This article examines Britain's response to Italy's forward policy in the Red Sea region during the mid-to-late 1920s. Previous examination and understanding of Anglo-Italian relations during this period has tended to focus on issues other than such concrete case studies, consequently failing to

create a sense of the often tense relationship between the two countries over a number of matters during this period. In this respect, Italian activity in the Yemen between 1925 and 1928 was particularly representative of the style and nature of Anglo-Italian relations during this period.

Dans cet article, nous examinons la reponse de la Grande-Bretagne envers les politiques d'avantgarde de l'Italie sur la region de la mer Rouge pendant la seconde moitie des annees 1920. Des examens et tentatives de comprehension des relations anglo-italiennes de l'epoque avaient tendance a se concentrer plutot sur des sujets autres que de telles etudes de cas concrets. C'est pourquoi ils' n'arriverent pas a convier l'esprit des rapports souvent tendus entre les deux pays sur un bon nombre de questions durant cette periode. A cet egard, les activites italiennes dans le Yemen entre 1925 et 1928 etaient particulierement representatives du style et de la nature des relations anglo-italiennes a cette epoque.

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This study seeks to understand the chain of events in the Red Sea and Arabian Peninsula in the mid-1920s that led to Britain and Italy facing each other across the negotiating table at the Talks of Rome in January 1927 and the way in which the Anglo-Italian relationship dictated the British attitude towards Italian activity in this region. (1) This article also seeks to examine the style and effectiveness of British foreign policymaking in the Red Sea region during this period. Complicated by local tribal politics and overlapping areas of responsibility and cocern, numerous government departments sought to influence policy, with mixed results. This-examination of the Foreign Office's reaction to Italy's forward policy in the Yemen clarifies the nature and methods of British foreign policymaking there and the degree of success achieved by Britain, and specifically the Foreign Office, in addressing Italian expansion and simultaneously preventing a fracture in Anglo-Italian relations. (2)

Although this particular period of Anglo-Italian interaction ended with what was essentially a successful outcome in British eyes, certain questions are raised. Why was British policy successful? Was it effective policy, or was it simply British strength as a whole, which was able to compensate for any localised shortcomings in diplomacy? Could it have been more successful in terms of formulation and execution? Alternatively, did the reason for the relative success of British policy lie at the feet of Italy's inability, at that time, to fully exploit the conditions that it encountered, or did Italy merely achieve what was possible in the circumstances? This article will attempt to answer these questions, and in so doing, provide a clearer picture of Anglo-Italian relations in the Red Sea during the period 1925-28.

1. The Red Sea Region 1925-28

During the 1920s the Red Sea and Suez canal were of huge commercial and military importance to Britain. The cessation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the building of the Singapore naval base demanded.rapid movement of the fleet to the Far East in times of trouble. November 1918 had seen the British Empire reach its peak, and the fact that some 70 per cent of this territory now lay beyond Suez reinforced the importance of the Red Sea route in British strategy. (3) The magnitude of this route to Britain's strategic interests was summed up by the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), which stated that, "along this route lies the most pressing of our commitments. All lines of communication are vulnerable, and this route particularly so ... This vital cord in our defence system is weak." (4) Part of this vital cord was the British colony of Aden, carved from the surrounding territory of the Yemen on the tip of the Southern Arabian peninsular and constituting a vital wireless station, fuel depot and convoy meeting point on the route to India. Even without Italian interference, Aden was under constant threat from local elements angry at the British presence. (5)

British concern was not limited to the waterway itself but extended also to Arabia. Still retaining strategic value due to its proximity to Persia and the oil supplies located there, it also constituted part of the overland link to India. In addition to this were the Red Sea Islands, lying off the Arabian Coast and constituting large, natural harbours; some of them, the Farsan Islands, were believed to contain significant oil deposits.

These factors only served to reinforce the Red Sea's political and strategic importance to Britain and focussed attention on the potential establishment of Italian power there. The matter was complicated, however, by local personalities. The removal of Ottoman influence from Arabia in the immediate postwar period had resulted in an increase in the power and aspirations of the local leaders in the region. (6) This was destabilising in itself as each sought to protect or advance his position. This in turn added to the spectre of outside influence being sought to help achieve this end. In concrete terms, then, the Foreign Office was facing a territorial dispute with a powerful tribal leader over a vital link in the chain of Imperial communications and a simultaneous bid for influence in the same region by a rival European power which, it was suspected, might be aiding those local malcontents. (7)

Anglo-Italian relations in the Red Sea and Yemen during this period, therefore, are set in the context of Britain's need for Imperial security, in the shape of secure lines of communication through the region and the Foreign Office's desire for strong relations with Rome. Both of these issues were interlinked. The establishment of Italian power in the Red Sea had serious implications for British policy makers, military and political. Italy was already in possession of two colonies in the region: Eritrea, on the west coast of the Red Sea, and Italian Somaliland, on the Indian Ocean. Both established towards the end of the nineteenth century, they were unprofitable and a drain on resources. If Italy could gain influence on the Eastern side of the Red Sea, notably in the Yemen, it would increase trade with the colonies. This in turn would provide Italy with a stronger physical presence in the region and potentially draw the Red Sea into its sphere of influence. As things stood, the Mediterranean was under strict British control, with both Gibraltar and Suez in its firm grasp. Italy, dependent as it was upon the importation of raw materials, was completely at Britain's mercy in this respect. In practical terms, Italy was extremely vulnerable to blockade; any alleviation of this by an enhanced Italian presence in the Red Sea would be highly desirable. In addition, from a political and ideological point of view, Rome could not be satisfied with having to accept the potential humiliation of the Red Sea remaining a British-controlled transit route to some rather meagre Italian possessions. This obviously stood at odds with the Fascist government's desire to promote Italy as a forceful new nation, subservient to no one. Such a position might only become more embarrassing as the years progressed. Such conditions ensured that the pattern of Anglo-Italian relations in the Red Sea region during this period would be fairly typical of their relationship as a whole. (8)

