaker, George was a retired Air Force general who had won acclaim during World War II for his handling of the Air Transport Command. He was selected to run the day-to-day operations as the company's general manager. Thornton, the assistant general manager, had been an executive with the Ford Motor Company.

In June, 1952, the management team in Culver city decided that Hughes must choose between them and Dietrich. As reported by Fortune magazine:

Through Eaker, the four vice presidents George, Thorton, Wooldridge, and Ramo sent to Hughes a memorandum marked Important Communication. They flatly accused Dietrich of attempting to seize personal power without regard to the consequences to the company and to the likely detriment of the Air Force schedules. They asked to see Hughes immediately.

Hughes, however was not so easily brought to bay. A week passed before his secretary even acknowledged he had received the memorandum. But the desired meeting was never set up. When next the management had information about Hughes, it was that he had flashed in and out of the plant, unannounced, shepherding several strangers whose names but not their connections had been entered on the visitors registry, but who had been recognized as Westinghouse executives. Soon George s group received a tip that Hughes had put the company on the market. (38)

The visit and others to follow were set up by Hughes as a means to establish the value of the company, but he had no interest, as the management team soon realized, in selling the company. Deciding to force matters once again, the managers sent Hughes a second communication putting him on notice that they could no longer be responsible for meeting the company's commitments.

On the evening of September 20, 1952, Eaker, Thornton, Wooldridge, and Ramo met with Hughes in an attempt to resolve their differences. (39) Hughes only chastised the group telling them that they were allowing their emotions to cloud their judgment. Nothing was settled and the dispute continued to fester throughout the spring and early summer. Ramo and Wooldridge made a final effort to break the impasse in July, when they met again with Hughes in one last attempt to resolve the matter. The pair waited twenty days for a response. When none was forthcoming, they handed in their resignations. One month later on September 11, 1953, Ramo and Wooldridge cleaned out their desks and walked out of the plant for the last time. Three days later George handed in his resignation, which was closely followed by Thornton's. (40)

The Air Force, which had been watching the growing crisis at Culver City with increasing alarm, decided to take action. The Pentagon had long anticipated that the differences between Howard Hughes and the company's management might jeopardize deliveries of the critical weapons systems being developed by Hughes Aircraft. Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbot was forced to act after word began to spread that the rest of the senior scientists and executives, comprising practically the entire secondary level of management, were about to leave.

Talbot could not let Hughes Aircraft fall apart. On September 18, he flew to Culver City accompanied by Roger Lewis, Assistant Secretary for Materiel, for a showdown with Howard Hughes. (41) "You have made a hell of a mess of a great property and by God, so long as I am Secretary of the Air force, you are not going to get another dollar of new business," Talbot exclaimed, threatening to put the Tool Company's Aircraft Division out of business. (42) Hughes pleaded for time to straighten out his company. Talbot relented and gave Hughes ninety days to revamp the ailing company's management structure.

As the ninety days ran out at Culver City, Hughes used the crisis to solve another vexing problem plaguing him: his spiraling federal tax bill. The domestic oil business was booming in 1953 and with it the profits at Hughes Tool Company. As the profits grew, so did his tax bill, but Hughes abhorred paying taxes.

It was against this background: an aircraft company torn by bitter revolt, the military pressing him to straighten out his business affairs, and the soaring income-taxes, that Howard Hughes demonstrated his genius for business and finance. In conjunction with his lawyers, Hughes devised a brilliant scheme for resolving both issues.

On December 17, 1953, Hughes's attorneys filed legal documents in Delaware setting up two new corporations. One was the Hughes Aircraft Company, a separate company formed from the assets and liabilities of the Radio Group of the Aircraft Division; the other was called the HHMI Corporation--a non-profit corporation set up with Hughes as its sole trustee. (43) The purpose of HHMI, as stated in its incorporation papers, was "the promotion of human knowledge within the field of the basic sciences and its effective application for the benefit of mankind. The next day, Hughes, or someone in his organization, decided that the HHMI Corporation sounded too much like a business and the name was changed to the Howard Hughes Medical Institute.

