The widely held views of market economy as a self-regulating system has relaxed the already insufficient attention to comprehending the workings and the use of objective economic laws. But having learned by bitter experience the price of the services of market's "invisible hand" economists have

To achieve required results at minimal expenditure of time and resources is the most pressing need with regard to protecting security, especially military security, economically. This author has already examined a number of questions connected with this. [1] At the same time he gave his own interpretation of security and might, their structure, interconnection between the economic, military, military-economic and other types of security and might. It will be recalled that security, in our view, is inseparable from the might and ability of those interested in security (individuals, groups of individuals, society, mankind) to overcome and remove threats having for doing that appropriate means, structures and forces, that is to say, having the might. It is from this position that this article examines the problem involved in figuring out indicators, threshold values and criteria of military-economic security as the necessary condition for its constant monitoring and competent forecasting for the purposes of opt imization of the state's military-economic policy. [2]

It is necessary to stress that of special importance in appraising military-economic security (MES) are indicators of military economy functioning. The completeness and comprehensiveness in appraising a system of military-economic support of military organizational development is determined by the completeness and comprehensiveness of precisely these indicators. However, even experts who study this problem have not formed a single and deep idea of it. It is impossible to agree with the view that the MES indicator is equal to the sum of objective indicators of economic security (ES) and military security (MS). Military-economic security has its own contents, independent significance, its own internal indicators, threshold values and criteria, the failure to take which into account means becoming prone to errors. For example, given quite favorable ES indicators, it is impossible to guarantee MS unless a military economy has been put in place the effectiveness of which largely determines military-economic secur ity.

The author implies by military-economic security the ability of the military economy to sustain the necessary military might (MM) and realize the military-economic potential (MEP) to the extent and within the timeframe provided for by the military doctrine of the state. For this reason we put the focus on military economy the scale, structure and effectiveness of which are the main parameters of military-economic security. It is these parameters that should be represented in terms of an expanded aggregate of indicators. At the same time, the formation and functioning of a military economy, which is a system, is decisively influenced by intrasystem ties. On the one hand, economic support of military might, the needs of the Armed Forces and other troops is the objective and the task of the military economy. On the other, in tackling the tasks the military economy cannot go beyond the limits set by the actual might of the economy. Therefore, talking about classification and subordination of indicators of milita ry-economic security we should differentiate between two groups: intrasystem indicators that characterize the state and development trends of the military economy, and suprasystem indicators--indicators of suprasystems composed of separate parts of the military economy. Only in the presence of a sufficient aggregate of the former and latter it is possible to make an objective appraisal of the state of military-economic security.

The most important for appraising military-economic security among suprasystem indicators are those characterizing, on the one hand, military security (military potential [MP] and military might), on the other, economic security (economic potential [EP] and economic might). They are rather well described in textbooks and periodicals, including Military Thought. There is a wealth of statistics containing generalized indicators, indicators of elements of the structure of each of them in various structural slices, as well as quantitative and qualitative characteristics of their essential interrelations. Let us dwell on some aspects of the methodology of forming a representative aggregate of military-economic security indicators.

In the present system of might seen as an aggregate of different types of might in their optimal combination, MM remains the main component. The other components, especially the internal political, informational and ecological components are growing in importance within the system and this cannot but be taken into account in distributing the limited economic resources earmarked for all types of security. This complicates the optimization of the might and the security structure, makes it difficult to determine the size of necessary MM and MP and maintain them on a due level.

But the fundamentally new thing is that with the attainment of the critical value of MM it becomes necessary to single out within it two parts--nuclear missile might and ordinary might--the roles of which are different. The former, in a manner of speaking, is intended for the maintenance of military-strategic parity and nuclear deterrent of the eventual adversary by threatening it with unacceptable damage. The latter should have high mobility, flexibly react to all sorts of outside threats, prevent, localize and settle all sorts of armed conflicts in the defense area of the CIS and perform peacekeeping functions.

