The author provides a comprehensive and forward looking overview of human development and human security in Eurasia, arguing that these two dimensions of government policy are inextricably related to peace. A key point in good governance is transparency. The author explains the situation of the

various countries in Eurasia which have had to find their way after the collapse of the Soviet regime and how successfully each is reorganizing. Finally, the author elaborates on how civil society debates in Russia have shaped Russian Foreign Policy in general, toward its neighbors, toward the US and Europe, toward the United Nations, and toward civil society. Could this approach become a model for other nations?

INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War world is evolving towards complex dependency and a multi-polar structure in international relations in both the economic and security spheres. This makes international security cooperation a challenging task for the twenty-first century.

The key elements of human security and human development approaches in Eurasia are based on the peacekeeping and peace enforcement by regional organizations, and civil/military co-operation in fighting against international terrorism. The post-Soviet transition in North and Central Asia, and other subregions of Eurasia shows the decisive role that human development plays in the conceptual framework for shaping political, economic and security environment in the region.

In recent decades regional security in Eurasia and the Asia Pacific was supported by bilateral defense alliances; collective security arrangements had been repeatedly rejected due to the bipolar confrontational structure of the international system. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and rapid acceleration of regional economic integration, multilateral security cooperation in the region gained momentum.

The notion of hierarchical collective security in the region is being replaced by a set of international security regimes based on a cooperative security concept. Within the framework of preventive diplomacy and reformation of the United Nations, transparency and confidence building measures, being implemented on sub-regional basis, are the centerpiece of these new multilateral security mechanisms.

Russia is a key player in Eurasia, due to its nuclear capability and UN status, as well as its indisputable potential. Russia should be actively engaged in the development of regional security regimes as a participant, mediator and/or guarantor, through maintaining nuclear non-proliferation, enhancing regional and sub-regional consultation and negotiation mechanisms, international peace support operations, regulating arms and technology transfer, and more.

New types of international NGOs, such as the Universal Peace Federation (UPF) and the Interreligious International Peace Council (IIPC), are bring humanization, morale and the spiritual vision to international relations. They emerge as prospective actors in world politics, able to promote the world a culture of peace, and to build a truer United Nations. The Inter-Religious and International Peace Council was inaugurated in October 2003 as a prototype of an intercultural UN. It is designed to enrich the far from perfect UN activities which are based on state power with spiritual and moral principles that seek opportunity and justice for everyone.

The proposal to establish an Interreligious Council at the United Nations fits with the mission of the United Nations and its Millennium Declaration Goals, which are to provide for international peace and security and human development. Assuming that humans are spiritual beings, the UPF maintains that any successful strategy for peace must take into account the substantial, spiritual dimension of our human identity, experience and interactions.

Globalization has complicated and added potency to internal conflict and terrorism. While creating wealth and better opportunities for many people, it has often negatively influenced the vulnerable members of society. The diffusion of information technology, the advancement in transportation and communication, and the free flow of financial capital, have all accelerated the movement of people. However, those who have been marginalized or deprived by poverty and inequity have up to now found it difficult to even voice their protest, except with extreme acts of terror like suicide bombings.

Where many ethnic and regional conflicts have a confessional component, inter-religious dialogue and the movement towards the global culture of peace becomes the most effective way to deal with the root causes of terrorism and violence. People-to-people dialogue and preventive diplomacy, practiced by the IIPC's "Ambassadors for Peace," and the IIPC's Middle East Peace Initiative and North East Asia Peace Initiative have proved to effective instruments for conflict resolution and peace building.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EURASIA

During the 1990s, the concept of "human development" has been accepted by an increasing number of researchers, policy advisors, politicians and social practitioners. The rediscovery of human development became most evident in the publication of the global Human Development Reports (HDR). The first global HDR published in 1990 defined human development as "the process of enlarging people's choices. The most critical of these wide-ranging choices are ability to live a long and healthy life, access to education, and access to resources needed for a decent standard of living." (1) The Human Development Index reflects the essential choices of people by combining life expectancy, school enrollment, adult literacy and average income.

This framework for human development was developed by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen who makes the distinction between people's activities--reflecting the various things a person may value doing or being--and people's capabilities. In other words, an activity reflects an actual achievement, while a capability is the ability to achieve. From a human development perspective, the quality of economic growth is just as important as its quantity. Indicators of quality include good governance, equality in health and education, environmental protection, in addition to general economic progress. (2)

Dramatic changes in the world's economic, political and social systems have brought unprecedented improvement in human living conditions in both developed and developing countries: profound technological breakthroughs in communications, transport, agriculture, medicine, genetic engineering, computerization, environmentally friendly energy systems, political structures, peace settlements, and more. But these changes also bring new uncertainties and challenges to both human development and security.

POST-SOVIET TRANSITION IN THE NORTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

The transformation from command to market-oriented economies and the emergence of democratic political regimes in the former Soviet Union, against the background of the global processes of change, created a unique and challenging situation in North and Central Asia (NCA). Since the early 1990s eight countries of the region (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have been suffering a difficult period of transition and socio-economic reforms. Slow economic recovery and social policy shortcomings create numerous challenges to democracy and good governance for these former pieces of the Soviet Empire.

The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in a dramatic slowdown of economic development and a total disruption of the existing social safety net. A sharp decrease of the standard of living, ethnic conflicts, and general social unrest provoked the large-scale migration and total frustration of millions of former soviet citizens of different nationalities. As the less developed in the USSR, the Republics of Caucasus and Central Asia suffered the heaviest losses in economic development and human potential.

While the industrial production index shows a steady decline in economic growth in the North and Central Asia over the 1990s, the NCA region, however, enjoyed a comparative advantage in terms of the development of human capabilities, such as health and education (areas of priority development of the Soviet system). This makes the North and Central Asian countries substantially different from the poor and developing countries in other regions.

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On the GDP-per-capita measure, 116 countries of the world do better than Armenia, for example. However, if social sector performance is also taken into account by using the Human Development Index (HDI) ranking, Armenia jumps 44 countries which are richer in income terms (including Morocco, Bolivia, South Africa, Turkey and Peru) to arrive at 72nd place. This comparative edge in social terms is more significant among the economically less developed countries of the region.

For two countries, however, the international standings fail to improve in ranking if switched from GDP to the HDI: Russia and Kazakhstan. One reason for this is that both countries have experienced large rises in adult male mortality during the post-Soviet transition, which reduces life expectancy, a key element of the HDI. (4)

This negative trend in life expectancy in Russia is worrisome. Life expectancy in Russia fell in 1999 by about one and a half years for men, to 59.9 years (just above the level of India), and by half a year for women. The crude death rate (total deaths per thousand) in 2000 rose for the second straight year, to 15.3, the highest rate since 1994. (5) If the steep decline in living standards of the country is to be reversed, policies must be improved to reduce poverty and inequity, features of the establishment of a "wild" market-oriented economic system.

Despite this negative trend, Russia retains a leading role among the former Soviet Republics. Even a decade after the Soviet collapse, Russia remains among the largest trading partners for all the CIS economies, especially those of Central Asia, and for many of them Russia is the largest source of foreign direct investment as well. Large Russian minorities remain in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russian culture and language remain a constant influence across the post-Soviet territory, and Russian foreign policy toward its neighbors plays a major role in defining these countries' geopolitical position.

The question still remains whether the economic recovery in Russia (and the rest of NCA) is sustainable. To the surprise of most observers, Russia reported a 20 percent cumulative GDP growth during 1999-2001, while the living standards for millions of Russians remained well below levels often years earlier. However, the Russian economy is finally beginning to look like a reasonably well-functioning market system. In contrast to the situation prior to the August 1998 financial crisis, Russia has been off of IMF life support for three years, and posted large budget surpluses during 2000-2001. Strong growth in spending by Russian households and businesses is now driving the economic recovery.

On the other hand, two key forces that have powered the economic recovery--the ruble's sharp depreciation after August 1998 and the high oil prices of 2000-2001--seem to be coming to an end. Prospects for continued strong GDP growth depend increasingly on the outlook for structural reforms, the implementation of which has proven exceedingly difficult in Russia and her post-Soviet neighbors. (6)

The series of the National Human Development Reports (NHDR) for the Russian Federation, published annually since 1995, show that the standards of living have deteriorated dramatically during the post-Soviet transition. The Reports concentrate on the economic trends in Russia during the transition and the substantial challenges faced by the government to address people's expectations and to alleviate social hardships, while ensuring the minimum necessary economic growth and equity.

The dimensions of poverty and income inequality are being explored, as well as their impact on the more vulnerable sectors of the population: the poor, pensioners, the unemployed, migrants and refugees. The corresponding impact on demographic indicators is also described, which includes a decline in population, a rise in mortality and suicide, a rise in divorce, and a rise in one parent families. These calculations show that Russia's Human Development Index has deteriorated considerably. In the mid 1990s the estimate of the HDI for the Russian Federation gave a value of 0.760. Because of the use of later data, the estimate gave a lower value than contained in the UNDP's global Human Development Report, which estimated a value of 0.804 for 1993, putting the country 57th out of 174 countries for which data were available. Use of the later data suggested that Russia has been moving from the last place among countries classified as "high human development" to one of those described as "medium human development."

NCA POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION: WAYS TO GO

Governance can no longer be considered a closed system. Its task is to find a balance between taking advantage of globalization and providing a secure and stable social and economic domestic environment.

