Leonid Viktorovich BOYKOV was born in 1952, in Moscow. He finished the Kazan Higher Tank Command School (1973), the M.V. Frunze Military Academy (1984).

Boykov served in various command and staff positions in the Moscow, Transbaikal, and Far East Military Districts; last position: chief

At present, Boykov is deputy head of the Operational Art Department; leading specialist on coastal defense operations, author of over 120 textbooks and other instructional materials, including monographs; a member of the Academy of Security, Defense, and Law Enforcement.

Coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing action is a highly relevant problem for every state that has an outlet to the sea. It has at all times been a multidimensional one, in so far as it requires the reliable protection of maritime population centers, ports, naval and air bases, and other installations both from land and the sea, which has necessitated the effective organization and conduct of coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing action.

At present, there are two main factors in amphibious landing: first, the use of new, more advanced amphibious landing assets by the world's leading navies and second, gaps in the realm of theory, which does not allow amphibious landing assets to be used to the maximum.

The world's leading navies still attach considerable importance to amphibious landing operations. They are regarded as major operational-strategic goals, especially at the initial period of a war (armed conflict). Presumably, as the assets of warfare develop, amphibious landing capabilities will be constantly growing, posing an increasing threat. This raises the objective need for the development and clarification of a number of propositions of the amphibious landing theory.

Analysis of shipbuilding programs of the world's leading navies shows that special attention is being given to the development, advancement and perfection of amphibious landing assets.(1) Priority is given to expanding air basing capabilities, reducing the time needed to conduct transport and landing operations, and increase the survivability of transport and landing facilities.

The U.S. Navy is seriously considering the question of procuring high speed, civilian high capacity transport vessels that can sealift marines and cargo within the boundaries of a theater of operations. One of such craft was tested in a marine expeditionary division. The embarkation of 870 personnel and equipment took five hours, and it took 15 hours to move from Okinawa to Japan, whereas it would take between 10 and 14 days to redeploy a marine division from Okinawa to the Yoko-ta air base by two C-17 airplanes. According to the U.S. marine corps command, the use of such craft will help reduce the workload placed on transport aviation.

There are also plans to provide amphibious landing forces with more LCAC [Landing Craft Air Cushion] type of craft which have a 50 percent higher strategic capacity than the LCU [Landing Craft Utility] type of vessels and four to seven times the capacity of LCM-8 and LCM-6 craft. Their employment makes it possible to start deploying heavy equipment (tanks, self propelled guns, and armored fighting vehicles) on shore the moment disembarkation begins, promptly augment the numerical strength of amphibious landing forces, and expand the bridgehead for landing subsequent groups of landing and assault forces, as well as to transport assets and evacuate injured or sick personnel.

The U.S. Navy command plans to modernize the LCAC type of craft to extend their service life. Seventy-four of 91 craft will be modernized. They will be equipped with advanced engines and command, control and communication systems, as well as modern navigation instruments and facilities. Evidently, LCAC will remain the principal craft of amphibious landing groups for years to come, but at the same time, [the U.S. Navy] is exploring the possibility of creating LCAC with a higher load capacity and protected by light armor. True, this work is still at the concept analysis stage. In the future, the U.S. Marine Corps is expected to adopt Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAAV). Around 712 million dollars has been earmarked for its development and the demonstration of its prototype. By 2015, it is planned to procure 1,013 such vehicles, which will replace the current Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV). The new vehicle will have a crew of three. It can transport 17 marines in full combat gear at a speed of 25 knots (46 km/h) by sea and 70 km/h by land. Amphibious assault vehicles are launched from an amphibious assault craft at a distance of 40 to 45 km from the shore.

Therefore, landing air cushion craft will in the foreseeable future become a major component of amphibious assault forces. Furthermore, these craft will have higher survivability due to the use of radar evading stealth technology, significantly increasing the reliability of transporting amphibious assault forces to designated areas. It should be especially stressed that the use of landing air cushion craft in the course of amphibious landing operations makes it possible to land amphibious assault forces on sections of sea and oceanic coasts that were previously considered inaccessible. This suggests that the favorable geophysical conditions of the coast line will no longer be a main factor in making a decision to conduct amphibious landing operations.