II. British Foreign Policymaking

The common perception of Anglo-Italian relations during the mid-to-late 1920s has been affected by a general focus on bilateral relations at a personal level: that is, the relationship between Austen Chamberlain, Britain's Foreign Secretary, and Mussolini. (9) While this does serve to underline the essentially friendly nature of the dealings between the two nations during this period, it can tend to disguise some important aspects of their relationship. These years witnessed constant and sometimes fractious involvement between the two countries in the Balkans, Abyssinia, and the Red Sea region. Economic factors in the shape of oil, and wider considerations of European security and the preservation of Anglo-Italian relations, had prompted Britain, under Chamberlain's surefooted guidance, move quickly to forestall Italian activity in Albania in 1925 and 1926. In Abyssinia during the same period, however, the success was not quite so forthcoming. The British-inspired Anglo-Italian agreement of December 1925, designed to secure for Britain a major economic concession at Lake Tsana, set in motion a chain of events that culminated with Mussolini's regime reviewing that country as a legitimate target for Italian colonialism. (10) But it was Anglo-Italian interaction in the Yemen and Red Sea that illustrated both sides of British diplomacy: the laissez faire, ad-hoc approach in danger of being undermined by more energetic actors and then its counterpoint--a subtle yet vigorous response to a perceived threat.

In terms of the formulation and practice of Britain's diplomacy, a number of committees, organizations, and groups contributed. (11) Aside from the Foreign Office, policymaking involved the Committee of Imperial Defence, the Chiefs of Staff, the Treasury, and various other Government departments whose expertise was called upon during specific matters. This in itself was symptomatic of one major problem with the exercise of Britain's foreign policy during this period. Extensive overseas possessions meant a complex method of administration and ensured that the Foreign Office never had overall control of foreign policy matters. This complicated apparatus certainly affected the speed and precision of British policymaking in the Red Sea region during the period examined. (12)

With regard to the Foreign Office specifically, the demands of such a responsible position meant that Chamberlain relied to a great extent upon his subordinates. Although placing value upon good relations with Italy and Mussolini in particular, pressing matters such as the Locarno negotiations in 1925 or, more usually, unfamiliarity with particular regions, forced him to dip in and out of the range of questions involving Italy, often having to delegate important policymaking to his trusted subordinates. Foreign Office reforms after 1918 led to work being shared between six policymaking departments organized upon geographical lines: Eastern, Western, Central, Northern, American, and Far Eastern. For the purpose of this article, the Eastern Department was responsible for the Red Sea region. (13) The Head of Department, John Murray, and his more junior officials, Victor Mallett and Francis Osborne, performed the majority of work relating to policy. They were watched over by Sir William Tyrrell, the Permanent Under Secretary of State (PUS). An experienced civil servant, he was there primarily to reduce the administrative burden upon the Foreign Secretary, but also able to exert some influence over policy himself; he dictated to some extent the flow of information both to the Foreign Secretary himself, but also to junior officials. (14) These men were deeply involved in Britain's response to issues faced in the Red Sea, guided from above by Chamberlain's constant reiterations to maintain cordial relations with Italy, a growing European power and potentially vital ally or, in the worst case scenario, another enemy to be added to the list alongside Germany and Japan. (15)

Yet, as mentioned already, the issue was not "simply" one of Anglo-Italian dealings. It was a triangular affair, comprised of Britain's desire to maintain the status quo, Italy's attempts to build its presence, and, lastly, the complicating factor of local power struggles between tribes and leaders. Tribal politics in the Yemen and the wider Arabian Peninsula created a background against which the two European powers fenced for influence. Britain's drive for maintenance of the status quo and Italy's desire to establish its power were both hampered by the enmity of powerful local leaders. Through this fog of local politics and confusion, the Foreign Office tried to address Italian ambitions, balancing the requirement to restrict a major European naval power with an avowed expansionist outlook from establishing itself on the main Imperial line of communication to the Far East, all the while preserving good relations with that country. Thus, the mid-to-late 1920s saw Britain facing some difficult decisions in the Red Sea region. Its vital colony of Aden was isolated and surrounded by the hostile forces of a native leader seeking to improve and sustain his territory. And it was not the only major power active in the region, facing as it did the growing presence of Italy.

III. The Yemen in 1925: Italian Influence Grows

By the summer of 1925, officials at the Foreign Office's Eastern Department were confronted with two distinct but by now increasingly overlapping issues in the Red Sea: the Imam and Italian activity. There were three main domestic personalities in Arabia: the Imam of Sanaa, who was effectively the ruler of Yemen minus that area controlled by Britain, the Idrisi, who ruled the minor territory of the Asir, and lastly Ibn Saud, ruler of what was to become Saudi Arabia. (16) The Imam was the leader of the Zeidi sect of Islam. Orthodox and resistant to change, it favoured self-containment and a limited foreign policy dedicated to preserving the integrity of the Yemen. For this purpose, the Imam wanted to incorporate British territory, known as the Aden protectorate, into his own. Aside from antagonising Britain, the Imam's desire for expansion brought him into conflict with the Idrisi, a relatively minor ruler but one who had traditionally enjoyed good relations with Britain. The final major personality in the region was Ibn Saud, leader of the Wahabis, a militant and puritanical Muslim sect, and ruler of the twin kingdoms of the Hejaz and Nejd. Alongside the Imam, he was an influential figure in the region.