Therefore, indicators of MM (MP) are in the first place those that characterize the strategic nuclear forces, their ability to serve as a nuclear deterrent (nuclear deterrent potential, counterforce potential, countervalue potential, correlation of the sides' strategic nuclear forces in terms of warheads, delivery systems, and so on). In the second, they are indicators of conventional forces (their potential, strength, number and quality of various types of arms and combat equipment, and so on). There are among both, indicators of the state of the Armed Forces and indicators of the effect achieved (that must be achieved) as a result of their employment. One cannot but agree with the view that problems of global and regional nuclear deterrent, updating the criteria of nuclear deterrent and validation of rational standards of effectiveness of strategic nuclear forces, among other things, have become a matter of urgency under the current severe economic constraints. They can be handled by qualitative gradation of damages to the military-economic potential of the eventual adversary and moving to lower levels of "deterring" damage, identification of bottlenecks in military-economic systems and looking for possibilities to selectively destroy these systems, reorientation of the strategic nuclear forces from operating under the most difficult condition of a retaliatory strike to operating under less difficult conditions of a surprise counterblow, and so on. [3]

The system military-economic support of military might should include specific indicators of MM in addition to generalized indicators, as well as indicators of costs involved in attaining military might. The idea of effectiveness of military-economic activities becomes more complete and concrete if we break down generalized indicators into their constituent parts, show how they changed and compare them with similar indicators of other countries. In this case we will find a solution to the problems of optimization of the structure of military might and the system of its military-economic support in terms of the tasks defined in the Military Doctrine of our state and in terms of the threats that transpire from comparing MM indicators of Russia and other countries. To illustrate, let us cite the system of indicators in the statistics of the United Nations. In it military expenditures are subdivided, first, in accordance with articles of expenditure (operational costs, technical equipment and construction, resea rch and development), second, in accordance with the branches of service (ground forces, navy, air force, and so on). This makes it possible to analyze the different aspects of defense development processes.

Each state can broaden the system of MM and MP indicators to fit its own special conditions and requirements. For example, considering the priorities of the Russian military reform that is going to take a long time, the possible key indicators are quality and the social status of the officer corps, the nuclear deterrent potential, the potential of conventional forces, and so on. Some authors think that the modem system of planning and control of the RF nuclear forces historically oriented to massive nuclear strikes is not suited very well to the realization of the concept of controlled escalation of armed conflicts, that the procedure for the selection of criteria and indicators of regional nuclear deterrence (unlike global deterrence) has not been studied and it is impossible to claim that the system of corresponding indicators and criteria has been sufficiently defined, formalized and generally accepted. [4]

As for suprasystem economic indicators, the Administration of Economic Security of the RE Security Council prepared--in accordance with the Edict of the RE President No. 608 of April 29, 1996 approving the State Strategy of Economic Security of the Russian Federation (Main Provisions)--the "Model List of Indicators for the Development of Criteria and Parameters (Threshold Values) of Economic Security of the Russian Federation." It included the various threats, took into account the many aspects of security structures and their intrasystem and intersystem ties. This is very important for assessing Russia's place in today's world, the degree of its economic independence, ability to keep up self-reliance of the system of military-economic support of military organizational development and enjoy the advantages of international division of labor. To illustrate, let us cite some of the indicators of economic security of the RF from the table compiled by S. Glaziev [5] (See Table 1).

Let us now turn to intrasystem indicators of military-economic security. They are initially based, according to this author, on parameters of military-economic might (MEM) and military-economic potential.

Military-economic might of a state is determined by the size of the military economy and represents a fraction of EM used for military needs of the moment. It can be more or less depending on changes in the international situation and the state's intentions. Where is the limit to the growth of MEM? This limit is the military-economic potential. It expresses the objective economic potentialities that can be used for defense purposes if military-economic resources are strained to the maximum, that is to say, if all nonmilitary needs of society are reduced to a minimum.

MEP = EM - [CEM.sub.min],

where [CEM.sub.min] is the part of EM that guarantees the absolutely necessary minimum of civilian consumption.

The world wars brought to the fore the problem of economic mobilization and for this reason interrelation between the categories we examine here is as follows:

[MEP.sub.r] MEM + [MEM.sub.mob],

where [MEP.sub.r] is realized military-economic potential; [MEM.sub.mob] is the part of EM that can be additionally turned into MEM as a result of economic mobilization.

There appeared such terms as "milirtary-economic readiness" and "military-economic mobility" with the help of which it is possible to give answers to the questions on which part of EM and within what timeframe can be changed into MEM, what is the ability of the military economy to the production and providing troops with new types of military items in accordance with changed military needs.

In the wake of World War II and with the attainment during the arms race of the critical military might ([MM.sub.cr]), or such might (in order to attain the economic, political and other objectives) that it cannot be further increased, there came a new qualitative shift in the relationships between the categories that we examine here. The extent of direct dependence of MM on MEM, MEP and EM is shrinking. If [MM.sub.cr] has been created (see the diagram), then by further increasing MEM--by doubling military expenditure, for example--it is possible to increase (to double) only the number of missiles, nuclear warheads and other elements of the military structure, but the result of their possible employment will remain the same, or critical. This means that additional spending will not benefit the military. It would rather be to the detriment of the other needs of society. However, having a critical military might of strategic nuclear forces, an economically stronger state can achieve superiority over an economi cally weak state in non-nuclear arms and conventional troops. This gives rise to problems of flexible response, escalation and de-escalation of military might. Military-economic pressure in a state with a more powerful and effective economy will be less and not as crippling as in states with lesser economic might. It can maintain the optimal structure of might and widely use various nonmilitary means.

The questions of structure and the measuring of EM and MM, MEP and MEM have always been the subject of special attention of military-economic science. One of its originators, prominent military economist Aleksandr Astafiev, stressed that the most difficult question is how big a country's army and navy can be. He saw the answer in "precise calculations of military and naval facilities down to the most trifling needs." [6] Today we have a need for a system based approach to structuring of the categories that are being examined here. Structures should be broken up on certain grounds in accordance with a clearly defined objective and represent a system of elements that should add up to a complete whole and possess the property of emergent evolution. It is also necessary to take into account intersystem ties.

Of greatest interest in developing indicators and models of military-economic backing systems are factor, functional-phase, sectoral and regional (territorial) structural slices. Each of them reveals elements that add up to a system and their regular interconnections. This meets the requirements of a system based nature and purposefulness of calculations, correspondence of indicators with realities and the objective of the research. This applies to both generalized indicators and to such widely used concrete indicators as the number and share of manpower resources, those mobilized (or suitable for being mobilized) for army service, employed in arms production and in other concrete defense fields; the volume and share of production assets (capital, facilities) used in various sectors of the military and civilian economy; the share of GNP, national income, aggregate social product earmarked for military purposes and amounts of money allocated for specific undertakings on a percentage basis; indicators of volum es of the production of arms and other military items in terms of cost and number; financial indicators providing vast general and detailed information.

Intrasystem MES indicators characterize MEM and MEP as a whole and their structural elements. Furthermore, it is important to examine indicators of the elements of various structural slices of the military economy because the effectiveness of economic backing of defense depends on the operation of all units of the military economy and all phases of the military-economic process and concrete military-economic undertakings. For example, the structural slice of two units--the military-industrial complex and the military-economic infrastructure--makes it possible to appraise military-economic security using indicators of these two specific subsystems. As regards indicators of the first subsystem, it is very hard to find a quantitative expression of the result of military production because this is not only a matter of calculating the cost (price) of products. The most important thing is their expected combat effect. The more there are effective types of weapons among military products, the greater is the overall effectiveness of military production and the greater is its contribution to the military economy and the entire military system. This is, incidentally, the purport of betting on high technologies, which is characteristic of today's military-technical policy. As Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, marshal of the Russian Federation, noted, resulting from the fact that for nearly ten years Russia's Armed Forces have received no new technical equipment and despite the fact that they are well provided with arms and military equipment (AME), they are conspicuously behind the militaries of advanced countries in the share of modern types of weapons and equipment, including systems and assets of information support of vital activities and, most important, combat employment of troops (forces). The latter circumstance, in particular, extremely hampers the use of high-precision weapons, which are now mainly used against the most important targets on the battlefield and behind enemy lines. Russia is also conspicuously behind the West for the number of such weapons available to troops (forces). [7]

Indicators of military-economic infrastructure should characterize the ability of corresponding services to timely arrange, in conditions of enemy countermeasures, the delivery to the troops of all they need for the conduct of war. Among such indicators are: the amount of rounds of ammunition, fuel and other supplies delivered to the troops and expended by them during the course of an operation, in a day or during the entire war; the number of kilometers of rebuilt or newly built roads; the number of repairs done to various types of weaponry, equipment and so on. Such indicators are many. But there are practically no general quantitative indicators of the effect of the results of combat activities. This complicates matters because rear services can do colossal work but at the same time prove ineffective.

There are many factors misrepresenting the effectiveness of military-economic infrastructures. For example, concrete features of the main military production: If it is highly mobile, this makes it possible to reduce the stockpiles of the rear service's organs, whereas a low mobility of the main military production necessitates an increase in mobilization stockpiles and more powerful rear service structures.

Of great importance also are the concrete conditions under which combat operations are conducted, for example, the disposition of forces (compact or dispersed), combat skills of the commanding officer, and some other factors. Analyzing the experience of military-economic support during the Great Patriotic War, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov wrote: "On some occasions tens of thousands of tons of ammunition were fired without result. And to think of the sheer number of groundless and unjustified regroupings and all sorts of movements of troops during the war. Colossal amounts of fuel and other expensive property and, most important, human effort were thus wasted." [8]

We have touched on the problems of indicators of separate units of only one structural slice of the military economy but the system of indicators is supposed to cover the other slices as well: in accordance with the functional-phase criterion which singles out from the military economy production, distribution, exchange (circulation) and consumption in accordance with territories (regions), and in accordance with the forms of ownership and socioeconomic organization among other criteria. Without dwelling on them here, we shall stress that unless there is a sufficiently complete set of indicators it is difficult to talk about objectivity of our appraisals of the state of military-economic security and suggestions on upgrading the existing system of military-economic support.

It is possible to put all intrasystem indicators into three groups (Table 2). Having formed a system of indicators, it is necessary to determine the upper and lower critical points (threshold values) and corridors of indicators using the rule of thumb and logic and proceeding from the requirements of the National Security Concept, Military Doctrine, economic strategy, military-economic policy and the existing enforceable enactments, technical and economic standards and calculations. Once we have solved this problem, we would be able to record the actual state of MES indicators at certain intervals and compare them with the threshold values. This will make it possible to get the picture of the state of MES at the given moment and detect trends toward either improvement or deterioration. Therein indeed lies the importance of MES monitoring.

Studying the experience of other countries and development of various indicators is certainly of scientific and practical value but it would be a mistake to mechanically adopt other countries' threshold values and criteria of MES or look for the "main indicator of military-economic sufficiency" single for all countries. [9] Furthermore, threshold values and criteria that apply today should be updated as many factors critical to national security change.

The various levels and spheres that manage economic support of defense need different sets of indicators and different details of the military-economic system and its sections and slices. Generalized indicators of economic, military and military-economic might presented as they evolve and interrelate internally offer a more or less complete picture of the state of military-economic security, which is supposed to be actually reflected in the model of the system of military-economic backing of military organizational development.

In solving concrete problems before the leadership of some or other level of the defense development process it becomes necessary to have additional and more detailed information that can be obtained from corresponding units of second-level indicators. Such units can be compiled in all systems: military, economic and military-economic. Their number can be rather big and classification can be based on different criteria.

In developing a rational aggregate of indicators one should bear in mind the fact that the military economy is supposed to protect military security rather than to undermine economic and other types of security in the process. Consequently, the system of military-economic support of military organizational development should be a constituent element of the national security economy system organically linked with the other elements. This is an essential condition.

Each indicator characterizes a system in a specific respect, only from one side and at a certain point in time. The threshold value of an indicator is a critical point beyond which quantity transforms into quality. For example, according to the concept of state policy with regard to military organizational development for the period until 2005, 3.5 percent of GDP is earmarked for national defense. One can, of course, doubt this threshold figure and whether it is acceptable for Russia. But if it expresses the minimal needs, it is impossible to systematically ignore it in federal budget laws.

In addition to indicators and threshold values it is also necessary to develop criteria, which make it possible, proceeding from the entire aggregate of indicators and threshold values, to judge the state of MES and emerging trends. A criterion, as a means whereby one forms judgements, is formulated with respect to an absolutely definite objective or problem that needs to be resolved. It is possible to accept as criteria clearly formulated principles, for example, the principle of victory in a war, the principle of superiority with regard to certain indicators, the principle of inadmissibility (averting) aggression on the art of eventual adversaries. Sometimes a criterion can be the extent of an effect to be achieved, for example, the ability to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the enemy.

So, the creation of a mechanism to monitor military-economic security is the most important condition for effectively maintaining it on the required level. This mechanism is comprised of a system of indicators, criteria and threshold values of MES, which should harmoniously blend with the system of national security economy indicators. Monitoring of MES as a constituent part of national security monitoring calls for conceptual and economico-mathematical modeling of military-economic processes in the system of the national security economy. So far, there is no sufficiently valid and complete system of military economic security indicators, threshold values and criteria. Its development, in our opinion, would take as a minimum a leading research center to unite and coordinate the efforts of specially created sections (subdivisions) in practically all research centers around the country.

NOTES:

(1.) See: Military Thought, No. 3, 1998; No. 5, 1995.

(2.) For details of the many categories and regularities mentioned in this article, see: Voyennaya ekonomika: Teoriya i aktualnye problemy. Ed. by A.I. Pozharov, Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1999.

(3.) See: Voyennaya mysl', No. 4, 1999, p. 78.

(4.) See: Pravitelstvennyi vestnik, No. 45, 1990; Krasnaya Zvezda, 1 Oct. 1999.

(5.) See: Rossiyskiy ekonomicheskiy zhurnal, No. 1, 1997.

(6.) A.I. Astafiev, O sovremennom voyennom iskusstve, Ch. 2, St. Petersburg, 1861, p. 22.

(7.) See: Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 Dec. 1999.

(8.) Quoted from: N.A. Antipenko, Na glavnov napravlenii, Nauka, Moscow, 1960, p. 17.

(9.) Voyennaya mysl', No. 1, 1999, p.63.

          Indicators and Threshold Values of RF Economic Security
INDICATORS                               Threshold              Actual and
                                           value   Actual state threshold
                                                                  ratio
Volume of GDP:
- overall with respect to G-7 average, %     75         29         0.39
- per capita with respect to world          100         25         0.25
  average, %
- per capita with respect to G-7 aver-       50         19         0.38
  age, %
Investments, % of GDP                        25         13         0.52
Research expenditures, % of GDP               2        0.5         0.25

Intrasystem MES indicators

A. Generalized indicators

MEM indicators:

- military expenditures;

- share of military expenses in GDP;

- military expenditures with respect to USA;

- military expenditures with respect to G-7 average expenditures;

- other indicators.

MEP indicators:

- supply of manpower resources;

- supply of raw material resources;

- supply of fuel and energy;

- dependence on imports of AME;

- other indicators.

B. Indicators of military economy structures (in organizational-departmental slice) [*]

Defense industry complex:

- production facilities in accordance with types of AME with respect to the level of defense sufficiency;

- technical standard of production of main types of AME with respect to the world standard;

- overall volume of state order, and with respect to defense industry complex production capacity;

- wage level with respect to the country's average;

- level of profitability;

- other indicators.

Military economy infrastructure:

- capacity of rear and technical services with respect to the forces' needs;

- other indicators.

C. Most important proportions (qualitative indicators)

Structure of military expenditures:

- R&D share in military expenditures with respect to geopolitical rivals;

- share of AME purchases in military expenditures with respect to geopolitical rivals;

- other indicators.

Specific indicators

- specific supply of resources to RF Armed Forces personnel with respect to geopolitical rivals;

- specific expenditure of funds for future provision of AME

- size of pay and allowances for military personnel;

- other indicators.

(*.) It is also possible to examine indicators of elements of the military economy structure in territorial and other slices.