Navies in a number of countries are also conducting research and development projects in the sphere of innovative information technology, the results of which can be used directly in the interests of naval infantry. In particular, one area of research is the possibility of creating "a mobile target detection network." Such a network could provide an amphibious assault operation commander more extensive information about the situation in a amphibious landing area, as well as about the adversary's amphibious landing denial activities.

One new trend in the operational employment of amphibious assault forces in the U.S. has been the creation and constant presence in strategically important part of the world oceans of amphibio patrol groups, designed to respond to emergency missions. Each such group as a general rule comprises one or two Tarawa or Wasp class amphibious assault ships, one Whidbey Island class dock landing ships, and several support and auxiliary vessels. They can transport a marine corps battalion or large unit with combat and special equipment. An important component of an alert ambitious patrol group are landing air cushion craft since, in the opinion of U.S. military experts, they can ensure the landing of amphibious assault forces on 50-70% of coastal areas throughout the world (15-20% without them). Landing air cushion craft, used in conjunctions with helicopters, enable such a group to operate not only on the beach line, but also on the entire coast. Furthermore, during the transfer of assault forces from amphibious transport ships to landing craft, the former can be located 40-45 km from the coast, not just 3-5 km, as in the case of conventional displacement landing craft.

The U.S. and allied navies should be expected to increase the number of such amphibious groups in various operationally important parts of the world oceans, since they have the capability, within three to four days of receiving an order, to start amphibious landing operations on the coast with the aim of securing control over it and ensuring subsequent unhindered augmentation of a grouping of forces in such an area, or to participate in other operations.

Analysis of the aforementioned trends in the development of amphibious assault and landing facilities leads to some conclusions about the impact on the character and content of amphibious landing operations.

* First, as the navy's combat amphibious assault and landing capability increases and the scope of missions assigned to it also expands, the views of the preparation and conduct of amphibious landing operations evolve and change. Analysis of these views suggests that the scale and scope of the employment of amphibious assault forces in wars and armed conflicts of the 21st century will continue to expand. Amphibious landing operations wilt be filled with a new content, and the character of their missions will also change.

* Second, the probability of achieving the element of surprise in amphibious landing operations has increased significantly in the recent period. During the years of World War II and the subsequent armed conflicts, fire support in amphibious landing operations was provided by, among others, aviation and warships with a relatively short effective engagement range. Therefore, they had to approach the coast, which to a very large extent weakened the element of surprise. The highly increased effective engagement range of modern sea and air based weapon systems makes it possible to suppress coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing targets from a considerable distance, outside the detection and effective engagement range of enemy fires. Furthermore, another contributing factor in achieving an element of surprise is the massed use of the aforementioned amphibious assault groups on alert in various parts of the world oceans.

* Third, the amphibious landing operation is becoming increasingly dynamic, which makes it possible to quickly augment an assault force. In amphibious landing operations during World War II and the War in Korea (1950-53), the high pace of landing on the shore was achieved mainly through the numerical superiority of an assault (landing) force. Thus, in invading Okinawa (1945), the Japanese garrison of 89,000 personnel was confronted with 452,000 U.S. troops with an overwhelming superiority in warships and aircraft. On Day 1 of the operation, 1,140 amphibious facilities ensured the landing of 50,000 assault troops. (2) In modern conditions, the high tempo of amphibious landing operations will be mainly achieved by using amphibious landing facilities.

* Fourth, the use of landing air cushion craft permits a broad employment of the "over the horizon" amphibious landing method. In this case, craft inner and outer anchorage and maneuvering areas will be located at a considerable distance from the shore (40-50 km). Therefore, during its movement from transport vessels to amphibious landing craft, naval infantry will be virtually impervious to the majority of coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing weapon systems.

* Fifth, the use of landing air cushion craft reduces the time that it takes amphibious assault forces to clear sectors within the effective range of enemy fire by three to five times or even more, as well as to substantially reduce and sometimes exclude the probability of amphibious assault troops hitting mines and explosive obstacles. This highlights the problem of achieving the effective engagement of enemy forces at the stage of repulsing an amphibious landing operation.