The latter was beComing increasingly emboldened in his desire to secure control of the Aden protectorate, and it soon became apparent to Foreign Office officials that he was being assisted somewhat by the supply of weapons from Italian sources. The complicating factor lay in the fact that Rome appeared to be supplying weapons both to the Idrisi and the Imam in their conflict with each other. (17) That July, in conversation with the American vice-consul, the Aden Resident, General Stewart, revealed his opinion that British concerns should centre not so much on the Imam, but rather the activities of Italy, claiming that Britain was being drawn into the petty politics of the Arabs, "merely to guard against the possible results of Italian activities among them." (18)

The Foreign Office, however, had already recognised the potential danger of such activity. Victor Mallet of the Eastern Department believed that Italian interest was stimulated by the possibility of oil in the Farsan Islands, adjacent to the Idrisi's territory. His fear was that the Idrisi might offer an oil concession in return for Italian armaments. (19) The main problem for British at this point, however, was their inability to determine the precise direction of Italian penetration. Was it directed towards the Idrisi or the Imam? It was known that ammunition had been landed at the Imam's port of Mokha, and that Italy had been attempting to consolidate its so far limited position in the Yemen. Yet it was also known that Italy was looking to improve its relations with the Idrisi with a view to securing

the aforementioned oil concession. This in itself would be unacceptable to the Admiralty, as it would mean a significant Italian presence on the island, thus threatening British communications through the Red Sea. As it was, Italian aspirations over Farsan and Kamaran, another group of Red Sea Islands, were not new. They dated back to 1916, and Italian claims to both sets of Islands had been discussed at various points during the Paris Peace conferences. (20) Italy was aware of the strategic value of Kamaran specifically, noting that it dominated the only stretch of water along the coast of the Yemen that could accommodate a sizeable fleet. (21) However, Lord Milner, head of the British mission to the Colonial Committee, which had met in 1919 to discuss the disposal of captured Turkish and German territory among the allied powers, was to remark: "We are 'fixed with notice' that they (Italy) have some undefined ambition to have a finger in the Arabian pie ... While we have no territorial ambitions in Arabia, we intend to keep the external relations of that country under our exclusive control." (22) British policy had not changed in that regard.

Now, in the summer of 1925, the problem of Italian intrigue in the Yemen was becoming more acute. (23) The port of Hodeidah had been captured by the Imam the previous January. He was now second only to Ibn Saud in terms of power and influence in the Arabian Peninsula. The Foreign Office was beginning to understand just how important the Imam was and the growing significance of his relationship with Italy. The prospect of such an alliance was regarded again with concern by Mallett. Aware of the potential disruption to British communications and trade around Aden and Somaliland, he stated emphatically that "we do not want Italy playing at politics anywhere in Arabia, and sooner or later we shall have to tell her so." (24)

The main force behind Italy's growing presence in the Yemen was the Governor of Eritrea, Jacopo Gasparini. A member of the Italian Colonial Ministry and committed Fascist, he had already come to the notice of British officials by way of his resistance to ongoing Anglo-Italian cooperation in Abyssinia. Although ostensibly concerned with building Eritrea's economic fortunes through trade with Arabia, he was said to have differed from those in the Italian Foreign Ministry who tended to be far more respectful of British power. (25) Gasparini seemingly recognised British superiority in terms of power and influence,

but believed that Italian colonial expansion could succeed if a regional strategy was adopted. He believed that Italy's best chance of progress in this respect was to push forward in isolated, select areas rather than on a broad front. (26) The elevation of Eritrea, in political terms, to the springboard of Italian expansion in the Arab world enabled him to initiate his policy and, in May 1925, he informed the Colonial Ministry that "it appears indispensable not to remain in this position of inferiority, especially in confronting the English." (27)

By the end of 1925, although Foreign Office concern over Italian activities had grown more acute, indecision prevailed. Officials were still unsure of what line to take with Rome. Mallett argued that Italy would soon have to be told in no uncertain terms to leave Arabia alone, but his argument was dismissed by Francis Osborne, First Secretary at the Eastern Department, who doubted that any such warning would be either effective or appreciated. (28) Nevertheless, Mallett's statement was an admission that while British policy makers accepted the de facto Italian presence in the Red Sea, at least on the western side, its encroachment into the Arabian Peninsula was a different matter. Italy had been an established presence in Eritrea since the latter part of the nineteenth century and, as such, its Red Sea ambitions were to be tolerated, but only if they remained within the limited scope that Britain foresaw for the undeveloped colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. Now that Rome appeared to be casting its net rather wider, Britain began to react with concern. Although the Foreign Office differed in its views to the Colonial Office with regard to the Imam, the latter being rather more jaundiced in its interpretation of his activities, their concern over Italian activity was shared. As for the Admiralty, its own fears were amplified by General Stewart who considered it "most undesirable that any foreign power should obtain ... a position in this group of Islands which to the best of my belief would make an excellent submarine base on a vital trade route." (29)