"Governance has three legs: economic, political, and administrative. Economic governance includes decision-making processes that affect a country's economic activities and its relationships with other economies.... Political governance is the process of decision-making to formulate policy. Administrative governance is the system of policy implementation. Encompassing all three, good governance defines the processes and structures that guide political and socio-economic relationships." (7)

Governance encompasses the state, but it transcends the state by including the private sector and the civil society. The parameters of good governance in its three key domains (state, civil society, and the economic sector) ought to have such characteristics, as participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, and strategic vision. Being inter-related, these characteristics arc mutually reinforcing and cannot stand alone. They represent an ideal, and no society has them all.

The World Bank has developed a combination of indicators allowing the transitional economies (including those of the NCA) to be classified into four "ideal types" based on the extent of political contestability and a widely accepted annual ratings of political and civil liberties provided by the Freedom House. Political contestability has been defined as the extent to which key decisions of the political process--such as choosing political leaders, adopting laws, and making binding policy decisions--are subject to challenge by freely organized groups within and outside government. Political contestability can thus be determined by such dimensions as:

* Political rights and civil liberties

* Veto points

* Government turnover

* War and political violence. (8)

The four types of the political systems in transition so far include:

Competitive democracies -- none of the North and Central Asian countries fit the criteria. Only Central and East European transitional economies are in this group.

Concentrated political regimes (Russia and Kyrgyzstan) -- combine multiparty elections with limited political competition through constraints on civil liberties, which results in a concentration of political power in the executive branch.

Noncompetitive political regimes (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) -- constrain entry of potential opposition parties into the electoral process and restrict political participation, resulting in a few institutional limitations to check the executive.

War-torn political regimes (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan) -- external conflicts or extreme internal contestability rooted in ethnic or territorial divisions place severe strains on the capacity of the state, resulted in a prolonged loss of political order and control and serious weaknesses in the provision of basic public goods.

Armed conflicts have been an important variable in the political dynamics of the North and Central Asia, contributing to classifying the regional political systems in transition:

Armenia and Azerbaijan, 1998-1994. Clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops led to bloody war over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, a part of the Soviet Union when the unrest first became significant. About one million people were uprooted from their home.

Central Asia: The Ferghana Valley, 1989-91. Tensions escalated in 1989 in the Ferghana Valley, which straddles the borders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and a series of violent outbreaks resulted in hundreds of death and extensive damage to property. Continuing tensions have been seen as a risk there since the late 1990s.

Tajikistan, 1992-1993. A civil war beginning in 1992 left an estimated 50,000 dead and up to 700,000 people displaced. By the time of the peace agreement in 1997, preceded by the Russian peacekeeping operation in Tajikistan, most of the displaced had returned to their homes, many of which had been destroyed.

Russia: Northern Caucasus, 1992-2002. An intense outburst of violence between North Ossetia and Ingushetia occurred in October 1992. In 1994 federal troops entered Chechnya, which had declared independence. Following two major periods of fighting (the second started in 1999 following the attempt by Chechen guerrillas to invade Dagestan), there are now an estimated 160,000 internally displaced people in neighboring Ingushetia. Those remaining in Chechnya face harsh living conditions and continuing violence.

In the two NCA concentrated political regimes, Russia and Kyrgyzstan, the collapse of communism was more a result of the contest among competing elites (nomenklatura) than a broad social movement. Though comprehensive reforms were proposed in the early stags of transition, the regimes lacked the credibility to build and sustain broad popular support for these reforms. Partial liberalization and privatization, soft budgets, and remaining barriers to entry generated tremendous opportunities for rent-seeking and theft. In noncompetitive political systems economic reform was driven not by the winners or losers of the reform, but by Soviet era authoritarian political leaders trying to maintain political control and ensure economic stability. Limited economic reform went hand in hand with limited political reform, as incumbent leaders restricted political opposition.

During periods of peace and relative stability, war-torn political regimes have tried to adopt comprehensive reform programs, but they were inevitably undermined by credibility problems. Prolonged conflicts also sharply reduced output, living standards and the resources of the states: physical and human capital deteriorated, poverty increased.

So what were the World Bank prescriptions for the transitional political systems in the North and Central Asia? In general, for the concentrated political regimes they are to mobilize the electorate and potential reform winners; to ensure and to use a free media, and to allow political and economic competition reinforcing each other. For noncompetitive political systems, they are to take advantage of higher levels of state capacity to implement reforms. For war-torn regimes, they are to restore stability and reduce uncertainty to the extent possible. Direct assistance and participation by bilateral and multilateral donors and technical assistance agencies will be critical in this fundamental effort. (9)

Sustainable human development aims to eliminate poverty, promote human dignity and rights, and provide equitable opportunities for all people through good governance. The promotion of human rights is of particular relevance in the context of its potential for excluding and marginalizing weak members of the international community and people with limited resources. Human rights affords protection against such exclusion and marginalization. (10)

Fighting against corruption has been an essential element of the overall efforts to ensure good governance in North and Central Asia. For example, the government of Kazakhstan during the past years has been undertaking systematic anti-corruption efforts, including the establishment of the Civil Service Agency.

Attempts to toughen control over officials and introduce appropriate legislative amendments do not directly affect the causes of corruption and, consequently, have not achieved the desired results. The Civil Service Agency has therefore initiated a pioneering program featuring the introduction of a computerized human resources information system, recruitment and testing procedures with numeric codes, a telephone hot line for citizens and the media, and expanded international experience exchanges. (11)

'RESPONSIBLE GLOBALIZATION': TOWARDS PRO-POOR STRATEGIES?

All debates on growth and governance in Asia, North and Central Asia in particular, make no real sense unless written into the context of globalization. Globalization aggravated the post-Soviet transition but, at the same time, provided powerful tools and solutions to help the former Asian Soviet republics overcome the painful transition period.

Generally, globalization is a process of change. It is being defined as the process of an increasing number of interactions between people in different countries at an increasing intensity, made possible by the continuous decline in international transaction costs. (12) There are two powerful engines that drive globalization: rapid technological change and liberalization. Analysts and policy makers admit that "globalization has profound implications for governance the final impact of which we cannot yet determine." However, the most profound of these include:

* the increasing marginalization of certain population groups, as a result of the technological/information revolution;

* the erosion of state sovereignty as transnational bodies increasingly mediate national concerns and press for universal laws;

* the increased globalization of social and economic problems, such as crime, narcotics, infections diseases and the migration of labor;

* international capital and trade are decreasingly accountable to sovereign states. (13)

A positive feature of the present globalization is that the global community is determined to eradicate poverty worldwide. This is clearly reflected in the Millennium Declaration of the UN Summit in September 2001, as well as in strategies of numerous international development and technical assistance organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank.

President Putin notably mentioned the need for "Socially Responsible Globalization," admitting that the post-Soviet transition could not be successfully completed, if the benefits of the globalization are not being properly used to the advantage of Russia and other post-Soviet transitional economies.

Should economic reform strategies have a poverty focus? Experts argue that "in considering social welfare, most people in general and most democratically elected governments in particular, would give more weight to the well-being of the poor than of that of the rich.... A policy that increases the income of the poor by one rupee can be worthwhile at the margin even if it costs the rest of society more than a rupee." (14)

However, developing a strategy that deals comprehensively with macroeconomic policy, structural and sector reforms, governance issues, social inclusion, and the medium-term public expenditure program is complex. IMF and the World Bank analysts admit that much is still unknown about what policies work best for some key aspects of poverty reduction." (15) Poverty reduction is still a major challenge for all key players on the international donors' scene, not to say of the potential recipients in North and Central Asia and other regions of the globe, who act as both objects and subjects of the globalization processes.

All international and bilateral donors and technical assistance agencies continuously learn lessons of the past. Still being accused of wasting a lot of aid targeted for the economic recovery and building democracy in the post-Soviet space in the 1990s, they try to adjust their capabilities to the actual needs of supporting growth and good governance in the NCA and other regions. In one of the recent interviews USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios noted that, at present, only a small portion of the official development assistance (ODA) to poor countries goes directly to governments, and little ODA is wasted. One third of USAID money is spent through international, US-based NGOs, one-third through universities, associations and local NGOs, and one-third through the private sector. (16)

However, observers admit that the United States currently ranks dead last among industrial countries in the amount, relative to the size of the economy, which it allocates to foreign assistance, barely one-seventh of one percent of GDP and less than a penny of every dollar in the president's 2003 budget. (17) President Bush's budget proposal for 2003 increased "international assistance" programs by just under $750 million. This, however, included almost $500 million for foreign military financing and $52 million for the Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training. While these expenditures were no doubt useful to enhance security and to resist international terrorist attacks, one could only agree with the newspaper, which argued:

  "Our efforts should include supporting nascent institutions of civil
  society; promoting pluralism of information and opinions; promoting
  economic development to reduce the appeal of radical alternatives; and
  creating modern educational systems that give young people ... the
  tools they need to flourish in a world where global connections become
  ever more important." (18)

This is particularly true for the region of North and Central Asia, which contributes significantly to global security, stability and sustainable development.

HUMAN SECURITY, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Scholars and experts associated with the Human Security Commission, and involved in human development studies, have well developed the conceptual framework for human development, human security and human rights. In general, human security shares the "conceptual space" of human development, which is people-centered, multidimensional, and defined in the terms of human choices and freedoms. But human development is a broader, long term, holistic objective; the aim of human development is the flourishing or fulfillment of individuals in their homes and communities, and the expansion of valuable choices.