The creation of the HHMI was a bold stroke of financial genius. By transferring all his stock of the Hughes Aircraft Company to the institute, Hughes turned the large defense contractor into a tax-exempt charity, preventing the loss of the company (Defense Department officials would think twice before canceling the contracts of a company owned by a company devoted to medical research "for the sake of mankind") and turning it into a tax heaven the would generation millions of dollars of revenue through payments form the Howard Hughes Medical Institute to the Hughes Tool Company. The former leased land and buildings from the Tool Company that would be used by Hughes Aircraft, which in turn paid HHMI for the use of the property. In addition to the lease payments, HHMI also owed the Tool Company for the difference between the assets it bought and the liabilities it assumed.

Without donating a single penny, Howard Hughes had created a public relations bonanza that was worth millions of dollars in income and tax deductions. As Bartlett and Steel so aptly point out, Howard Hughes had created the ultimate charity: "the American taxpayer was to pick up the entire bill for the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, while Hughes basked in the warm glow of testimonials to his philanthropy and quietly collected money from his own charity." (44)

The last act in the thirty-year drama surrounding Howard Hughes active participation in managing the Hughes Aircraft Company was played out in February 1955, when the first and only board of director's meeting of the Hughes Aircraft Company was held since its inception three months earlier. (45) At the meeting Hughes appointed Pat Hyland vice-president and general manager, elected him as a director, and formed an executive committee of Howard Hall and Pat Hyland. He then gave the committee all powers in the operation of corporation, except:

1. The name of the company could not be changed.

2. The executive committee could not authorize payment of dividends.

3. The executive committee was not empowered to take title to any real estate, but was empowered to take leases as might be necessary for corporate purposes. (46)

Once this was completed Hughes adjourned the meeting.

For the next twenty years, Hughes Aircraft was successfully run by Pat Hyland, who had only minimal contact with Hughes until the latter's death in 1976. In the interim, Hyland guided Hughes Aircraft as it grew into a multi-billion dollar aerospace giant.

In 1985, the company which Howard Hughes had established in 1932 to support his interest in aviation was sold to General Motors for $5 billion.

Operational Use of the E-Series Fire Control Systems

The E-1 fire control system consisted of the AN/APG-33 radar and the A-1C(M) sight directing 20-millimeter cannon in the F-89 and .50-caliber guns in the F-94. The system was designed to intercept enemy bombers with pilot and observer playing separate roles. The radar was operated solely by the observer, who switched it to automatic search operation at the beginning of a mission. If a blip appeared and was identified as unfriendly, the observer assumed manual control of the antenna and locked the radar on the target. The antenna then automatically held on the target while the radar continuously measured range, azimuth, and elevation.

At the lock-on point the pilot would begin the attack. He could steer on a pursuit course either by focusing on the target visually with the optical sight or by following steering data presented on the scope. In a radar attack, the pilot maintained the interceptor on the course of the target by keeping a dot within the steering circle in the center of the radarscope. At the appropriate range he uncaged the computer gyro and thus displayed the steering dot by the computed lead angle. After correcting his course for the lead angle by centering the dot again and watching the range circle shrink to a point where it coincided with a circle etched on the face of the scope, he opened fire.

The E-3, E-4, 3-5, and E-6 fire control systems functioned generally like the E-l, but employed the lead collision attack mode. In the E-3 and E-4, an artificial horizon and range trace marker were displayed on the scope until the target blip appeared and lock-on could begin. At that time the steering dot and two concentric circles appeared. Centering the dot in the inner, or reference circle placed the aircraft in the lead collision attack mode. A gap in the outer, or time-to-go circle indicated the closing rate on the target. When the time before the projected impact of the rockets with the target reached 20 seconds the inner circle suddenly shrank to provide for more precise steering, and the outer circle gradually collapsed until approximately four and one half seconds before firing. The rockets were fired automatically at the instant time-to-go equaled the time it would take for the rockets to reach target. In the E-5 and E-6, the pilot saw only the artificial horizon until the radar locked on, after which the steering dot and concentric circles appeared.