Yet although the British Government was still unwilling to intervene in order to prevent the Idrisi's power being extinguished, this laissez faire policy did not extend to the Imam and his gradual encroachments into the Aden Protectorate. The question was how he should be discouraged from such activity. Although the Colonial Office advocated military action, Chamberlain saw an opportunity instead to increase British prestige at Rome's expense and suggested that a diplomatic line be taken. Sir Gilbert Clayton was thus despatched to meet personally with the Imam in an effort to solve the impasse. (30) The diplomatic line, however, proved inconclusive. Negotiations took place in early 1926 and, although friendly in nature, left a number of matters unresolved, notably the Imam's refusal to recognise the protectorate treaties. Clayton, moreover, had been hamstrung in his negotiations from the beginning. The ad hoc nature of British policymaking in the region was reflected in his bargaining tool to be offered to the Imam: the port of Hodeidah. The British somehow neglected the fact that the Imam had possessed Hodeidah for over a year by this point.

Digesting the failure of its diplomatic initiative, the Foreign Office concluded that further discussions or even a military offensive were now unlikely to solve the impasse. Further diplomatic failure would only further damage British prestige, while bringing in the Army would require large amounts of men, and incur significant casualties and costs. Chamberlain appeared frustrated at the ineffectiveness of British policy, stating that he found the situation in Arabia to be "profoundly unacceptable," with the way now open for Italy, through its links with the Imam, to strengthen its position on the eastern side of the Red Sea. (31)

Competition between Britain and Italy for influence in the Red Sea now gained momentum. The latter increased its supply of war material to the Imam, while Britain sought to forestall Italian encroachment in the Farsan Islands by allowing British companies, notably the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Eastern and General Syndicate, to bid for the oil concession there. (32) Others began to raise concerns over Italian activities in the region. In July 1926 Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, wrote to the Foreign Office, expressing his worry that Italy might gain control over the oil Concession on the Farsan Islands, adding that, if anyone were to gain control of the concessions, they should be British. (33) His concerns were soon supported by the Admiralty, uneasy about the Italian's installations of heavy guns overlooking Kamaran Roads. The Foreign Office, however, was quick to dispute the veracity of the Admiralty's intelligence. (34) It wamed that if complaints were made, the Italians would respond that it was the Imam who had mounted the guns. (35) Indeed, the contrary nature of the reports emanating from the Red Sea was enough for Chamberlain to tell his subordinates that they should accept his lack of understanding of the situation: "Everyone here is talking a language of which I don't know the ABC." (36)

The Admiralty's concerns, although dismissed by the Foreign Office, had some substance. During an interdepartmental conference in the summer of 1926, it was noted that Kamaran Bay, the island's harbour, was possibly the third largest natural harbour in the world, capable of accommodating an immense fleet. (37) The Admiralty's representative, Commander Hitchins, reiterated Admiralty opposition to letting any European power occupy or use Farsan or Kamaran. The conference concurred, concluding that that it was necessary to prevent occupation by the Italians, under whatever guise, of the Kamaran Islands. (38) The most likely method to ensure this was to supply arms tO the Idrisi, enabling him to resist the Imam's advances. The Colonial Office suggested that the arms embargo should be lifted, that the Aden resident supply the ammunition, and that the Italians be notified of Britain's decision. (39)

The benefits of such a policy were twofold. Not only would it circumvent the territorial aspirations of the Imam, it would remove the necessity of approaching the Italians over the issue, as their progress was a natural corollary of lais. The problem lay in the fact that the British moratorium on arms supplies to the region had allowed the Italians to supply the Imam with a stockpile of weapons to enable him to deliver a knockout blow to the Idrisi. In the worst-case scenario, this could be done before arms arrived from Britain to stabilize the Asir. Besides which, any attack upon the Farsan Islands would be delivered by the Imam rather than Italy, which made it impossible for Britain to appeal to the Italian Government. The Foreign Office and, in particular, Mallet considered that the best way to proceed was to disguise British concern over the Farsan Islands by asking the Italians to refrain from supplying arms to the Imam, as it was facilitating his attacks upon the Aden protectorate, which was British territory. (40) Italian officials were considered clever enough to read between the lines, but would have no grounds for protest. Nevertheless, the situation was considered serious enough that, at the subsequent Cabinet meeting on the subject, Chamberlain proposed that he himself should meet with Mussolini and ascertain the exact position of Italy in the matter. His proposal was accepted. (41)

In the meantime, aware that the Imam controlled over half of the Idrisi's territory and now appeared on the verge of attacking the Farsan Islands, which could then be handed to the Italians, the Foreign Office began the process of drafting warnings to the Italians. Although friendly in tone, the overtures recommended that the two countries "endeavour to understand and, when necessary, frankly discuss their interests in Arabian affairs," and warned that "a situation might thus arise where the Idrisi-Imam conflict might develop into a conflict between Italian and British interests." (42) The note concluded by stipulating that the safety of Britain's communications with India and the East was a paramount feature of British policy, and that by dealing with the matter in a spirit of co-operation, any embarrassment or delicate situations could be prevented from occurring later. (43)