In contrast, human security has a strictly delimited scope. While both approaches address those who are already destitute, human security also has a systematic preventative aspect. While human development aims at "growth with equity," human security focuses on "downturn with security." The human security approach identifies and prepares for recessions, conflicts, emergencies, and the darker events of society. Finally, human security activities may at times have a much shorter time horizon, and include emergency relief work and peacekeeping as well as longer term human and institutional development. (19)

Summary of the Human Security Conceptual Framework (20)

Working Definition:

The objective of Human Security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, without impeding long-term human fulfillment.

Safeguard        Provide and Promote Human Security by:
                 Identification (of critical pervasive threats)
                 Prevention (so that the risks do not occur)
                 Mitigation (so that if risks occur the damage is
                 limited)
                 Response (so that victims or chronic poor survive with
                 dignity and maintain their livelihoods)
                 Respect Human Security by:
                 Identification, Prevention, and Mitigation of
                 predictable side-effects that threaten human security,
                 regardless of the primary objective
Vital core       A rudimentary but multidimensional set of human rights
                 and human freedoms based in practical reason Spans the
                 freedom from fear and the freedom from want To be
                 specified by appropriate procedures in context
All human lives  "People-centered"
                 --focused on individuals and their communities
                 Universal and non-discriminatory
Critical         Critical threats cut into core activities and functions
pervasive        Pervasive threats are large-scale, recurrent dangers
threats          Threats may be direct, such as genocide or a civil war
                 Threats may also be indirect, for example
                 underinvestment or financial collapse.
Long-term human  Human Security is not sufficient for human fulfillment.
fulfillment      Human security processes should be consistent with
                 ongoing human development by supporting participation,
                 freedom, institutional appropriateness, and diversity.

Human security and state security have a number of strong similarities. Both proactively identify and prioritize threats to the security of key populations, on the basis of empirical evidence and strategic analyses. At present, both recognize key threats to be conflict, AIDS and disease, economic and financial instability, and terrorism. Both also develop systematic, comprehensive, durable, and coordinated institutional responses to selected threats that involve multiple actors and range from research to field action. The preparedness and response mechanisms use legal, political, sectoral, and economic approaches, as well as authorized military instruments.

Two differences between state security and human security are also of note. First, State Security largely concerns territorial units and the persons who dwell within them. Second, state security is also significantly concerned with the relative distribution of power between states and with territorial integrity; this agenda is legitimate and complements, but is not part of, the human security agenda.

Human security and human rights are likewise deeply interconnected. Both are concerned to identify a rudimentary set of universal concerns that span poverty and violence. However, human security may not necessarily prioritize all human rights equally, and in practice different institutions that respect or promote human security will legitimately prioritize and address only certain rights and freedoms. Still, to the extent that human security concerns at least some rights, institutions are clearly obligated to provide it.

DEBATES ON HUMAN SECURITY IN ASIA: BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

The shocking terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 has completely changed both the global security environment and perceptions of the international security community. As terrorists primarily target civilian populations, not only nation-states, the notion of human security becomes the top priority. National governments and the globe have to learn how to provide security for human beings--individuals and peoples--as we begin an age of anti-terrorist wars.

The issues of human security have been primarily developed with regard to Western civilization and the Euro-Atlantic collective security system. Richard Cohen states that human security stands at the center of any real international security system built around liberal democratic ideals. The furtherance and protection of the basic freedoms of the individual is the nucleus from which all other forms of security must radiate. (21)

In turn, Michael Mihalka implies that consensual decision practices often aid the multilateral security approach to establish a common identity, and the felt need for cooperative security--despite civilization and/or regional specifics. He calls ASEAN "a limited cooperative security without democracy," adding: "ASEAN countries share only two common factors: a geographical propinquity and a belief in a common future, but it has succeeded as a cooperative security unit." (22)

Issues of human security have been on the agenda of Asian thinkers and policy makers throughout the last decade. In the mid-1990s Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan noted: "The term Human Security is new to Asia, but this should not mean that the idea of comprehensive security and well-being of people is often not considered and pursued within the framework of security: they are more often attended to as development issues." (23) He added, in this connection, that national security does not necessarily mean just state security, that is, the security of the territory and sovereignty of the state against external threats and the security of the existing governing order or regime against domestic threats. National security is often perceived to include the security and welfare of the state and the people.

Cultural and civilization patterns played a critical role in the debates on human security and human rights in Asia. Sisela Bok made an interesting observation while recalling the debates on the draft Declaration on Human Rights at the UN World Conference in June 1993. A coalition of Asian governments headed by China, Indonesia and Malaysia argued for a trade-off between economic well-being and political rights, defining the latter as "Western notions." Poor people, they claimed, do not care about voting rights so long as they are hungry and ill-housed. Others argued that access even to food and shelter can depend on being able to exercise political rights.

In this connection, Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate and the author of the human development concept, noted that famines occur precisely in societies where individual rights and a free press are prohibited, and where information needed to force government response to the crisis is therefore not being disseminated. (24) Lincoln C. Chen, a prominent expert in the field (and now a Member of the Human Security Commission), at that time reasonably concluded: "The trade-offs in priorities between diverse definitions of security ... may be deeply rooted in different cultural, historical, and social contexts, but ... there do exist some basic universal attributes.... In practical policy formulation, it would be important to identify synergy, rather than conflict, between these diverse aspects of security." (25)

The emerging threat of international terrorism has completely changed the nature of the debate on human security in Asia. Even skeptics and critics of "Western notions" now agree that concerted action is needed to protect the basic rights of people, whether it is liberal democratic, Confucian or some other form. Maj. Gen. F. E. van Kappen (NL), former Military Advisor to the UN Secretary General, emphasized the importance of comprehending the nature of the terrorist, still evolving, threat as follows:

* Strategic -- it exists and continues to develop worldwide, including in nations, that have not yet experienced terrorism.

* Asymmetric -- in sharp contrast to conventional warfare with traditionally arrayed forces, rules of engagement and acceptance of international law, all of which are intentionally disregarded by terrorists to gain advantage and achieve unexpected impacts. The very fabric of civilized society is the primary target.

* Apocalyptic -- seeking specifically to inflict suffering, death and damage on a grand scale with no regard for short or long term impacts on innocent civilians, including children, and when necessary, on their own members. The same is true for impacts on infrastructure (often targets) or the environment.

* No rules, no negotiation, no restrictions -- driven by a deeply rooted belief in the total inferiority of Western societal and governmental basic principles, values and norms. An analogy from a western cultural perspective might be that of the Christian concept of the "Devil."

* Not always Islamic -- terrorist causes are sometimes embraced, either through sympathy with motivation or by indoctrination/training by non-Islamic individuals, groups or, conceivably, nations.

* One-sided understanding -- terrorists, as a whole, have invested long-term effort and study to understanding us in sharp contrast to our very limited understanding of them. They have lived with and participated in the features of Western society, often for years prior to being called upon to execute an attack. They begin the process of education and training with children and continue the process indefinitely. In terms of understanding the adversary, they have been proactive; we have been mainly reactive. (26)

In view of the threat perception as mentioned above, the Human Security concept should become more applicable and instrumental. To this extent, it could be summarized as follows: (27)

Instrumental Security                     Security objective
(means)                                   (ends)

Military, Economic,       HUMAN SECURITY  Survival, Well-being
Political, Environmental                  Freedom

A clear link between human security and human development (well developed due to a special effort by Japanese scholars and the government of Japan) appears to become an "Asian response" to the emerging terrorist threat. In November 2001, ASEAN adopted a Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, calling "to pursue effective policies and strategies aimed at enhancing the well-being of our people, which will be our national contribution in the fight against terrorism." (28)

The recent Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Cooperation in Asia (CICA) held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in May 2002, also concluded: "We regard the building-up of efforts to end poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, extremism, intolerance, ingrained hatred and all the forms of discrimination as one of the paramount tasks of the world community. We consider it necessary to ensure the sustainable development of all regions of the world and pay more attention to the socioeconomic aspects of globalization." (29)

FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

In a broad sense, the three P, Protection, Promotion, and Prevention, are the pillars of the Human Security approach. Underlying the approach is its ethical and value base, for these actions depend upon the commitment, leadership, and motivation of the public and their governments. (30)

The recent experience of international crisis management and response proves the increased role of Human Security approaches. During the Cold War, UN peace keeping consisted mainly of stationing troops in an area of conflict in order to "freeze" that conflict while attempts to find a political solution were being pursued. Today, it is believed possible for the UN to deal with the root causes of conflicts: poverty, social injustice, etc. (31)

Both national-level and international human security responses also require an enhanced degree of cooperation and coordination. Practitioners in the field noted that "In view of the overall change in post-Cold-War UN peace-keeping operations, in which the actors have multiplied and become more diverse, we need to consider the meaning of the term 'cooperation.' Traditional peacekeeping has relied heavily on terms such as 'coordination' and 'unity of command' because the relevant organization has consisted mainly of one or two major parts."

The UN peacekeeping experts further concluded: "With the present focus on the relation between the military and the civilian components of a UN peacekeeping operation, we define 'coordination' as organizational matters within any of the components, while 'cooperation' is the relation between the different and independent components." (32) This distinction between cooperation and coordination is also relevant to the complex anti-terrorist responses in the field of crisis management.