* Sixth, a modem amphibious landing operation is, rather, an air and naval operation, since the enemy has broader possibilities for employing air assault forces. For example, during World War II, large air assault forces were only dropped in the interest of amphibious landing operations in Sicily (1943), South Italy (1943), Normandy (1944) and South France (1944). Today, due to the significant development of aviation both on the quantitative and qualitative level, there is an opportunity to drop air assault forces not only by fixed wing aircraft, but also by helicopters, which was not possible before. Furthermore, up to 30 percent of a total amphibious assault force can be air dropped.

Due to the changes that have occurred in the character and content of amphibious assault operations, a number of new requirements for the modern coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing operation on the sea shore are becoming an objective necessity.

* First, the increase in the scale and scope of the employment of amphibious assault forces requires a commensurate buildup of army, navy and air force assets in sectors prone to amphibious landing attacks.

* Second, taking into account the fact that the probability of achieving an element of surprise in amphibious landing operations increases, it is necessary to ensure that activities involved in the direct preparation of coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing operations could be completed within shorter time frames. That can be accomplished by making thorough advance preparations to the maximum degree possible.

* Third, the process of landing amphibious assault forces is becoming more and more dynamic, which enables the adversary to promptly augment the force that has landed on the shore. Hence the need for a target specific improvement in the preparation of maritime sectors in the interest of ensuring the timely and unhindered movement forward of second echelons and reserves to counterattack amphibious assault forces and throw them back into the sea.

* Fourth, the use of the "over the horizon" method of landing amphibious assault forces enables the adversary to avoid heavy losses in the process of transferring an amphibious assault force from transport to landing air cushion craft. This necessitates effective reconnaissance at sea as part of the preparation of a credible coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing operation in the interest of providing weapon systems with essential data to ensure the effective engagement of enemy targets as a considerable distance from the landing (objective) area.

* Fifth, the use of landing air cushion craft in an amphibious landing operation seriously complicates the effective engagement of assault elements of naval infantry as they approach the shore. This requires a higher effectiveness in engaging an amphibious landing force by improving the weapon system in the water area abutting the shore, as well as of the system of minefields and explosive obstacles and other artificial obstacles both in the water and on land.

* Sixth, in so far as amphibious landing operations will involve air assault forces on a broad scale, there is a special need for achieving a high level of effectiveness in air defense, as well as the ability of troops to conduct perimeter defense in the process of countering an amphibious landing operation, since after dropping (landing), air assault forces will be delivering strikes against defending troops mainly from the rear.

As is known, the basic requirements made for any defense include aggressiveness and stability. With respect to a coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing operation, aggressiveness should evidently consist in delivering a series of powerful air and naval strikes against amphibious landing and support (auxiliary) forces, as well as on their weakest links and elements; subsequently also strikes against ground forces in repulsing an amphibious landing operation; a prompt and effective maneuver and redeployment of reserves and fires in sectors prone to amphibious landing.

Therefore, the aim of aggressive defense in a coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing operation is to impose one's will on the adversary, seize and maintain superiority at sea and in the air in the course of the entire operation. The imposition of one's will consists in forcing an adversary to alter the original plan of an amphibious landing operation and to land its assault force on those sectors of the shore where we expect it and which are fortified the most. Analysis of combat experience shows that this can be achieved mainly by misleading the enemy command as to the organization of coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing action, a well thought through maneuver, supported by troops, naval and air assets.

The aggressiveness of coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing action can also be enhanced via well organized activities to disrupt the enemy command and control, reconnaissance, EW and other systems of amphibious and air assault forces. Another line of ensuring aggressive coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing action could be an augmentation of assets and assets designed to effectively engage air assault forces, focusing their efforts on delivering strikes against helicopter carriers in transit and then against air assault forces as they are airlifted to be dropped to the objective area and when they perform their missions on the shore.