Britain was becoming more conscious of the potentially negative effects of its refusal to become involved in the Red Sea. However, it was equally apparent that there was no universally agreed policy that could be implemented, a fact illustrated by the need to rely on the local forces to resist the Imam's advances. If Britain--took matters into its own hands, explanations would have to be given to Rome as to the precise nature of British interests, their basis, and their effect upon legitimate Italian activity. This could raise a number of problems, not least a misinterpretation by Mussolini of British motives. Any perceived attempt to restrict what was considered legitimate Italian expansion would be given a cool reception. Another disadvantage was that Britain's reasonable explanations of strategic necessity might be overshadowed, in Italian eyes, by more obvious and less creditable factors, namely commercial concessions. The decision to allow British firms to compete for oil concessions in the region now meant that Britain's more justifiable stance over the need to protect its Imperial communications might be obscured by its perceived desire to exploit, amongst other things, the Farsan Islands' oil deposits. The situation was now serious enough to prompt Chamberlain to remark that "we are engaging in a covert war with Italy, she under the Imam's Flag and we under the Idrisi." (44)

IV. The Italo-Yemeni Treaty

In September 1926 the Anglo-Italian debate in the Red Sea suddenly assumed a different complexion with the signing of the Treaty of Sanaa. (45) Although simply a treaty of friendship, it signalled a significant increase in Italian commitments and aspirations in the region. Although engineered by Gasparini, its roots could be traced back to Britain's failure to come to terms with the Imam at the beginning of 1926 and the obvious disillusionment of the Yemeni leader with British diplomacy. This reversal, rather than Gasparini's determination to confront British power, appeared to have stimulated the Colonial Ministry in its efforts to corne to an official agreement with the Imam. (46) Gasparini, aware of the potential for success, now proposed a cautious policy aimed at cementing the progress made. (47) British officials, however, after their experience with Italian diplomats in Albania and Abyssinia, would no doubt be suspicious of Italian motives.

The Foreign Office appeared relaxed when news of the treaty broke. The view taken was that if the agreement contained no secret clauses then there was no cause for concern. Privately, however, there was unease over a deepening links between Italy and the Imam. Rome now recognised him as the King of Yemen and, as such, recognised his territorial claims to the Aden Protectorate. Consequently, Chamberlain, increasingly worried at the prospect of a clash of interests between Britain and Italy, ordered that the Italian Government now be made fully aware of British concerns. Although stating that "great care must be had for Italian susceptibilities," he nonetheless declared himself confident that Mussolini desired a friendly settlement. (48) Tyrrell therefore summoned the Italian Ambassador, Della Torretta, and, after congratulating him upon Italy's diplomatic success, presented the memorandum. (49)

Within a month of the Treaty being signed, Chamberlain was presented with the opportunity to discuss the matter personally with Mussolini at Leghorn in late September 1926. By then, he had already informed Dino Grandi, Italy's Parliamentary Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that a disagreement between two local chiefs was in danger of spilling over to a misunderstanding between

Britain and Italy. (50) In light of this and in view of the memorandum recently presented by Tyrrell, Mussolini suggested to Chamberlain that representatives from both countries should discuss the ongoing situation in the Red Sea and Arabia. (51) In retum, Chamberlain accepted Mussolini's explanations of Italian commercial interests, but reiterated British concerns: anything affecting the route to India interested Britain in a special manner. In view of this, occupation of the Asir on one hand and the Yemen on the other could cause conflict between Britain and Italy. (52)

While Chamberlain and Mussolini conversed at Leghom, Italian officials at the Pallazzo Chigi (the Italian equivalent of the Foreign Office) were busy digesting the memorandum given to Della Torretta earlier that month. Their response was to propose to the Foreign Office that matters be discussed in "a spirit of cordiality and mutual comprehension of interests." (53) Mallett was nonplussed, for his hope had been that the memorandum would serve as a friendly warning to the Italians not to meddle too deeply in Arabian affairs rather than stimulate negotiations upon the subject. (54) Italian diplomats now appeared to be suggesting the partition of Arabia into two spheres of influence: the Hejaz and Nejd for Britain, the Yemen and Asir for Italy. (55) Chamberlain was firm in his guidance, declaring that Italy should not be asked what it wanted, "as definition easily becomes crystallisation." (56) Instead, matters should be kept open until it was decided exactly what was wanted in Arabia. Once the Cabinet and CID had examined these points, British policy could be decided. The Italians could then be approached and told what Britain's vital interests were. It was decided that negotiations would be delayed until after the CID had made their report. (57).

The CID's conclusions arrived in early November 1926. (58) It had been agreed that Britain should exclude any European power from the Arabian shores of the Red Sea, and most importantly from the Farsan and Kamaran Islands. The importance of these Islands, in terms of Imperial communications, and the danger posed by Italian occupation under the guise of the Imam, led the CID to suggest that their defence should be undertaken by Britain itself rather than the Idrisi. After digesting the report, Lancelot Oliphant, Head of the Eastern Department, asked Sir Gilbert Clayton to head the forthcoming British negotiations in Rome. He emphasized that there would be no negotiations as such. Clayton would merely be required to act as the mouthpiece of the government. His task would be to give the British position, meet any italian criticisms, and invite an equally frank expression of Italian views and policy. Sir Ronald Graham, British Ambassador to Rome, would guide him throughout. Chamberlain made it clear from the outset that the intention was to "promote political co-operation between the two countries by a frank exchange of views regarding British and Italian interests in the Red Sea." (59) There was no need for a formal agreement. Indeed, the British Government was keen that this meeting should be merely a series of discussions, as opposed to negotiations. The Foreign Office was well aware by now of the talent of Italian officials to transform simple meetings into far-reaching discussions of Italian desiderata. Italian aims and interests in the Red Sea were to be accepted, but only if they were of a commercial and economic nature, as opposed to political. (60)