Crisis management experts warn that, despite its growing ability to respond to crises, the U.S. still faces many challenges in the area of crisis management. In 1996, the U.S. passed legislation allowing local governments to prepare for terrorism in cooperation with the military, but the two sides are still working out the clashes between their cultures." (33)

Civil-military cooperation and coordination could be of critical importance for the complex human security responses to the possible weapons of mass destruction attacks by terrorists. Russia's Minister of Defense, Sergei Ivanov, noted that a rather high probability of WMD terrorist attacks could be justified by the following possibilities and trends:

* Broad dissemination in the world and easy access to information on the issues of nuclear physics and technologies, poisonous agents;

* Growth in production and use of fissile materials in many countries that increases the danger of their seizure by terrorists with the purpose of fabricating nuclear explosive devices or which we think to be more realistic so far using radioactive materials with terrorist aims; specialists call it a dirty weapon;

* Possibilities of stealing, purchasing or seizing various nuclear and other WMD systems elements by terrorists. (34)

Richard A. Falkenrath and Robyn Pangi note that, in many discussions of the WMD terrorism threat, the basic distinction between national security and personal safety is often forgotten.

  If an individual were to rank the likely causes at death in terms of
  probability, it is quite unlikely that death from an act of nuclear,
  biological or chemical terrorism would make the top ten. She should
  quite rightly be more concerned with cancer and automobile accidents,
  even murder and natural disasters.
    However, if national leaders were to rank the single, purposeful
  events that could kill thousands or tens of thousands of its citizens,
  a terrorist WMD attack should be in the top three. Given the severity
  of the potential consequences, future acts of WMD terrorism should be
  regarded as likely enough to place this threat among the most serious
  national security challenges faced by modern liberal democracies. (35)

The experts point out that the budget of the U.S. federal WMD preparedness program grew from effectively zero in 1995 to approximately $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2000, which made the U.S. domestic preparedness program one of the fastest growing programs of the late 1990s. This program "is motivated by the ambitious goal of broadly reducing the vulnerability of American society to large, destructive acts of terrorism by improving a wide range of operational response capabilities across the country, at all levels of government ... Because no other nation has embarked on a comparable terrorism preparedness program, the American experience is unique (to date) and instructive."

However, the U.S. existing capabilities relevant to CBW response are distributed widely and unevenly throughout an extraordinary complex latticework of functionally organized agencies; levels of government; and public, private and non-governmental actors. These organizations have distinct interests, budgetary constraints and legal authority. They are, for the most part, not hierarchically organized and have overlapping (or even competing) areas of responsibility. In many cases, these agencies have no history of routine interaction and sometimes have powerful institutional interests motivating against cooperation with one another or with a new priority imposed by the national security wing of the federal government. (36)

Joint actions by the global community against international terrorism will also need a new level of cooperation and coordination. President George W. Bush stated in his Address to a joint session of the Congress on September 20, 2001: "We will direct every resource at our command--every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war--to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network." (37)

This political will is being shared by other state leaders, who joined the USA in an anti-terrorist coalition. As the Russian Minister of Defense noted at a NATO/Russia conference on fighting against international terrorism, "We have to ensure joint actions by law enforcement establishments, secret, customs and financial services, coordination of information policies. To achieve this objective, a totally new level of coordination between our countries is required ... I am confident that the military should make the main contribution to the fight against terror, specifically it concerns the destruction of logistics and infrastructure of international terrorist activities." (38)

At the Summit in Rome in May 2002, NATO Member States and Russia agreed to strengthen their cooperation in the struggle against terrorism through a multi-faceted approach, including joint assessments of the terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, focused on specific threats, for example, to Russian and NATO forces, to civilian aircraft, or to critical infrastructure. (39)

As a Member of the Russia/NATO Council (NRC), Russia could link Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific regional security systems. In June 2002, the presidents of the six member nations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), including Russia, signed in St. Petersburg an agreement on setting up a permanent regional anti-terrorism agency and strengthening cooperation among the member countries in the field of security. The SCO members said in the agreement that they are convinced that concerted actions must be taken, including heightened collaboration to crack down upon terrorism, separatism and extremism, so as to guarantee territorial integrity, security and stability.

The main challenge for the emerging trans-regional security mechanisms will be to combine decisive action with addressing root causes of terrorism. As Michael Green puts it, "U.S. officials are less sympathetic to the root causes of terrorism (economic or social injustice) and less encumbered by international law. Japan is more methodical, less willing to create alarm by preparing for crises, more sympathetic to the root causes of terrorism, and less willing to respond to terrorism as a global problem."

Thus the solution could be to "separate roles and missions with regard to terrorism, so that each side operates within a context that is legally and politically comfortable." (40) If not only the USA and Japan, but all the rest powers willing to fight against international terrorist threat, were able to do the same, the common "conceptual space" of Human Security, Human Development and Human Rights could become an actual common security space for peoples in Eurasia.

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: NEW INSTRUMENTS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Within the Human Development and Human Security conceptual framework, international security regimes emerge as effective and innovative tools of Global Governance and regional security management in Eurasia.

The concept of international regimes could be interpreted within the context of Neo-realism and Neo-Liberalism, as two basic schools of thought in Political Science related to International Relations. While Neo-realism primarily deals with the classic notion of the balance of power, according to which International Law and international institutions are being viewed as supplements of state-to-state interactions on the international arena, Neo-liberalism is more optimistic about the future World Order, which, it believes, should be based on balance of interests rather than balance of power.

By assuming that international stability could be secured by asymmetric distribution of complex national power, one should admit that international regimes are to be conceptualized on a basis of interpretation of interaction of respective national interests, in view of a key role played by International Law and international institutions, and with regards to specific regions of the globe and specific areas of international relations.

John Ruggie introduced the concept of international regimes to Political Science in 1975 as a set of mutual expectations, rules, plans, organizational and financial arrangements, adopted by a group of states. At a special academic conference, international regimes were defined as a set of defined or presumed principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, which reflect the position of actor states concerning a particular sphere of international relations. Principles reflect understanding of origins, facts and integrity (honesty) of the behavior. Norms are standards of behavior reflected in rights and responsibilities. Rules are specific guidelines for behavior. Decision-making procedures reflect established practice of making and executing a collective choice. (41)

Some scholars think that international regimes include all kinds of interactions within the international system. Such a broad interpretation could be argued by the fact that the system of international relations by definition (42) consists of independent sovereign states which, simply put together, cannot be viewed as a regime. On the other hand, regimes could not be reduced to international institutions with formal rules and structure. More reasonably, international regime does exist if relations of actor states are regulated in a certain way and/or not based on independent decision-making.

International regimes could also be defined as decentralized institutions, which means not an absence of sanctions for violating norms and rules of a regime, but a necessity of consensus on sanctions implementation, which could be less strict, comparing to a collective security system. Regimes are necessary not for centralized implementation of agreed decisions, but rather for an atmosphere of confidence and predictability in international relations, conducive to international cooperation and coordination of national interests. International regimes set up standards of behavior, which could help to estimate intentions and reputation of a partner and to exchange information, thus increasing mutual predictability of behavior on an international arena.

Principles of a regime provide for a broad definition of common goals (e.g.: WMD proliferation is a threat to global peace and survival, which is a fundamental principle of the non-proliferation regime). Norms more strictly define legitimacy of international behavior, but still regulate rights and responsibilities of the participants in a general way (for the non-proliferation regime it is a pledge to avoid actions which could facilitate the WMD proliferation). Rules, though often mean the same as norms, more specifically regulate rights and responsibilities of the participants and could be more easily corrected in case of necessity. Decision-making procedures have the same level of instrumentality as rules, and define ways and means to enforce principles and correct rules of a regime, if necessary.

Principles, norms and rules of an international regime are closely interlinked, which is a basic criterion for its legitimacy and viability. It helps to distinguish between a correction of rules within the regime and a change of the regime per se. In common, principles, norms, rules and procedures regulate behavior of the participants of a regime, though it is not being automatically enforced with the help of hierarchical law.

International security regimes, compared to international economic regimes, are less developed because of the Security Dilemma, which makes an actor state always perceive a neighbor as a potential threat and thus causes inevitable chain reaction of military potential upgrade. Actor states are specifically concerned not with an absence of agreed rules in international security sphere, but with a risk that one of the players could drop the ball and get a comparative advantage. A "price of betrayal" is much higher in international security than in economics, which makes security regimes less sustainable compared to economic ones. Two basic types of international regimes differ in "price of betrayal," complexity of control over rules implementation and a trend towards gaining a comparative advantage. (43)

Mutual predictability, confidence and information exchange are of paramount importance for international security regimes, which do not stand for total reciprocity but rather strengthen and institutionalize it. Norms and rules of a regime secure agreed understanding of reciprocity in a particular sphere of international relations, thus making violation non-legitimate.

Balance of power and balance of interests are the core of international security regimes. National security interest is an ultimate priority for each actor state in an international arena. National security is being defined here as a state of protection of vital interests of an individual, society and a state from internal and external threats, and as a state of a country with no threats of war or any other attempts to challenge its sovereignty, independent development, territorial integrity, and ability to act as a subject of international relations.

National security interests define the attitude of states to international law and international regimes, which could vary from total isolationism to constructive engagement. In turn, balance of power could be interpreted as:

* A policy aimed at maintaining of a certain level of power;

* Actual state of balance of power between actor states;

* More or less equal balance of power;

* Any other balance of power.