The stability of amphibious landing defense is characterized by an ability of groupings of ground, naval and air assets deployed in sectors prone to assault (landing) operations to successfully repulse strikes by enemy air and naval tasks forces in fighting for superiority in the air and at sea, in sectors of operation by amphibious landing (air assault) forces, disrupting landing (air assault) operations, and holding sectors and areas of the shore. Today, stability of coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing action is to be achieved primarily by ensuring the high survivability of naval forces and assets, an effective organization of defense, close interaction between large strategic formations, combined units and units of arms and branches of service that are involved in countering amphibious landing operations, as well as ensuring all round support for their actions. Stability of defense is key to accomplishing the objectives of a coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing operation.

Debate has been ongoing for quite a long time in the pages of military periodicals about the place and role of various types of combined formations in an amphibious landing operation. In its character, a coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing operation is defensive, but the air, ground and naval forces and assets participating in such an operation are expected to deliver strikes on enemy assault (landing) forces from a substantial distance, without waiting for their approach from the defense line, taking into account the actual capabilities for effective engagement. A number of experts regard the ability and readiness to effectively engage enemy assault (landing) forces at all stages of their action, not only in the course of repulsing an amphibious landing operation to be a crucial factor in repulsing aggression in oceanic and maritime sectors by operational-strategic, operational, and operational-tactical formations. In so doing, they operate on the assumption that if an operational-strategic formation is able to effectively engage enemy amphibious landing forces at the stage of their concentration and embarkation, as a general rule, a considerable distance away from a defended coastal area, it conducts a counter amphibious landing (air assault) operation. And if operational and operational-tactical formations are unable to make such an impact on the adversary, they conduct a counter amphibious landing operation on the coast. At first glance, such an approach to determining the role and place of formations in repulsing amphibious landing operations is well reasoned, but upon closer examination, it turns out to be untenable.

* First, there is a confusion of two different concepts--i.e., "the form of employing combat assets'" and "the type of military action." A counter amphibious landing operation is nothing but a variation of a defensive operation, whilst as an operation, it is a form of employing formations defending the coast. How is it possible to "conduct defense in the form of defense?"

* Second, it seems that the criterion that has been chosen--i.e., the effective range of combat assets available in a formation (and therefore, their ability to effectively engage enemy amphibious landing forces at all stages of action in an amphibious landing operation)--is rather moot. The fact is that it is unrelated to the specific military-political situation on the ground and does not take into account the physical-geographic or operational-strategic specifics of different regions. Supposing amphibious landing forces are concentrated at ports and embark on transport vessels before the outbreak of hostilities with a state on whose coast it is planned to land these forces (cf. the Nazi amphibious landing operation in Norway in 1940). Is it possible to use counter amphibious landing assets against them in that case? Furthermore, the sealift of enemy amphibious landing forces and operational cover (support) assets can, under certain circumstances, be accomplished even before the start of a war. In yet another situation, embarkation points are located at a considerable distance from the coast, and it is impossible to use counter assault assets against them (cf. the Falkland sea operation by the British Royal Navy in 1982). In such cases, effective engagement of enemy assault forces will only begin at the landing stage. Assuming the aforementioned criterion, a front or army (army corps) in such a situation will conduct not a counter amphibious landing operation but a coastal defense operation.

Here is yet another example showing that the proposed approach is inapplicable to defining the role and place of various formations in repulsing attacks from the sea. In defending the Far East coast, the forces and assets of an operational-strategic formation deployed in the Maritime Region cannot impact on enemy amphibious landing forces en route, for example, to the Sakhalin area due to their insufficient effective range. At the same time, an operational-tactical unit defending the island is well positioned to effectively engage enemy landing (assault) forces as they accomplish movement forward in the Laperouse Strait. Finally, in planning action to repulse an enemy amphibious landing (assault) operation, combined units plan the conduct of counterstrokes, which is an element of an operation.

Such examples can be easily multiplied. Therefore, in determining the place and role of operational-strategic formations in a coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing operation, it is essential to proceed from the this fundamental principle: operation is a form of the operational employment of a front, army or army corps. And as the aforementioned examples show, there are no sufficient grounds to believe that combat action by these formations in an amphibious landing operation assumes some other form, which would be distinct from an operation.