V. The Talks of Rome--January 1927

Clayton and Graham met Gasparini and Raffaele Guariglia in Rome on l l January 1927. (61) The British duo soon gained some idea of Italian methods when a telegram arrived in Rome the next day from Lord Lloyd, Britain's high commissioner in Egypt. (62) He had met Gasparini while the latter was en route for Rome. During discussions, Gasparini had suggested that in order for Britain to make progress in the Yemen, it needed a stalking horse, a job for which Italy was perfectly suited. This could be achieved by way of a secret understanding between the two. Lloyd stated that he had been noncommittal in his reply. It was clear to both Clayton and Graham that Gasparini might be seeking to play his own game in these negotiations, outside of official Italian policy. (63)

The opening day of talks saw discussions begin over the Farsan Islands. The Italians acknowledged British fears regarding Imperial communications but stated that they needed the islands to be developed economically, thus enabling Eritrea to take advantage of any increase in trade. (64) This would be prejudiced by the presence of British military forces on the islands themselves. Guariglia offered a moratorium on any Italian military presence in return, but was told by Graham that the Admiralty was strongly against any such deal. (65) It was quickly accepted by both parties that British interests revolved around political matters and the security of communications through the region, while Italian interests were commercial in nature and connected with the economic expansion of Eritrea. (66) The Italian perspective appeared to have been well articulated, in fact. The Foreign Office was now fully aware that the Farsan Islands were considered by Italy to be of vital economic importance to Eritrea and although Britain had made its position clear, it had to consider the Italian point of view to prevent unnecessary resentment on the part of Rome. (67)

There was a complicating factor, however. On 15 January, news arrived that Ibn Saud and the Idrisi had signed the Treaty of Mecca, which now put the Asir under the protection and suzerainty of the Ibn Saud. This would undoubtedly shift the balance of power in the region away from the Imam, reinforcing the Idrisi's claims against him, and complicate the Imam's relations with Britain. Italian interests were likely to surfer accordingly. Although the Italian delegates in Rome lobbied Britain to refuse recognition of the treaty, the Foreign Office felt that it could not do so, when it was in amicable treaty relations with both Ibn Saud and the Idrisi, merely to satisfy the dubious claims of a third ruler, with whom Britain had poor relations. (68)

Clayton then met with representatives from the Foreign and Colonial Offices to discuss what might be offered to the Italians. On the issue of the Treaty of Mecca, it was decided that British endorsement would be postponed rather than refused. On the wider issues at hand, it was decided that Italy should be pushed to accept some sort of formula recognising the vital strategic interests of Britain in the Red Sea. (69) They would also be required to renounce any political ambitions regarding the Farsan Islands. Chamberlain then contacted Clayton in order to congratulate him upon the progress made and to stipulate what he wanted to extract from the Italians. (70) This corresponded to what had already been decided, but Chamberlain emphasised that if political co-operation could be secured, then economic co-operation would follow. Accordingly, he favoured an Italian share in the Farsan oil concession at some point, commenting that this was something the British government favoured in principle, even if it were not at this moment practicable. Indeed, the veracity of Italian ctaims had been duly acknowledged by their British counterparts, and Clayton concluded that "the Ambassador (Sir Ronald Graham) and l were both impressed by the arguments advanced by the Italian representatives and, on reflection, came to the conclusion that they applied with equal or greater force to the British side of the question." (71)

The Anglo-Italian discussions finally concluded on 10 February with a joint declaration affirming Britain's strategic interests regarding the Kamaran and Farsan Islands, but acknowledging Italian economic interests in the region. (72) It was also stipulated that neither power had political ambitions in Southern Arabia and the Red Sea and that both countries would maintain close contact on all questions relating to the Red Sea and Southern Arabia, seeking to prevent conflict between the Arab Chiefs. The issue of the Kamaran Islands had been touched upon only briefly. It appeared that the Italians knew something of Britain's unease but had declined to push the subject. (73) Chamberlain, upon being notified of the results of the talks, considered that the objectives that Britain had set out to secure by initiating the talks had been reached and congratulated Clayton on the success of the mission. However, hOt all British officials were entirely satisfied. In a letter to Chamberlain, Lord Birkenhead warned against giving the Italians a free hand in Arabia, one which would allow them to strengthen their hand in the Yemen. (74) Birkenhead believed that the original purpose of the talks had been to clarify the respective aires and views of Britain and Italy in the Red Sea, as well as letting Italy know that its game was up. This had been accomplished, and Britain should now be careful of committing itself to an agreement which it would consider binding, but which Italy would not. Chamberlain responded to Birkenhead's concerns by emphasizing the benefits of accommodating Mussolini in the Red Sea: "On looking round the map the main, if not the only point of possible divergence is in the Red Sea and its neighbourhood. If then we can come to some understanding about that area ... I think our one possible difficulty with the Italians might be removed." (75)

Chamberlain was fully aware of the Italian government's capacity for duplicity but believed that it generally stemmed from the activity of junior diplomats at the local level. Having already encountered this behaviour when smoothing out Anglo-Italian relations in Albania the previous year, Chamberlain could see in Gasparini the sort of element that typified this behaviour. However, he believed that Rome, specifically Mussolini, exerted a strong and calming influence upon Italy's Red Sea policy:

   I am fully aware that the average Italian is naturally out for his
   own country's ends on every possible and even small occasion.
   This has been shown by Mr. Gasparini's attitude during the
   recent conversations. On the other hand, when his local enthusiasm
   got carried away, he was on each occasion gently made
   to feel the curb by Guariglia, who was undoubtedly acting on
   general instructions received from Mussolini himself. (76)

Nevertheless, Birkenhead's comments indicated the degree of mistrust felt by many within official circles towards Italy. Rome's grasping attitude since the war, combined with the Fascist reputation for opportunism, still caused disquiet within some quarters of the British government. It was understood that such techniques were the on1y way in which Italy could make progress against the Anglo-French hegemony in Europe and Africa. Weakened as it was by poverty, political dissent, and a lack of real military capability, the traditional concept of a nation's diplomacy resting upon a basis of power was inverted for the Italian model, leading to an emphasis upon what could be regarded as underhand manoeuvring to accomplish diplomatic objectives. However, this approach consistently left a bad taste in the mouth of often rather conservative British government officials and diplomats, used to more subtle and sophisticated methods. Yet it was also evident that Chamberlain was keen, at this point in time, to rise above these criticisms, eager to see the positives for Britain of a satisfied Italy. Aware as anyone else of Mussolini's tendency to push for more than he was entitled to, his response to Birkenhead's fears illustrated his belief that he could steer Mussolini in the right direction, to the eventual and lasting benefit of Britain.

Both sides came away from the discussions feeling that they had more or less achieved their objectives, although both sides had been forced to compromise. For Britain, the conversations must have provoked a slightly mixed reaction among policymakers. Having called for discussions in reaction to what it believed were intolerable Italian ambitions in the Red Sea, Britain felt that the Rome conversations had, superficially, given Italy the initiative. Italy had forced Britain to openly relinquish plans it might have had for a permanent base in the Red Sea islands, although it was safe to say that an emergency or outbreak of war would force Britain to disregard its promise. Added to this was the acceptance by Britain that Italian claims were as valid, if not more so, than its own. For the Italians, although the conversations had seemingly been of benefit in some areas and appeared to legitimize their presence on the eastern side of the Red Sea, they had also forced Italy to openly relinquish any political activities and accept a ceiling on its ambitions in the Red Sea.

With conversations over, Britain once again turned its attention to the Imam. In late February, the Colonial Office drafted a letter warning him that any future encroachment upon the protectorate would be met by British military action. This provoked immediate consternation on the part of Italian officials, who saw their hold in the Yemen threatened. (77) However, Britain's ability to deal with the Imam, peacefully or not, was hampered by more than just pledges made to Italy. Indeed, it threatened to highlight the paucity of a concerted government policy in the region. The importance of the Red Sea, in both a strategic and commercial sense, dictated that numerous government departments were affected by events there, yet the lack of any fixed Arabian policy had created a situation whereby those same departments competed against each other to press their views. (78) For instance, the government and defence of Aden featured input from the Colonial and Indian offices and also the War Office, which for this purpose included the Admiralty and Air Ministry. Added to this were the Bombay Presidency and the Aden Resident himself, who answered to the Colonial Office, but whose proximity to the situation gave his opinion some independent authority. The Foreign Office, while not responsible for administration within the protectorate, considered the region to be under its own purview. The large number of government departments involved in turn led to varying opinions on how the problem should be handled. The Aden Resident, for example, in conjunction with the Admiralty and War Office, considered that although the government should be open to discussions with the Imam, it should be made clear that he must withdraw completely from the Protectorate. Alternatively, the Foreign Office and the Air Ministry Suggested that the Imam's position in the protectorate might be recognised provisionally. They in turn were opposed by Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for Colonies, who; being briefed on Aden matters by the War Office, came down on the side of the latter. (79)

However, the Foreign Office knew that problems existed whichever direction was taken. Military action required an increase in the strength in the Aden garrison, at precisely the time that the CID was seeking to reduce overseas commitments. Alternatively, a reduction in British military strength could lead to an increase in tribal strength, which would eventually require an increase in garrison strength. The decision was forced by the Imam himself in October when he stipulated that not only should he remain in the protectorate but that he should also be given the Red Sea islands, including Kamaran. He accompanied this by a further encroachment into the protectorate. Osborne, after hearing confirmation of this, urged that the Imam be bombed. (80) The Colonial Office concurred and after being given notice of British intentions, the Imam's forces withdrew, simultaneously warned that they would be bombed immediately if they encroached again. (81)

The Italian response to this event had been immediate, but conciliatory, offering to restrain the Imam from further action, Italy was worried that any attack by Britain on the Imam would encourage lbn Saud to pursue the same policy, leading to the probable destruction of Zeidi power and the total eclipse of Italian interests. Italian officials were therefore keen that their influence be felt in the dispute and so sought to persuade Britain that this was the sort of matter that required Anglo-Italian cooperation. The Foreign Office response was terse, reminding Rome that throughout the recent bilateral conversations it had never been understood that Italy would act as a mediator in any dispute between Britain and the Imam. Initially, Mussolini appeared upset at the Foreign Office response, challenging the legitimacy of Britain's actions. (82) However, the official Italian attitude appeared to have changed by the rime Graham spoke to Grandi at the end of October. Grandi told him that Italy fully supported the attitude taken by Britain, but had wished for notification so as to exercise their own influence upon the Imam in order to curb his actions. (83)

Meanwhile, the continued lack of cohesion on the part British administration in the region continued to attract criticism. Lord Lloyd lamented the fact that there was no British diplomatic or consular authority responsible for more than a part of the Peninsula. He reasoned that this was hampering the effectiveness of British policy in Arabia and, although he accepted that the govemment's policy towards Italy and the Yemen was governed by wider considerations, he stated that it was imperative that Britain be more aware of what was happening on a local scale.