Balance of power system has a built-in contradictory function, for it provides for stability of power relations between actor states, and at the same time aims at prevention of power domination (which presumes possible shift of the power balance). (44) Within a balance of power system, actor states are supposed to equalize power ambitions of each other and thus decrease the level of violence within the system. They would try to upgrade their positions primarily through negotiations but, in the end, would be ready for confrontation to achieve this goal.

Within the balance of power system, an actor state would stop the confrontation to prevent elimination of an essential element of the balance, and would counter any attempts of domination by other members of the system. It would help to restore and/or acquaint a partner status for those members who lost or did not achieve it yet. In fact, balance of power system is a non-stable equilibrium with no return to previous position if the balance is disrupted. Balance of power could change depending on a concrete situation of regional and/or sub-regional security and a degree of involvement of states in international security arrangements.

Provision of national security, protection and promotion of national security interests in the international arena is the state's exclusive prerogative. As Hans Morgenthau, in his political science classic, used to point out, state interests defined as a state power are a key to understanding the essence of international politics and explaining the nature of policies pursued by states. (45) National security interests thus act as predominantly state interests. In this case, the state is an autonomous agent tackling a task impossible to reduce to a sum of individual interests and aspirations. (46)

As for the subject of security per se, four basic approaches could be identified. The first implies protection of an individual state's basic interests (national security). The second, international security, focuses rather on interconnection between one state's security and that of others (collective use of armed forces, international institutions and regimes). The third approach (regional security) is the same as the second, but it presupposes the most efficient security systems on a regional level. The fourth trend, global security, includes, on top of military security, protection of human rights, environment, economic development, etc.

However, admitting that all four approaches exist, one should not oppose them to one another as security in the present-day world is indivisible. No country anywhere can afford to protect its national security interests falling back on nothing more than its own resources. Ensurance of Russian national security could not be separated from Russia's constructive engagement in strengthening international and global security membership in Asia Pacific security regimes.

One can hardly dispute the idea that international security regimes can never rely exclusively on balance of power and strong-arm relationships. Rather they will constitute a complement to the strong-arm relations that are there anyway. It follows from this that complex power unequally distributed between states would make sure that multilateral security mechanisms stay asymmetric, particularly on regional level, and also lend a quality of hierarchy to modern international relations per se.

Within the framework of similar regimes some participants achieve security, others achieve autonomy. A more powerful state would provide security for its weaker counterparts, thus enhancing the autonomy of decisions taken; a weaker regional power would receive security guarantees in return for promises to follow the stronger state's politics, putting its military bases at the latter's disposal.

Applied to the Asia Pacific conditions, this means that the nucleus of a regional alliance there, according to Yasuhiro Nakasone, may be one of the bigger military powers in possession of nuclear arms. Regional alliances that have no influential member states may be a plausible proposition, but they would be unable to ensure regional security with anything like proper efficiency. (47)

Conceptualization of international regimes based on the dialectics of the balance of power and the balance of interests implies that the states, on the strength of certain perception of national security interests, may, under some circumstances, prefer to take security decisions together, if they think they stand to gain from this.

Abiding by the jointly agreed "rules of the game" docs not mean that states pursue the same goals and ideals in their politics or reject the principles of national sovereignty. Their chief driving motive there is an urge to look after their long-term interests and ensure that their partners' behavior in the international arena is predictable.

The functional dynamics of international regimes rest on the notion of cooperation, which is not at all synonymous with harmony or affinity between national security interests. Cooperation within an international regime is a response to conflicts, real or hypothetical, rather than the absence of conflict. (48)

The road to cooperation within an international regime is through negotiations during which the parties may achieve position convergence or policy coordination with the result that the likely negative impact of certain things they decide on other decisions is fully or partially removed. As Robert Keohane argues, interstate cooperation occurs when the policy of one state is seen by its partners as conducive to their own policies through coordination.

Cooperation and policy coordination within the international regime framework are not the same. The former underlies the regimes intended for achieving a certain positive result; the latter is the basis of regimes created not to follow any particular course, but to avoid certain consequences (a negative result). For the second type of regime to function it is enough to work out mutually acceptable conventions (formal or informal). The first type regimes also require, on top of that, a degree of institutional legalization.

Moreover, the balance of interest's dialectics implies that collaboration within the international regime framework is not merely a function of security interests. In itself, the existence of common or similar interests is not enough to ensure the functioning of such regimes. There have to be suitable institutions, besides, to make sure that the partners behave in a predictable way, and to reduce imbalance in information exchange.

Conceptualization of international security regime presupposes a more detailed functional division between international regimes and international institutions, which has been a subject of theoretical debate. Even those scholars who deny that international regimes need to be institutionalized recognize this as a major parameter of the regime functioning.

While some analysts view the un-institutionalized regimes as "quasi-regimes," others argue that international regimes and international institutions are independent and perfectly capable of "going it alone." The regimes may or may not be institutionalized, whereas international organizations can (although not necessarily) function as regimes. (49)

The United Nations is a specimen of international organizations that are not regimes since membership in them does not prevent states from taking political decisions but merely enables them to discuss matters and interact with one another on both a formal and informal basis.

At the same time, the United Nations, and especially some of its specialized agencies or statutes, such as IAEA or the Register of Conventional Arms, are so important to regional security regimes to function that this positively universal international organization frequently proves to be the only focus of national security interest coordination.

REGIONAL SECURITY REGIMES IN EURASIA AND THE ASIA PACIFIC

Eurasia is witnessing the emergence of two types of multilateral security regimes:

* Regimes of transparency and confidence-building involving primarily information and communication exchange and ensuring the openness and predictability of Asia Pacific countries' military activities;

* Restrictive regimes (regimes of non-proliferation and export control) that provide for banning or limiting certain types of military activities, production or use of some kinds of weapons and equipment.

The fundamental distinction and sine qua non of regional security regimes functioning is their interconnection and mutual complimentarity. Neither bilateral security relations non multilateral arrangements at the sub-regional or regional levels, nor yet relevant efforts taken by the United Nations should run counter to each other or serve as an alternative means of security consolidation. Only together can they make sure that the environment is conducive to cooperative security in Asia Pacific.

The primary substantive aspect in the functioning of the Eurasian multilateral security mechanisms is the implementation of a complex set of measures for guaranteeing openness in different nations' diplomatic and security dealings (transparency) and the verification of their military capabilities. Among confidence-building measures in the broadest sense we may list any efforts directed towards the reduction of uncertainty which provokes tension and increases the probability of military conflict. Technological progress allows one to express in tangible form the political aspirations of the parties involved and makes easy the development of any number of confidence-building and security measures.

Inasmuch as the main goal of cooperation in the area of security is the averting of armed conflict, the primary goal of transparency measures is the minimization of security dilemmas by means of providing open channels of information and communications along the entire spectrum of security problems, from the exchange of data on military budgets to the prior warning of military exercises.

The usefulness of transparency measures may be determined not so much by the degree of trust between the parties involved, but by the amount of concrete, verifiable information regarding security exchanged (this is a necessary, but inadequate condition). In the absence of reliable information on the actions of a potential adversary, the other side will be inclined to exaggerate his intentions in the areas of defense and security, and prepare for the "worst case" scenario. Transparency measures strengthen mutual trust and perform an "early warning" function against aggression and the possibility of armed conflict.

Transparency measures may include the publication of documents regarding national military strategy and doctrine, white papers on defense, and also data on military budgets and arms procurement plans. Among the most important transparency measures one may also list The UN Register of Conventional Arms, compliance with international arms verification and control regimes.

Transparency measures may be implemented on a stage-by-stage basis, with a gradual moving up from simple to more complex forms; also, by widening the measures to include security issues other than military: economic, environmental, refugee problems, the battle against illicit drug trade, smuggling, piracy, etc.

The creation of a multilateral negotiating and consultative mechanism may be viewed as both the end and the means for establishing a regime of transparency and confidence-building measures. A multilateral dialogue on the problems of regional security could be the primary means for an equivalent exchange of information in the spheres of defense and security. This might help to correct mutual threat perceptions, and also develop alternative proposals in the areas of transparency and military verification measures.

The experience of recent years has shown that non-governmental channels of dialogue ("track-two diplomacy")--above all, exchanges by scholars and experts regarding security issues--can play a vital role in the development of structures for a mechanism of regional negotiation and consultation. Historically, these have been the forerunners of formal structures for such multilateral confidence-building mechanisms, creating beforehand an informational and political environment favorable to their establishment.

The outlook for strengthening the formal negotiating and consulting mechanism, the transparency regime, and the means of building trust in the APR has been linked primarily with the work of ASEAN and its Asian Regional Forum convened periodically under its auspices.

Over the past few decades, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has had a decisive influence on the character of security arrangements in the region. The unregulated nature of relations between the two Koreas and the extraordinarily high concentration of troops and weapons on such a small piece of territory result in a high potential for regional and sub-regional tension. Here, transparency arrangements and military and political verification measures assume a special urgency.

Transparency and verification measures in the naval arena occupy a special place in the security structures for the Asia Pacific. The waters of the Pacific Ocean are a theatre for the intersection of the vital security interests of the major Asia Pacific powers. Transparency and verification measures in the naval arena are becoming especially important: in recent years, there has been a noticeable increase in the naval capabilities in the Asia Pacific.

Transparency in military spending would be a substantial and much-needed step forward, inasmuch as the region has firmly occupied a leading position in global military spending in recent years.

The next step in establishing a regional transparency regime would be an exchange of information on the state of the armed forces in the region. This would allow the calculation of a relatively accurate estimate of comparative military capabilities and, correspondingly, an evaluation of potential threats.

The UN Register of Conventional Arms is the largest and, at present, the most effective transparency measure for armaments yet.

The transparency regime for military expenditures, armed forces and weaponry appears to be well-developed and institutionalized. It is combined with measures to regulate and restructure armed forces and weapons, and is capable in the long run of acquiring all the features of a restrictive international regime.

Development of the non-proliferation regimes in Asia Pacific will be connected with suggestions by interested regional powers for improving and strengthening the existing regime elements, which includes NPT operation, the IAEA multilateral inspection mechanism, conclusion of the CTBT and other nuclear disarmament agreements, as well as setting up sub-regional and regional zones free from nuclear arms and other types of WMD.

The issue of strengthening non-proliferation regimes involves not only nuclear arms, but also chemical and biological weapons and the means to deliver them over long distances.

The NPT and related agreements and arrangements; ban on chemical weapons; ban on biological and toxic weapons; restrictions on their delivery means, and also monitoring of conventional arms, modern military technologies and dual-purpose technologies--all these components of non-proliferation and export control in Asia Pacific are interconnected, interdependent and should act as a single system of restricting security regimes.

One of the Asia Pacific non-proliferation regime constituents is the regime of control over military and dual-purpose technology proliferation. In consequence of the general economic growth in Asia Pacific countries, the scale of military and dual-purpose technology transfer in the region is expanding inexorably, which encourages the arms race and defense industry development, particularly in such countries as China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan.

Russia's status of a leading nuclear power and UN Security Council permanent member, as well as securing and promoting of Russian national interests in Asia Pacific, necessitate its participation in regional security regimes, both in the form of immediate presence and as a balancer, arbiter and mediator.

Among the most promising methods of Russian involvement are participation in strengthening the regional nonproliferation regime and multilateral negotiation-consultation mechanisms; maintaining adequate levels of Russian military, above all naval, regional presence; development of bilateral security relations with Asia Pacific countries; continued participation in settling the Korean issue; and promotion of mutually beneficial military technical cooperation with regional countries.

The strategic priorities of Russia's policy in the Asia Pacific came down to the task of ensuring stability and security on Russia's eastern border, providing favorable external conditions for Russian reform, and also creating prerequisites for Russia's active involvement in regional integration processes.

While moving towards these priority goals, one should take into account the lessons of both the Soviet Union's over-ideologized and costly Asian policy and the "new thinking" policy whose architects often took the balance of interests to be a positive sum game, in the mistaken belief that bilateral relations with Asia Pacific countries were improved at no cost to third-country interests. The hostility with China had resulted in huge military costs; relations with Japan had remained deadlocked, making impossible any security arrangements in Northeast Asia or Soviet economic cooperation with Asia's most prosperous nation.

More pragmatic and narrow focused sets of measures in preference to all-embracing but practically unrealizable initiatives is a welcome trend in the work of Russia's Foreign Ministry, that is yet to master the art of "fine-tuning" while elaborating regional security arrangements. Loose and uncombined consultative mechanism, gradually developing into a system of transparency and non-proliferation security regimes, is much more probable in Eurasia and the Asia Pacific, in comparison with the European type of strict and formalized collective security system.

The Eurasian policy of Russia has become more dynamic and balanced, geared to promote national interests in a more effective way, with emphasis on multilateral security cooperation. This could make Russia a more active participant, balancer and/or mediator in the emerging Asia Pacific cooperative security system and regional security regimes.

RUSSIA AND TRANS-REGIONAL SECURITY REGIMES IN THE NORTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

Problems of security in the Eurasian geopolitical space necessitate a normative and descriptive approach in interpreting the very notion of Eurasian community, whereby analysis of the Eurasian traditional consciousness is to go hand in hand with theoretical comprehension of a new reality that takes in the sphere of international security as well. Therefore it seems appropriate to assign a broader meaning to what is understood by the Eurasian geopolitical space, as it in fact extends over the whole Eurasian continent, separate regions and subregions which are an area of Russia's security interests.

In the post-Cold War period Eurasia represents a giant testing ground as it were, where almost all regional security regimes known to date coexist and interact. In Eurasia all major models of regional security regimes are represented: the Common Security regime, Collective Security regime and Cooperative Security regime. Although all of them share a number of common features, each is distinguished by clear specifics of its own.

Regional security is being defined here as a specific geographic element of the global security, and as a state of relations between countries in which they do not feel mutual threat of war or any other threat to their respective sovereignty and independent development. Regional security is a system with both "vertical" links between national, regional, international, etc. security, and "horizontal" links (military, political, economical, environmental, humanitarian, etc. security).

In a classical concept of security communities by Karl Deutsch, amalgamated (integrated) security communities with a high degree of centralization and common decision-making mechanism (NATO, Warsaw Pact) were opposed to pluralistic ones, in which formal integration is being replaced with multilateral consultation mechanism. The former had been well developed during the Cold War, while the latter still emerge on regional and sub-regional level and thus need further conceptualization.

Collective security concept is the most developed in theoretical and practical terms, and is being primarily viewed as an American idea and/or the USA foreign policy tool. The "Wilsonian" nature of the collective security concept is obvious. It is being defined as a system of inter-state cooperation, within which an act of aggression against one of the participants means aggression against the whole system. While unions or alliances are created as a mean of protection from potential threat, collective security system could be inward-oriented and punish members of the system who would commit an aggression.

As Hans Morgenthau puts it, collective security is an ideal solution of the law enforcement problem in a community of independent nations (50) and should be effective only if applied to any aggressor, be it enemy or ally. The essential features of a collective security are as follows:

* Unprecedented degree of universality and requirement from each member of the system to react.

* Automatic use of sanctions in case of necessity.

* Adherence to the status quo and common understanding of aggression and a necessity to counter it. (51)

The main problem with collective security enforcement lies with normative nature of the collective security concept. It proscribes how collective security members should react to an aggression, but does not describe real situations of its practical implementation. One should mention also collective action problems: many states wish to participate in collective security during peacetime as free riders--they just cannot pay for it.

Besides that, within a collective security system reaction to an aggression inevitably slows. In theory, preventive diplomacy could be an element of a collective security system, but in practice, mechanism of military retaliation to an aggression has not been developed. While within military alliances the common enemy is clearly defined, mobilization and force deployment plans are ready--collective security participants always need additional time for coordinating efforts.

Some American political scholars imply that collective retaliation for an aggression could diminish unilateral retaliation, which could be less powerful but more rapid. Multilateral response is less flexible but more powerful. Compared to these two, effectiveness of military alliances lies somewhere in-between. Automatic reaction to an aggression within a collective security system could even provoke escalation of a conflict, due to the common perception that each violation of peace means violation of stability and international security.

There is also a status quo problem. Strict adherence to status quo ante within a collective security system could complicate conflict resolution, because both participants and mediators to a conflict often argue about who should be labeled as aggressor. (52)

Collective security systems are more advantageous in a sense that they do not only counter aggression, but also strengthen mutual confidence and international cooperation, thus making an aggression less probable. Within a collective security system, states prefer cooperation rather than conflict. They could not only change their behavior in the international arena, ways and means to protect national interest, but even to amend national interest itself with more respect to interest of other actors. (53)

Within a broad perception of a collective security's goals and objectives, they become even more normative. Within a regional or international system, each state that commits aggression, threatens peace or abuses norms of civilized behavior, could be treated as violating norms of a collective security system. Only collective security could respond to such new security challenges as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ethnic and regional conflicts, economic crises, mass flows of refugees, violation of human rights, environmental disaster and large-scale civilian casualties in military conflicts. (54)

Yet the collective security system both as an abstract model and as a range of different variants of its practical realization, including the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS, is not fault-free either. For instance, the so-called problem of collective action, i.e. setting up collective security systems, especially in peace, may tempt many states to take advantage of their membership without shouldering appropriate costs thereof (both literally and figuratively).

Russia and its partners within the Commonwealth of Independent States which signed a Collective Security Treaty in 1992 have fully experienced all merits and demerits of a collective security system. The Treaty stood the test and moved into the new century, upgraded and reinforced.

An important stage in developing the Collective Security Treaty was a session of the Collective Security Council (CSC) of the member states, which currently include Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, held in May 2000 in Minsk.

That the Declaration of the Heads of State of the Collective Security Treaty had adapted the Treaty to current geopolitical conditions represents a serious step in creating an efficient collective security system in Europe and Asia. The session also approved "Rules on the Procedure for Adopting and Implementing Joint Resolutions on the Use of Collective Security Forces and Facilities" and "An Outline of Coalition Strategy."

The Treaty member states do not segregate themselves from any other CIS countries nor from any military and political organizations and alliances, with which they are prepared to develop military cooperation to meet common challenges and to counter common threats. An essentially open nature of the Pact allows for partnership relationships even with NATO, which fact is likely to contribute to maintaining stability in Eurasia at the macrolevel and to developing transregional regimes of international security.

One of the most promising directions in the activities of the Collective Security Council is creating a consultation mechanism on the problems of peacekeeping activities and forming collective rapid deployment peacekeeping forces. The Treaty member states seem to have drawn a lesson from the dubious experience of their prior peacekeeping activities in Central Asia.