As for the requirement that strikes on amphibious landing forces be delivered at the maximum possible distance away from the shore, it is also moot. From our perspective, it is necessary to apply the following principle: As an amphibious landing force moves away from its coast, it becomes more exposed (in particular, it cannot be covered by coastal antiaircraft or fighter aviation assets). Furthermore, as it approaches the objective area, more assets can be employed against it. So, is it reasonable to attempt to effectively engage an amphibious landing force, for example, with air strikes at embarkation points, where it is reliably protected by coastal antiaircraft systems, at the risk of sustaining substantial losses? Here are just two historical examples.

In June 1942, the Japanese command prepared an amphibious landing operation to seize the Midway Island and take control of its airfields. It should be noted that there were no islands with Japanese fighter aviation in direct proximity to it. Presumably, that was a major factor in the decision by Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Naval Forces, to deliver the main strike on the amphibious landing force not in transit but in close proximity to the disembarkation zone, where Japanese base fighter aviation was out of range. Within just one day (June 4, 1942), U.S. aviation delivered several crippling strikes on the Japanese amphibious landing and operational support forces, as a result of which the Japanese navy lost four aircraft carriers, one heavy cruiser, 235 war-planes, and 3,500 personnel. The Japanese operation was thwarted with minimum losses on the part of the U.S. Navy (one aircraft carrier, one destroyer, 150 warplanes, and about 300 personnel). (3)

Presumably, the same considerations were applied by the Baltic Fleet Command in September 1944 when it planned the effective engagement of a Nazi amphibious landing force en route to seize control of the Gogland Island. Taking into account that the amphibious landing force had a weak air defense system while cover provided by fighter aviation was insufficiently effective because it was a considerable distance away from air fields, the Soviet command entrusted the principal role in effectively engaging the convoy to fleet aviation. On September 15, its fighters sealed off enemy air fields at Rakvere. Then ground assault aviation attacked the Nazi ships, after which the convoy began to retreat from Gogland. In all, [Soviet] aviation sank 10 transport and landing craft and two large warships, and downed or damaged 22 fighter aircraft. (4)

It is also necessary to note that some military analysts are convinced that actions by troops and forces in carrying out the objectives of a counter amphibious landing operation constitute its stages. This assertion is rather questionable. After all, stages come one after another in succession (first, then second, etc.) At the same time, such an objective as repulsing enemy air strikes will have to be achieved throughout the course of the entire operation, not just at its initial stage. In addition to this, it is quite evident that under certain circumstances some operational objectives need not be achieved. Thus, once an amphibious landing force has been effectively engaged at the concentration and embarkation stage or in transit, there is no need to deal with the subsequent stages.

Therefore, from our perspective, the operational objectives of a coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing operation cannot be equated with its stages. Furthermore, why is it that operational objectives in offensive and defensive operations are not considered as its stages, but in a counter amphibious landing operation they are?

On the whole, the present status of the theory and practice of amphibious landing defense requires the resolution of a number of problems involved in the preparation and conduct of coastal defense and anti-amphibious landing action. The main such problems are as follows: improving defense preparation and organization activities; employing expedient methods of conducting anti amphibious landing operations and forms of employing anti amphibious landing forces in different operational-strategic situations; searching for ways of ensuring concealment in the deployment of ground and naval forces in sectors prone to amphibious landing and enhancing their survivability in countering amphibious landing forces and providing effective operational cover; ensuring a prompt and effective buildup of forces and assets in sectors prone to amphibious landing (assault); achieving the necessary effectiveness in repulsing massed air and missile strikes; enhancing the level of effective engagement of enemy forces at the stage of repulsing amphibious landing or air assault operations; further organization and preparation of maritime areas, and some other matters.

NOTES:

(1). Chertanov, "Voenno-morskiye sily SShA--prognozy, proyekty, resheniya," Zambezhnoye voennoye obozreniye, No. 10, 2006.

(2). A Volny, Okinawa, 1945, OOO AST Publishers, Moscow, 2002, pp. 40, 70-75.

(3).B.L. Gart, Vtoraya mirovaya voyna, Voyenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1976, pp. 336-337.

(4). B. Vasilyev, "Razgrom nemetsko-fashistskogo morskogo desanta u ostrova Gogland v sentyabre 1944 goda," Voennaia mysl', No. 12, 1978.

Maj. Gen. L.V. BOYKOV

Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor