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Most articles on air power focus on pilots land planes. This article deals with airmen contributing to air power from the ground: aerial port, security police, environmental health, combat controllers. If you regard these, mostly enlisted career fields, as less

glamorous and therefore less important and interesting, think again. Based on my observations as an Air Force historian during three deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the contributions to air power by airmen on the ground are anything but ordinary.

Airmen in Kyrgyzstan

Following his firsthand historical interpretation of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999, Gen. John P. Jumper, Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe, revamped the capability to rapidly stage and launch forces at austere locations by activating the 86th Contingency Response Group (CRG). The 86th CRG consisted of an air mobility squadron, a security forces squadron, and an environmental medicine flight, all designed to form one cohesive unit to achieve this goal. (1)

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States required aircraft to operate from bases near Afghanistan. Closer locations meant increased combat effectiveness by reducing aircraft response time, increasing aircraft time-on-station, limiting aerial tanker requirements, and enabling the arrival, storage, and loading of large quantities of humanitarian relief supplies. Traditionally, the Air Force sent Tanker Airlift Control Elements from Air Mobility Command to perform this mission, but when an air base was needed in Kyrgyzstan, General Jumper, now Chief of Staff of the Air Force, pushed for the deployment of the 86th CRG. (2)

Airmen of the 86th CRG constantly struggled to adapt to operations in a former Soviet satellite state. From holiday celebrations to daily operations, airmen faced numerous challenges as diplomats and war-fighters. Upon their arrival at Manas International Airport, in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in December 2001, an immediate decision had to be made concerning the placement of cargo. The group arranged with Kyrgyz airport authorities to use a certain portion of the terminal. However, when forces moved pallets that night, the group was "double-crossed" and quickly found the deal made with the day-shift supervisor also required a handshake agreement with the night-shift supervisor. This lesson of stovepipes and power trips suggested the use of interpreters in the future. (3)

Inclement weather and lack of airlift hampered initial delivery of supplies and equipment. However, by January 2002 aerial port specialists had unloaded more than 6,000,000 pounds of materials stretching the cargo yard to one-quarter mile and enough equipment to begin building a tent city. Airmen first removed piles of snow. Then, on the day they began erecting tents, the weather changed dramatically to sunny and 60 degrees Fahrenheit. In fact, at one point airmen wore T-shirts as they erected tents. Never before had the local interpreters seen such warm weather for January and were dumbfounded. For many airmen, they knew exactly who was responsible for the good weather. (4)

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The day after arriving at Manas, security forces patrolled the airport with open weapons. The airmen, conscious not to scare the local inhabitants, handed out candy to the children. As each day passed security forces increased their presence little by little. Whether it was by issuing badges, establishing entry control points, or building an armory, security forces constantly improved the posture at Manas. (5)

The mission for the Environmental Medicine Flight was clear: to make sure the meals were safe. As it turned out, the problem wasn't so much the food, but water. Airmen initially tried to get the local Coca Cola bottling plant to provide water, but once again dealt with the wrong people who made empty promises. The plant could not change production from sparkling to plain water. Eventually the Environmental Medicine Flight helped a local company pass inspection and began purchasing bottled water. The flight also took soil samples to make sure the ground was safe before construction. (6)

By the end of February 2002, airmen of the 86th CRG had built an air base in Kyrgyzstan and handed it over to the 376th Aerospace Expeditionary Wing. The group handled more than 25,000,000 pounds of fuel for 170 aircraft and unloaded more than 12,000,000 pounds of cargo. The group also erected more than 200 tents and set the stage for over 3,000 coalition forces. Combat sorties took off from Manas only 75 days after the first airmen arrived. The remarkable achievement of air power on the ground kept Operation Enduring Freedom at the enemy's front door. (7)

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Airmen in Iraq

The 86th CRG learned of a possible mission in northern Iraq when the group participated in a planning conference with the Southern European Task Force. Contacts made during the conference led to the 86thCRG providing assessment data on eight airfields in northern Iraq. Concurrently, United States Army Europe earmarked the 173d Airborne Brigade, SETAF's major component, for United States Central Command. Because the 86th CRG had worked with the 173d in past exercises, the combination was a good match. (8)

Members of the 86th CRG traveled to Vicenza, Italy, home of the 173d, to conduct liaison work critical to their participation in OIF. Just like it had done for Kyrgyzstan, Air Mobility Command competed for the base opening piece, but the 86th CRG had already begun interacting with the 173d and become a key participant in the joint planning and eventual operation. Ironically, the planning lasted longer than the operation itself. (9)

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In early March 2003, the 86th CRG and the 173d went to Qatar for further planning. There the 86th CRG learned that the mission in northern Iraq would not be an airfield seizure of Bashur but an airfield lodgment because of the local Kurdish population's friendliness towards the United States. The concept called for an airborne insertion of 1,000 troops, 20 of whom would come from the 86th CRG. The insertion used 15 aircraft--the first five carried heavy equipment and the rest carried passengers. Then, over the next five days, 40 additional aircraft delivered the remaining equipment and personnel. Airmen decided what went on each aircraft, to include cross-loading airborne soldiers based on their specialties, as to not put "all of their eggs in one basket." (10)

The twenty-airmen airborne team came from a variety of specialties including security, intelligence, aerial port, medical, civil engineering, and fuels. The plan called for the team to get to Pisa, Italy, by March 21. However, after arriving on the 20th they quickly learned the Army had moved the 173d directly to Aviano Air Base, Italy. The location changed due to limited capabilities at Vicenza and political considerations to use an Italian airfield versus Aviano--an American-run base. It became clear the 20 paratroopers were in the wrong place, so they boarded a bus for a seven-hour ride to Aviano and arrived as planned on March 21. (11)

Meanwhile, the rest of the 86th CRG prepared for deployment from Ramstein Air Base, Germany. The Supply Mobility Element issued Joint-service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (J-LIST) suits, the latest version of chemical warfare defense equipment. The Air Force had originally directed the suits be sent to Incirlik AB, Turkey. However, they were diverted to Ramstein for the CRG's use, when by chance the Air Force Civil Engineer heard of the group's need through connections with an AMC representative, who had earlier visited the CRG with an eye toward AMC building a similar type unit. During his visit, the CRG had briefed the AMC representative of the need for J-LIST suits who conveyed that need to the Air Force Civil Engineer. (12)

On March 23, the main body of the 86th CRG arrived at Aviano. While there, the CRG further planned with the 173d Brigade. During the planning, United States Central Command set the night of March 27 for the parachute drop and first combat airborne insertion using the C-17 Globemaster III. (13)

The day prior to the airdrop, the media criticized OIF for not having any troops in Iraq's oil rich north. The next day there were 1,000 combat troops on the ground in northern Iraq. Within a couple of days after the initial airdrop there was a full brigade on the ground. Only the U.S. Air Force was capable of such a feat. (14)

Planners were concerned about exposing the valuable C-17 aircraft to possible hostile fire. Airmen addressed the threat by considering more than 140 possible routes into Iraq. A day before the airborne mission started, Turkey agreed to permit over-flight rights, which shortened the mission from eight to five hours. In addition, planners made the airlift mission work through a stream of nearly three-dozen air refueling connections over the Black Sea. The Air Force committed 65 percent of its combat air power to protect the airlift force. (15)

As the C-17s taxied on the ramp at Aviano, aircrews looked out the window and noticed an amazing sight. Although the air and ground crews tried to maintain a low profile days before the launch, the base woke up to thousands of troops and 15 aircraft lined up on the ramp. The huge formation drew people from every direction. People waving American flags stood on rooftops and lined the streets. They sensed that something big was about to happen. (16)

Prior to their arrival at Aviano, the 86th CRG sent an airfield survey team to design a plan to park the many C-17s there, something that had never been done before. The planners succeeded, and though it took a lot of choreographing the plan worked out well. (17)

About an hour out from the drop zone, the mood aboard the aircraft turned serious. Usually aircrews used an independent source of instrument information to guide to final approach; however, for Bashur, crews used only their Global Positioning System, which meant the navigational systems on board the C-17 were deemed trustworthy enough to navigate the airplane to visual flight rule minimums. (18)

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Once over Bashur airfield hundreds of soldiers and airmen stood, yelled, stomped their feet, and then ran out the back of the airplane. It literally brought tears to aircrew members' eyes. The necessity to get an Air Force commander, Col. Steve Weart, jumping in with an Army commander validated General Jumper's vision of the contingency response group being a force with an airborne capability. (19)

Only three paratroopers suffered injuries serious enough to warrant extraction. None of them belonged to the Air Force. The rainy weather leading up to the jump reduced the impact on what otherwise would have been a hard surface. Of the 964 paratroopers scheduled to jump (944 from the 173d and 20 from the 86th CRG), only 36 did not exit the aircraft in time and became known as "alibis." Jumpers only had 55 seconds of usable drop zone between the green light, telling jumpers they were clear to jump, and the red light, telling jumpers to stop. (20)