It would be quite in place here to recall that in 1993 the Council of the Heads of State of the CIS resolved to carry out the first peacekeeping operation by the CIS in Tajikistan and prescribed Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan to provide their military forces for that purpose. However, the Kazakhstan parliament did not ratify the resolution and, as a result, peacekeeping forces of only three countries were stationed in Tajikistan, with the Russian 201st Motorized Infantry Division as the chief task force. The total strength of the troops made up 7,000 men instead of the 16,000 provided for in the resolution of the Council of the Heads of State of the CIS.

In 1995-1996 Kyrgyzstan unilaterally withdrew its peacekeeping battalion from Tajikistan attributing the decision to lack of funds to support it. Uzbekistan came next in 1998. (55) Thus the absence of an effective coordination mechanism led to a collapse of the idea of a multilateral peacekeeping operation, triggering a storm of criticism in the West in respect of Russia's "unilateral interference" in Tajikistan's internal affairs.

The Bishkek summit of the Collective Security Council in October 2000 passed a resolution on elaborating regulations and a plan for creating collective armed forces of the Treaty member states. Thus the Collective Security Council evolves as an effective instrument of ensuring security of its members: the principles of building regional security subsystems in Central Asia, the European part of the CIS and in the Caucasus are taking body and form; the legal basis is being improved and mechanisms of creating allied rapid deployment forces laid down.

Alongside enhancing the military component of the organization, military and technological cooperation is also reactivated. According to the Agreement on Basic Principles of Military and Technological Cooperation signed in June 2000, the Treaty member states undertook a commitment to supply each other with weapons and military equipment at prices available for their own armies, which is likely to cut by half the cost of supplying the allied forces with the latest weapons and to offer other members of the CIS an incentive to accede to the Treaty. (56)

The Common Security concept, originally developed in the documents of Olaf Palme and Bruntland Commissions in the early 1980s, declares reciprocity and non-confrontation, in line with the principles as mentioned below:

* Non-use of military force in conflict resolution; use of force only for self-defense.

* No attempts to gain military superiority over other states.

* Appraisal of the fact that national security should not depend on the level of military power.

* Reduction of military forces and arms control as basic principles of common security.

Common security has been viewed as an alternative to use of force in international relations. As Olof Palme put it, it was impossible to win a nuclear war that would mean common destruction and elimination. International security should be based on common survival, rather than mutual destruction. (57)

Security and stability could be disrupted not by superior military might in itself, but because of the international environment that makes possible provocative and aggressive behavior. Common security is based on a certain code of conduct, which includes:

* Mutually beneficial international participation.

* Restraint from policy which could hamper interests of other states.

* Prevention of conditions enabling an actor state to get one-sided advantage at the expense of others.

* Political will and resources available for the international community to counter those breaking agreed rules. (58)

Russia shares the main Common Security principles and abides by them while developing and implementing its foreign and defense policies. As it is stressed in the Concept of the National Security of the Russian Federation, "Common interests shared by Russia with other countries still hold in respect of many international security issues, such as the opposition to proliferation of mass destruction weapons, prevention and settlement of regional conflicts, struggle against international terrorism and drug trafficking, solution of acute environmental problems of global nature, including nuclear and radiation security." (59)

It is the common interests and shared security threats that drive Russia closer to its neighbors on the Eurasian geopolitical space, and compel it to coordinate its efforts in countering such threats.

International terrorism instigated by Muslim fundamentalists and extremists takes a special place on the list of new, untraditional threats, countering which has of late become vital for Russia and its neighbors in Eurasia. It is therefore no mere coincidence that Russia, involved as it is now in a different anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya and harshly criticized by the West, enjoys full understanding of its position in the East.

In particular, Russia's activities in Chechnya have won sympathy and support in China, as separatists' unrest in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region frequently takes the form of terrorist actions. A poll conducted in 1999 in seven big cities of the People's Republic of China (PRC) showed that 88.4 percent of the Chinese condemn a diplomatic attack upon Russia directed against an anti-terrorist campaign in Chechnya; 87.6 percent of those polled noted that Chechen gangs disguise their real aspirations for independence under a veil of striving to resolve ethnical conflicts, using terrorism as a means to attain their purpose; 80.6 percent spoke out in favor of enhancing international cooperation in countering terrorism and religious extremism. (60)

Moreover, as reported by Russian media, dozens of Uighur mercenaries, citizens of the PRC, are taking part in hostilities on the side of Chechen rebels. Uighur rebel fighters participated also in large-scale armed sorties against governmental forces in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 1999. Uighurs, residents of the Chinese province of Xinjiang, are getting more and more involved in the activities of extreme Muslim groups, seeking to undermine stability in Central Asia and Muslim regions of Russia.

In April 2000, in Peshawar, Pakistan, there was a gathering of Uzbek, Tajik, Uighur and Chechen militants, attended by more than 100 terrorist group leaders, where a short-term program of joint action was at issue. One cannot help sharing the opinion expressed by observers that "should Talibs and Uighur insurgents succeed in breaking through into the [Ferghana.--V.P.] valley, Russia runs the risk of choking in a stream of drugs, refugees and imported crime ... In order to keep its borders safe Russia, as it was 100 years ago, shall remain China's ally on the Uighur issue." (61)

Illegal drug-trafficking is also one of the gravest threats Russia and its neighbors in Eurasia have encountered recently. As an international drug cabal strives to get Russia more deeply involved in the traffic of "hard" drugs from Europe to Southeast Asia, smuggling of drugs through regions bordering on Central Asia and Northern Kazakhstan has become a real national calamity for Russia.

It is a matter of particular concern for the Commonwealth of Independent States that the Taliban drug traffickers have close links with a number of extremist groups working to destabilize and overthrow legitimate ruling regimes in some post-Soviet states. These groups are maintaining direct ties with Afghan and Chechen field commanders. Money raised through drug trafficking is used to fund new terrorist sallies aimed at changing the existing political order in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The Cooperative security concept is very similar to common security and is being often defined as a diplomatic cooperation between states in international security area. (62) While traditional balance of power concepts deal with possible behavior of states during confrontation, cooperative security places an accent on preventive diplomacy and confidence-building measures, to set up regular channels of communication, mechanisms of consultation and security dialogue, shared decision-making, etc.

While a collective security system needs a common enemy to justify its existence, cooperative security is inclusive, rather than exclusive, and relies more on informal dialogue than on formal institutions. In terms of strategic military planning, cooperative security is concentrated on preventive measures rather than deterrent, and aims at reducing risk of military conflict, especially those involving WMD.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the former Shanghai Five, can be cited as a graphic example of a cooperative security system in Eurasia. Its appearance can be traced back to April 1996, when representatives of China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed in Shanghai an Agreement on Military Confidence Building in the Borderland, whereby a transparent and military confidence zone was defined 100 km deep on both sides of the former Soviet-Chinese frontier.

The next year, in April 1997, a follow-up document, an Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces on the Border, was signed in Moscow. The document provided for personnel cuts, for restriction of certain kinds of weapons and military hardware, and set forth allowable levels for the armed forces of the member states near the border.

The third meeting of the Shanghai Five took place in July 1998 in Almaty. The parties discussed creating a security system in the region and expanding the five countries' experience to cover the whole of the Eurasian continent. Another issue on the agenda was multilateral development of economic and transport cooperation. By that time several workgroups commenced examining proposals on the subject topics.

Gradually the Shanghai Five turned into a standing multilateral working forum whose influence on security in Eurasia became appreciable. Within the framework of the workgroups a draft on a nuclear-free zone in Central Eurasia was prepared, and debates started on drafts of cross-border cooperation, joint struggle against international terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking.

In this light a bill dealing with a nuclear-free zone in Central Eurasia is of particular interest. In April 1998 an expert group formed in Bishkek proceeded to draft a Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. This activity was resumed at a session of experts in Tashkent in February 1999. Thus the idea of a nuclear-free zone in the region evolved from a political declaration to practical realization steps. (63)

Participants in the fourth summit of the Shanghai Five held in Bishkek in August 1999 passed a joint declaration, which underlined the following:

* significance of efficient countermeasures against international terrorism, illegal drug traffic, arms smuggling, illicit migration and other manifestations of cross-border crime, national separatism and regional extremism;

* resolve to prevent use of their respective territories for carrying on activity detrimental to sovereignty, security and public order of any of the five states;

* support for the efforts of the Central Asian states to create a nuclear-free zone as well as backing Kazakhstan's initiatives to convene a meeting on cooperation and trust measures in Asia;

* statement of the fact that multipolarity is a general trend in the development of the modern world, which contributes to lasting stability in international relations. (64)

In December 1999 Bishkek hosted a meeting of the chiefs of law enforcement authorities of the five states, in the course of which coordination of joint activities in fighting international terrorism and organized crime in Central Asia was brought up, including information exchanges, revision of respective countries' legislation toward their unification, and conduct of joint operations. Participants decided to set up a standing Bishkek Group to coordinate law enforcement activities of the five countries.

In July 2000 at a summit held in Bishkek the Shanghai Five was renamed the Shanghai Forum, which reflected the evolution of this multilateral consultative body into a multilateral security regime. Russia has endorsed the motion to appoint special coordinators to attend to administrative issues of the Forum, as well as supported the initiative to hold meetings of heads of government of the member states.

The Dushanbe Declaration stated that multipolarity becomes "a dominant element in the architecture of a new world order now taking shape and represents a positive factor of international stability." The parties to the Declaration pledged to proceed with giving "proportionate assistance to countries that face the danger of their territory being used by extremist and terrorist forces for hostile purposes." (65)

Being a flexible and promising form of an international economic and security regime, the SCO has rather good prospects to expand geographically in Eurasia and beyond. Such countries as India, Mongolia and Iran have already declared their desire to join in its activities this or that way.

As a prototype of a new security regime in Eurasia, a "strategic triangle" of Russia, India and China can take form, far less formal but more flexible. Its groundwork is laid by bilateral constructive strategic partnership relations, that Russia established with China and India over the few past years. The motion on multilateral coordination of politics in the framework of the triangle was initially proposed in late 1998 by the then Russian Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov. Though drawing controversial comments from politicians, scientists and the public, this idea has gained currency. In case this "triangle" comes off, US influence could be counterbalanced.

One can and should consider a number of possible interpretations of the idea. It reminds us of triangles, polygons and strategic alliances which appeared in the 1960s and 1970s both in Asia and elsewhere. It looks like E. Primakov put a completely different meaning to the concept. In fact it was proposed that strategic cooperation between the three countries should be strengthened by way of policy coordination, which would mean allocating to the triangle functions of a multilateral negotiation and consultation mechanism and partly of a transregional security regime.

Russia's strategic interests as regards the "strategic triangle" are to maintain regional stability, which is impossible without carrying out strategic cooperation with such countries as China and India. When speaking of such kind of triangle we imply a pattern of flexible multilevel strategic cooperation designed to maintain stability in the region. In effect it deals with maintaining stability and security on the whole of the giant Eurasian continent, so that cooperation among these three countries hardly can be exaggerated.

It is regional security regimes based on the principles of openness, predictability, harmonization of national interests and inter-civilizational dialogue that may become the mainstream in enhancing international security on the giant expanse of Eurasia.

RUSSIA'S FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY CONCEPT: PUBLIC DEBATE

Russia's foreign and security policy in Eurasia is determined by its national security interests. Since the process of Russia's new self-identification is far from complete, national self-awareness, statehood, comprehension of the goals and prospects of national development, all these essential conditions for shaping national security ideas arc still in the making. Thus Russian civil society is engaged in discussions on the country's national security and foreign policy doctrines and concepts.

In April 2004 the Executive Board of the Russian Political Science Association (RPSA), in cooperation with International Federation for Peace and Reconciliation, conducted academic debates on the Concept of the Foreign Policy of Russia.

The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, approved by President Vladimir Putin on June 30, 2000, was drafted as a strategic policy document by several Russian agencies, with the Security Council of Russia acting as a supervisor and coordinator. The document emerged as a product of numerous inter-agency cooperation and coordination efforts, involving the Russian academic community.

Some of the participants to the debates suggested that the opposition to the current foreign policy course is still being represented by a larger segment of the military industrial complex, conservative minded political establishment, and the left-wing side of the political spectrum. However, the concerns on the current political course, aimed at establishing partnership with the West, have certain grounds.

During Boris Yeltsin's Presidency, Russia and the West experienced "partnership number one," which was spoiled due to a number of reasons, including the selfish and near-sighted Western policy towards Russia. In the 1990s this policy disappointed those among democrats and liberals, who advocated partnership, and strengthened positions of the "anti-Westerners" inside Russia.

In 1999, Russia found itself marginalized in the international arena. That became the moment of truth, just to recollect the participants of the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, severely criticizing Russia. After that a new pragmatically oriented leader appeared in the Kremlin, and corrections in the foreign policy course became inevitable.

The vision of the future of the Russian-American relations, as displayed in the current Foreign Policy Concept, is clearly obsolete. "The recent big difficulties in the relations with the US," as the Concept puts it, is a matter of the past. What is needed now is the precise Russia's vision of the problems and prospects of the US-Russian partnership, based on the common solution of the global problems and joint struggle against the common threats.

The Foreign Policy Concept should definitely reflect the vision of the long-term tendencies in global development and strategic trends in the country's foreign policy. However, the factor of uncertainty also matters in international relations. That is why the Concept implies "fundamental and dynamic changes." Keeping these changes in mind, some experts suggested that it makes no sense to plan the foreign policy for 10-15 years ahead, not to say that a good strategic policy document could hinder the foreign policy tactics and the negotiations practice.

However, the acting Concept provides, as a whole, an adequate vision of current international relations and the long-term tendencies of the new world order. The certain key provisions just need to be focused in such a way as to portray the existing realities and current foreign policy practices. That is why the participants to the RPSA debates spoke in favor of the renewal, rather then the complete replacement of the acting Foreign Policy Concept.

Russian Foreign Policy and the United Nations

The Concept's definitions of the modern world and of Russia's foreign policy top priorities caused the most heated debate. E.g., the Concept implies that the United Nations "should remain the main regulating centre of international relations." The UN's role in global affairs could not be enhanced without its consistent and radical reformation, while the Concept refers to this reform in rather general terms. The Concept should contain the more clear vision of the reformation of the "UN Family" as a whole, including the UN Security Council, specialized agencies and programs.

Another problem is how to make the United Nations more efficient, while keeping the UN Charter intact. The transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE could be an example: new documents of the same high status, as the founding acts, were being adopted, which introduced new issues, mutual obligations of the States and new development benchmarks.

A new document could be also adopted by the UN, which would get around the issue of the UN reformation and of changing the Charter. Such a document would contain new founding principles for the international community to follow.

One of the two extremes in the attitude to the UN is predominant in the Concept: total pessimism, on the one hand (the UN is not able to make timely decisions and implement them effectively, etc.), and the extreme legalist approach, implying that the UN Charter should be implemented, exactly as it was written, on the other. However, the UN Charter is neither an international law nor the list of the rules of international behavior. Even so, it is subject to various interpretations.

The Concept does not touch upon another vital issue of how to make the UN more efficient in dealing with the intra-state problems and conflicts, which are not international. The document should also give a clue to Russia's interaction with the international organizations and regimes, such as G8, Contact Group for Yugoslavia, the Middle East Road Map sponsors pool, etc.

The Foreign Policy Concept and "Humanitarian Intervention"

The Foreign Policy Concept very strictly says: "Humanitarian intervention, limited sovereignty, etc. concepts are totally inappropriate for international behavior," while these interventions have been de facto practiced, under the UN aegis, for quite a while.

We can recall the polemics of 1999 involving the UN Secretary General and a number of States, including Russia. The positions were obviously different. The Secretary General maintained that the large scale and systematic violations of human rights forced the international community to react and sometimes to interfere in the country's internal affairs, while Russia clearly objected. This prompted the UN Secretary General to stop using the term "Humanitarian Intervention" and to start looking for other approaches to the problem. The Secretary General has approved the report "Responsibility to Protect," produced by the Sahnoun/Evans Commission, which was tasked by the UN to investigate the problem of protection of victims of aggression and genocide.

The potential of this document is far from being exploited to the full extent, which became obvious after the war in Iraq. Russian politicians, diplomats and experts should pay close attention to it, especially in view of the fact that the Sahnoun/Evans Commission continues its work, involving the Russian representatives.

Certain provisions of the Foreign Policy Concept have become clearly obsolete, like the ABM Treaty of 1972, or the Global Missile Control System Initiative, which had been proposed, but not been substantiated by practical policy moves in the recent years.

It is also not clear, why the "information security" is to be viewed as "an aspect of strengthening of strategic stability," and thus "deserves a special attention." The fight against international terrorism is second to last on the list of Russia's foreign policy priorities, as outlined in the Concept, which is obviously not true today.

The participants to the RPSA debate suggested that the acting Concept diminishes the role of force in foreign politics, and the role of Russia in current geopolitics. Russia is surrounded by the major centers of terrorist threat, and its role in countering international terrorism has been increasing. The Concept covers the security issues with certain warps, while these issues should rather be outlined more extensively by the National Security Concept.

The Concept implies the necessity of collective reaction to international crises "on the basis of strict adherence to the International Law," which needs to be corrected. As is known, these norms are far from ideal, and fail to properly deal with the burning issues of current international peacekeeping. The Concept should rather say: "on the basis of adherence to and development of the International Law" (as is understood, the norms of International Law should be obeyed, unless new ones are not introduced).

The Concept also says: "Russia presumes that only the UN Security Council could sanction the use of force for the purposes of peace enforcement." However, in certain cases Russia itself relies on the principles used by the Western countries during the operation in Yugoslavia in 1999. None of the Russian peace support operations in the CIS was mandated by the UN Security Council and, from the point of view of International Law these situations were not being handled properly.

Russia was content with the UN observation missions, and/or by informing the UN Secretary General on a regular basis, or by the UN resolutions with a general support of the CIS as a regional organization entitled for peace support operations, etc. It is in the best interests of Russia now to increase the role of regional organizations in peace support operations.

One should recollect, in this connection, the address of President Vladimir Putin to the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, with the explicit outline of Russia's foreign policy, including the necessity to delegate the UN peacekeeping responsibilities to regional organizations and arrangements, including NATO, the European Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), etc.

The Concept should recognize the necessity of agreed criteria for humanitarian intervention into country's internal affairs, including that with the use of force, instead of labeling humanitarian intervention as totally unacceptable. The cases for sanctioned humanitarian intervention could be as follows:

* Wh