NOTES

(1.) Simon Ramo, The Business of Science, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1988), p. 36.

(2.) Research and Development Projects of the Engineering Division, Air Technical Command, January, 1946, p. 50, Historian's Office, Air Force Material Command, Wright-Paterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio [hereafter "Historians Office, AFMC"].

(3.) D.S. Fahrney, "The History of Pilotless Aircraft and Guided Missiles," p. 743, unpublished manuscript, RG-72, NA, College Park, Md.

(4.) "'Tiamet'--NACA Research Missile," Aero Digest, February 1947, p. 80.

(5.) Mary F. Self, "The Development of Guided Missiles," Historical Division, Intelligence T-2, Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, June 1946, p. 60.

(6.) Tiamat MX-570 (General Description), Fahrney Collection, RG-72, NA, College Park, Md [hereafter Fahrney Collection].

(7.) "JB-3 Tiamet Jet Bomb," Army Air Forces, Washington, D.C., dated June 1945, Historians Office, AFMC.

(8.) Army Air Forces Material Command, Memorandum on Air-to-Air Missiles, September 5, 1945, NASM TO-40000-01, National Air and Space Museum Archives, Washington, D.C.

(9.) Assistant Chief of Staff, Materiel and Services Division, Progress Report Development Status and Availability, dated April 5, 1945, Fahrney Collection.

(10.) Headquarters Air Materiel Command, Wright Field to Commanding General, Army Air Forces, 29 March 1946, Fahrney Collection.

(11.) Ramo, The Business of Science, p.37.

(12.) Notes of "Meeting of Department Heads Held at Eaton's Rancho, February 4, 1941, 7:30 p.m.", p. 1, author's collection.

(13.) Ibid., p. 5

(14.) Lawrence A. "Pat" Hyland, Call Me Pat (Donning, Virginia Beach, Va., 1993), p. 193.

(15.) Jerome Beatty, "A Boy Who Began at the Top," The American Magazine, April 1932, p. 35.

(16.) Ibid.

(17.) Robert W. Rummel, Howard Hughes and TWA, (Washington: Smithsonian Press, 1991), p. 126-27. See also: "TWA, Hughes Aircraft Developing New Airline Radar Safety Devices," Aviation News, May 12, 1947.

(18.) Rummel, Howard Hughes and TWA, 127.

(19.) Testimony of Gen. Ira C. Eaker, February 7, 1971, Texas #139,362 [Hughes, Howard R., Jr., Estate Litigation, 1977-1981], p. 123, Ira C. Eaker Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

(20.) Ibid, p. 123-24.

(21.) Weekly Information Reports Air-to-Air Missiles, Fahrney Collection, Box 71.

(22.) Supersonic Air-To-Air Guided Missile, MX-904, dated October 31, 1948, Fahrney Collection, Box 71.

(23.) Weekly Information Reports Air-to-Air Missiles, Fahrney Collection, Box 71.

(24.) Semi-Annual Progress Report of the Guided Missile Program Department of the Air Force, December 31, 1950, p. 27-28, Historians Office, AFMC.

(25.) Air Force Systems Command, Aeronautical Systems Division, "Development of Airborne Armament 19101961," Vol. III Fighter Fire Control, (hereafter Airborne Armament Vol. III), p. 498, Historians Office, AFMC. The AN/APG-3 was the same radar used in the B-36 tail defense system and was chosen for fighter aircraft modification to shorten the lead-time on an operational fire control system.

(26.) Robert L. Woltz, "Before the Beginning of SPIE," SPIE--The International Society for Optical Engineering, http://www.spie.org/50years/index.cfm?fuseaction =chronicle.

(27.) Airborne Armament Vol. III, p. 499.

(28.) Ibid., p. 505.

(29.) Ibid., p. 506-507.

(30.) Knaack, Marcelle S., Encyclopedia of US. Air Force Aircraft and Missiles, Vol. I, (Office of Air Force History, Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 159.

(31.) Airborne Armament Vol. III, p. 543.

(32.) "Hughes Takes Wraps Off Avionics Giant," Aviation Week, 58, No. 21, May 25, 1953, p. 14.

(33.) To speed development of program, the Materiel Command recommended development of an interim F-102 (designated F-102A) with J57 engine (due to delays in the J67 originally planned) and in interim fire control System for the "ultimate" F-102 (designated the F-102B which ultimately became the F-106).

(34.) Airborne Armament Vol. III, p. 542.

(35.) Ibid., p. 563.

(36.) "Hughes Takes Wraps Off Avionics Giant," Aviation Week, 58, No. 21, May 25, 1953, p. 14.

(37.) Charles J. V. Murphy, "The Blow Up at Hughes Aircraft," Fortune, February 1954, p. 118.

(38.) Ibid., p. 191.

(39.) Ibid., p. 194.

(40.) Ibid., p. 196.

(41.) Ibid., p. 116.

(42.) Ibid., p. 199.

(43.) Hyland, Call Me Pat, p. 200. Note: the aviation activities of the division ultimately became Hughes Helicopters, Inc. with continued ownership for many years by Hughes Tool Company.

(44.) Donald L. Bartlett and James B. Steele, Empire: The Life, Legend and Madness of Howard Hughes (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), p. 200.

(45.) Hyland, Call Me Pat, p. 203.

(46.) Ibid., 234.

Thomas Wildenberg is the co-author of Howard Hughes: An Airman, His Aircraft and His Great Flights (Paladwr Press, 2006). He is a former Smithsonian Fellow having served successive terms as a Ramsey Fellow at the National Air and Space Museum in 1998 and 1999. Mr. Wildenberg is the recipient of a number of awards recognizing his scholarship. These include the Surface Navy Association Literary Award, the Edward S. Miller History Award, and the John Laymen Award. The first part of this article was published in the Fall 2007 issue of Air Power History, while the second part was published in the Spring 2008 issue.

Table 1: Hughes Fire Control Systems Supplied to the
U.S. Air Force

          Aircraft
             Used        Aircraft      Aircraft
System        on           Name         Speed

E-1       F-89A,B,C      Scorpion      Subsonic
            F-94A,B       Starfire      Subsonic
E-3         F-86D         Sabre        Subsonic
            (Early)

E-4         F-86D         Sabre        Subsonic
E-5         F-94C        Starfire      Subsonic
E-6         F-89D        Scorpion      Subsonic
E-9         F-89H        Scorpion      Subsonic
MG-3        F-102A     Delta Dagger    Mach 1.2
MG-10       F-102A     Delta Dagger    Mach 1.2
MG-12       F-89J        Scorpion      Subsonic
MG-13       F-101B        Voodoo       Mach 1.7
MA-1       F-106A,B     Delta Dart      Mach 2
APG-63   F-15A,B,C,D      Eagle       Mach 2.5+
APG-70    F-15C,D,E       Eagle       Mach 2.5+

System            Armament

E-1       .50 Cal. machine gun
E-3       2.75 in FFAR
           (Folding fin
            aircraft rocket)
E-4       2.75 FFAR
E-5       2.75 FFAR
E-6       2.75 FFAR
E-9       2.75 FFAR; AIM -4A,B,C,D
MG-3      2.75 FFAR; AIM -4A,B,C,D
MG-10     2.75 FFAR; AIM -4A,B,C,D
MG-12     2.75 FFAR; MB-1
MG-13     MB-1; AIM -4A,B,C,D
MA-1      AIM -4E,F,G
APG-63    AIM-7F/M;AIM-9L/M;
            AIM-120
APG-70    AIM-7F/M;AIM-9L/M;
            AIM-120