Airmen jumped carrying 35-pounds of load-bearing equipment and a weapon, a 50-pound parachute, and an 80-pound rucksack. Because it rained heavily just prior to the jump, the mud was both a blessing and a curse. Although the soft ground made for a favorable landing, it also complicated assembly at the rallying points. (21)

The mud was so thick in places that airmen sank to their knees. As a result, plans for real estate management and movement of vehicles were quickly altered. To make matters worse, it hailed twice that first day, and temperatures dropped as low as 33 degrees Fahrenheit. With no shelter, cool temperatures, and limited water, hypothermia became a real concern. Left with no choice but to put workspace and pallet space on the ramp, the aerial porters carefully managed wing tip clearance of the large C-17 aircraft. (22)

The muddy conditions at Bashur delayed follow-on forces. The old adage that "no plan survives contact with the enemy" was no exception, only this time it wasn't contact with the enemy, it was contact with the enemy's land. (23)

The use of night vision goggles proved essential for required nighttime landings on an unimproved airstrip with no lighting. The Air Force front-loaded some of its key command and control, aircraft maintenance and marshalling, and mobile aerial port capabilities because the mission required immediately setting up a tanker airlift control element within 30 minutes and receiving follow-on aircraft. (24)

The planned mission was extremely ambitious. For instance, the minimum time to download a C-17 by AMC regulations was one hour and 45 minutes, and that was with rapid offload for one aircraft. During this mission, airmen unloaded two aircraft in 30 minutes in totally blacked-out conditions using night vision goggles and infrared illuminators and glint tape all over the field. The engine running offload was a record shattering event. (25)

The aerial porters placed all rolling stock and pallets on the ramp until daylight and then moved the cargo forward because it was too hazardous to navigate on the muddy surface at night. The delay in movement did not affect C-17 ground operations. (26)

During the first four nights of the air land operation, airmen downloaded, on average each night, a dozen C-17s, carrying 100 vehicles, 500 personnel, and 1,000,000 pounds of cargo. They did so in only four hours of darkness in a completely austere field with bare base equipment. Bashur was now the only C-17 strategic airlift capable airfield available to coalition forces in northern Iraq. (27)

The 86th CRG deployed with 150 people and only one-fourth of its equipment. Unlike its deployment to Kyrgyzstan in 2001 when the 86th CRG deployed using six C-5s, the group entered northern Iraq using only two C-17s. The remaining 13 C-17s were used by the Army. (28) Members of the 86th CRG built a base at Bashur airfield under harsh weather conditions and provided an aerial port for 371 missions, 4,264 passengers, and 11,283 short tons of cargo, enabling the 173rd Airborne Brigade and Joint Special Operations Task Force-North to stabilize the north. (29)

Air Commandos in Iraq and Afghanistan

From February to May 2007, I was privileged to serve as the historian for Air Force Special Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Known as the Combined Joint Special Operations Air Component, its mission was to provide highly flexible and predictable air and ground effects in support of the overall special operations commander. Although a joint organization with helicopter forces from the U.S. Army and Navy, the air component comprised mostly of Air Commandos from the 1st Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida. (30)

Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism in 2001, special operations became "the worst nightmare of America's worst enemies," according to President Bush. Night after night, Air Force Special Operations Forces teamed with designed task forces to successfully achieve tactical, operational, and national strategic objectives. These task forces comprised of Army Special Forces, Navy SEAL, other government agencies, conventional, coalition, as well as Iraqi and Afghani special operations forces and police. During my tenure, I covered two of these task forces' historically significant operations. (31)

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The most important objective in 2006 was called Operation Medusa in Afghanistan. From September 2 to 14, special operations forces attacked the Taliban's Panjwayi Anti-Coalition Militant command network of hundreds of well-trained fighters gathered west of Kandahar Province. Air Commandos supported the fight with AC-130 Spectre Gunships and MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft. The operation proved significant because the anti-coalition militant forces had control of the Panjwayi District and consistently attacked nearby highways and bases. Despite Al Qada persistently re-supplying and reinforcing enemy forces, special operations forces killed nearly all of the enemies in action. The defeat of the anti-coalition militant hindered the Taliban's obvious desire to control Kandahar. (32)

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To put in perspective the importance of Operation Medusa, the regional commander stated the mission was "The single most important and successful combat operation conducted in Afghanistan since 2002 (Operation Anaconda)." According to the task force commander, "The warrior ethos and professional acumen demonstrated by every Air Commando was instrumental to the success of one of the most decisive campaigns in the history of combat operations in Afghanistan." (33)

A second historically significant objective occurred when troops came in contact with the enemy at Najaf in Iraq on January 28 and 29, 2007. Air Commandos provided the quick reaction forces needed to support the Iraqi and U.S. special operations forces. These forces contributed as first contact in the battle. Specifically, Air Commandos contributed by the de-confliction of airspace on troops in the trenches. Air Commandos also furnished devastating fire with the gunships, which arrived over the engagement area. Air Commandos also provided three of the four combat air controllers and all of the helicopters throughout the engagement. (34)

Air Force Special Operations Forces flew numerous sorties and killed hundreds of enemy fighters in this operation. According to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Arabian Peninsula Commander, "The AC-130 airpower was decisive in Najaf." Ultimately, the Iraqi army moved on the village of Najaf and secured the surrender of hundreds of personnel. (35)

Overall in 2006, Air Commandos flew more than 5,000 sorties and more than 15,000 hours in support of operations similar to these. This was significant considering a force structure possessing very few airframes. Air Commandos received more than 3,000 requests for air support and delivered on nearly all of them. This was due in large part to a 97.6 percent maintenance effectiveness rate and the high degree of flexibility on the part of the crews and planning staff During the year, Air Commandos expended more than 120,000 rounds of munitions, transported more than 7,000,000 pounds of cargo and 20,000 passengers, and offloaded more than 200,000 pounds of fuel. As a result, the unconventional Air Force directly contributed to more than 600 enemy killed in action, more than 400 high value targets destroyed, and more than 2,000 detainees captured. (36)

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Having seen firsthand the contributions of air power from the ground, I find it ironic that the Army and Marines Corps added troops throughout Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, while the Air Force reduced its number of airmen. Since then, the Air Force announced it will need up to 2,000 more "battlefield airmen" to support our ground forces.

NOTES

(1.) Briefing, 86th CRG Comdr, "Manas KG," Nov 28, 2001.

(2.) Intvw, Col Billy Montgomery, 86th CRG Commander, with Randy G. Bergeron, Historian, Dec 4, 2001.

(3.) Briefing, 86th CRG Comdr, "Manas Kyrgyzstan," Dec 13, 2001.

(4.) Notes to Staff Meetings, 86th CRG Historian, Dec 2001-Feb 2002.

(5.) Intvw, Capt Eric Rundquist, 786th Security Forces Squadron Commander, with Randy Bergeron, Jan 13, 2002.

(6.) Intvw, Maj Jim Poel, Environmental Medicine Flight Commander, with Randy Bergeron, Jan 20, 2002.

(7.) Msgs, 86th CRG Comdr, "Situation Reports," Dec 2001-Feb 2002.

(8.) Intvw, Col Steve Weart, 86th CRG Comdr, with Randy Bergeron, Apr 1, 2003.

(9.) Intvw, Lt Col Mike Marra, 86th Air Mobility Squadron Commander, with Randy Bergeron, Mar 31, 2003.

(10.) Ibid; Report, 86th CRG Comdr, "Weekly Activity Rprt," March 3-7, 2003; Report, 86th CRG Cmdr, "Weekly Activity Rprt," March 10-14, 2003; E-mail, USAFE AFFOR/A3 to 86 CRG/CC et al, "Request to USAFE to participate in 13 Mar 03 CENTCOM CFSOCC VTC," Mar 12, 2003; E-mail, USAFE/LGX to 16AETF/LNO et al, "RE: Iraq Base Beddown BOS Responsibilities," Mar 28. 2003.

(11.) Intvw, Colonel Steve Weart, 86th CRG Cmdr, with Randy Bergeron, Apr 1, 2003; Spreadsheet, 86th CRG Pers, "Chalk List," Mar 2003; E-mail, CAT-LNO3 to 16 AETF/A4 et al, "100- DPB Feedback," March 18, 2003.

(12.) Email, SFS/CC to SFS/S-1 et al, "CRG NBC items," March 11, 2003; Email, 86 CRG/CD to 86 AW/HC et al, "FW," March 2003; Email, 86 AMS/CRG to 86 AMS (ALL) et al, "JLIST Suit Issue," March 17, 2003; Email, 86 CRG/CD to 86 CRG/CD et al, "Timeline for processing," Mar 18, 2003; Briefing, 86th CRG, "AMC Brief Part I," Mar 10, 2003; E-mail, CAT-LNO3 to 16AETF/COS et al, "FW: 86CRG Timeline," Mar 17, 2003; Discussion, Col Steve Weart, 86th CRG/CC, with Randy Bergeron, [AF/CE diverts chem. suits], ca. Apr 03.

(13.) Intvw, Lt Col John Laub, Deputy Commander, with Randy Bergeron, Mar 29, 2003.

(14.) Article, Air Mobility Command Public Affairs Office, "Commander recounts historic Iraq C-17 airdrop," April 13, 2003.

(15.) Ibid; Intvw, Lt Col Marra, 86th Air Mobility Squadron/CC, with Randy Bergeron, Mar 31, 2003.

(16.) Intvw, Lt Col Marra, 86th Air Mobility Squadron/CC, with Randy Bergeron, Mar 31, 2003.

(17.) Ibid; E-mail, Lt Col Charles R. Hunter to ECJ4-LOJMC Gp et al, "FW: Forces Joining 173rd at Aviano," Mar 23, 2003.

(18.) Ibid.

(19.) Article, Air Mobility Command Public Affairs Office, "Commander recounts historic Iraq C-17 airdrop," Apr 13, 2003.

(20.) Ibid; Intvw, Lt Col John Laub, Deputy Commander, with Randy Bergeron, Historian, March 29, 2003.

(21.) Intvw, Col Steve Weart, 86th CRG/CC, with Randy Bergeron, Apr 1, 2003.

(22.) Ibid.

(23.) Intvw, Lt Col Mike Marra, 86th Air Mobility Squadron Commander, with Randy Bergeron, Mar 31, 2003; E-mail, 31OSS/INXP to 86AW/CC et al, "86ECRG Delay," Mar 27, 2003; E-mail, 31OSS/INXP to 86AW/CC et al, "86ECRG Delay," March 28, 2003.

(24.) Intvw, Lt Col Mike Marra, 86th Air Mobility Squadron Commander, with Randy Bergeron, Mar 31, 2003.

(25.) Intvw, Col Steve Weart, 86th CRG/CC, with Randy Bergeron, Apr 1, 2003.

(26.) Intvw, Lt Col Mike Marra, 86th Air Mobility Squadron Commander, with Randy Bergeron, Mar 31, 2003.

(27.) Ibid; Article, "Airlift For Paratroopers A Million-Pound Daily Deal," Washington Post, Mar 31, 2003, p. 17.

(28.) E-mail, 86th CRG/CD to USAFE/HO, "RE," March 6, 2003; Spreadsheet, "Bashur PID103IR," 86AMS, May 9, 2003; Spreadsheet, "PERSCO Roster," 86AMS, April 19, 2003; Report, 86th CRG/CC, "86CRG Roster," Mar 14, 2003; Report, 86th CRG Deputy Commander, "CRG HQs staff," Mar 15, 2003; E-mail, USAFE AMOCC/ XOPC to USAFE/HO, "FW: Bashur M&M Ver 4," Mar 18, 2003.

(29.) E-mail, 86th CRG/CC to 3AF/CRC et al, "Bashur Fld Closure, Apr 26, 2003.

(30.) Bfng, Combined Joint Special Operations Air Component Directorate of Personnel, "Right Start," Mar 1, 2007; Intvw, Col Stephen Clark, CJSOAC Commander, with Randy Bergeron, Mar 5, 2007.

(31.) See note above.

(32.) Bfng, 15th Special Operations Squadron, "Operation Medusa," Sep 27, 2006.

(33.) Bfng, 16th Special Operations Squadron, "CJSOAC Impact to Operation Medusa," Oct 30, 2006.

(34.) Bfng, CJSOAC/J2, "Najaf-QAIS NAIS," Jan 27, 2007.

(35.) Bfng, CJSOAC/J3, "Najaf Troops in Contact," Feb 19, 2007.

(36.) Rprt, CJSOAC/J5, "2006 Mission Tracker Summary," ca. Jan 2007.

Randy Bergeron is an historian at Headquarters, Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida. He has 26 years of continuous service in the United States Air Force; the first 23 years as a many times decorated military member and the last three as civilian historian. Mr. Bergeron served as an enlisted airman at nearly all levels in the Air Force to include wing, center, numbered air force, and major command. He worked at Strategic Air Command (SAC), Military Airlift Command (MAC); Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC); and Air Education and Training Command and the United States Air Forces in Europe. He has as authored 28 Air Force historical reports and numerous articles and publications including a biography of Maj. Thomas Buchanan McGuire, Jr.; a study of Operation Thursday, the Air Commandos in the Pacific during World War II; a study on Operation Just Cause, the Democratization of Panama, and many more. A graduate of Auburn University, he participated in five major deployments as an historian between 1990 and 2007.