Lloyd's criticisms were supported by Tyrrell, who, in a letter to Sir Samuel Wilson, complained at Britain's attempts to deal with the various matters arising. (84) He believed that British policy was drifting along in a haphazard manner, losing whatever control it may have had over events in the Red Sea. The reason for this, he concluded, was the requirement to reconcile the interests of three different departments. (85) A clear example of this could be seen in the ongoing difficulties with the Imam. Tyrrell cited an incident on 16 November, when the Colonial Office, which was ultimately responsible for the tribes, had agreed with the Air Ministry's suggestion that when air operations were justified, they should be pursued until the Imam was ejected from the Protectorate. The Colonial Office had asked if the Foreign Office agreed, while the latter received a simultaneous request from the Aden Resident to postpone any operations until all chances of an agreement had failed. Thus, the Colonial Office had asked the Foreign Office to sanction a course of action that its own representative opposed.

VI. 1928: The Waning of Italian Influence

By the close of 1927, Italy came to realize that it had backed the wrong man in the Imam. Now, in the first months of 1928, this impression grew stronger. Not only was the Imam in danger of being eclipsed by Ibn Saud, who by now had taken control of the Asir, he was starting to come to terms with the realities of British power. In early January, John Murray, head of the Egyptian Department, met Hassam Pasha Anis, ex-Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Egyptian Government. Anis had recently visited the Imam and believed that he was disillusioned with Italian help and more amenable to British influence. (86) This impression was reinforced by a conversation between Commander Crauford and Clayton subsequent to Pasha's visit. Crautbrd, who had recently met with the Imam's advisors, agreed that the Imam was genuinely keen to come to an agreement with Britain and, while regretting his rejection of Clayton's overtures in early 1926, felt that it would be undignified to reopen negotiations at this stage. Effectively, Crauford was laying blame at the feet of the Aden administration for creating difficulties that need not have existed, thereby unwittingly aiding Italian ambitions. (87)

It was at this point in spring 1928 that a major change occurred in Italian representation in the Red Sea region. At the end of April, Graham informed the Foreign Office that Gasparini had been removed from his post. (88) He had apparently fallen out of favour in Rome and was to be replaced by Corrado Zoli, previously the High Commissioner of Trans-Jubaland. (89) The news elicited little comment from the Foreign Office. Murray, head of the Egyptian Department and therefore familiar with Gasparini's policies in both Eritrea and Ethiopia, concluded that the chief reason for Gasparini's departure had been his Arabian policy and that time would tell whether his removal would alter Italian policy in the Red Sea. (90) It could be argued that Rome's decision to replace Gasparini with Zoli was a subtle message. Zoli was an able, respected diplomat well known to the Foreign Office by virtue of the negotiations over the cessation of Trans-Jubaland by Britain to Italy in 1924-25. His establishment in Eritrea, and the obvious contrast in his methods compared to Gasparini, may have been a signal by Rome that it wished to align itself with British policy.

Certainly, Gasparini's methods had lent credence to the assertion that much of Italy's colonial policy over the past few years was a series of "drastic Ministerial initiatives, barely restrained by the permanent bureaucracy in place in Rome." (91) Indeed, Tyrell had articulated the prevailing attitude of Foreign Office officials on the subject of Italian diplomacy when he stated that "Italian agents abroad know that an excess of zeal may be forgiven them but that weakness will not. A premium is put on exceeding instructions." (92) Now, subsequent to Gasparini's fall from grace, suspicion of Italy both in the Yemen and Arabia in general lessened on the part of the Foreign Office. (93)

This feeling of growing Italian cooperation was reinforced by its actions in light of Britain's decision in late May to bomb the Imam. (94) This was a result of his continued refusal to withdraw from the town of Dhala, inside the protectorate, Italy did nothing to dissuade the British government from its course of action. (95) Indeed, Rome appeared to take an increasingly dim view of the Imam's behaviour. (96) During the first week of September, the Italian government appeared keen to promote evidence of the conciliatory nature of Italian policy in the Red Sea. An article by Roberto Cantalupo, former Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, appeared in Corriere Della Sera, promoting the compatibility of British and Italian interests in the region. (97) But opportunism still lurked. Even as late as November that year Mussolini was open in his desire for the conflict between Britain and the Imam to continue bubbling away so that Italy could play both sides off against the other and maintain a foot in both camps. (98)

By 1929, then, Italian policy in the Red Sea was essentially compliant with British desiderata. Although Italy continued to maintain a watching brief on the region, and Arabia especially, into the 1930s, it had been served notice that blatant expansionism would not be tolerated. Any attempt at a "regional" policy in the face of British dominance had been abandoned for the time being. Consequently, public and private utterances from Rome implied that, rather than competing, Italy was now willing to align itself with Britain. Unless it did so, it faced the prospect of losing whatever influence it still possessed in that region. This newfound desire to follow Britain's lead was reinforced in early 1929 in a telegram from Guariglia to Bordonaro on the issue of Aden and the Imam. (99) The former stated that Italy's role was now to focus on enabling Britain to attain its objectives and finished by instructing Bordonaro that, "we must seize every chance to emphasise this attitude of ours, so that it goes beyond the generic collaboration of the Talks of Rome." (100)

VII. Conclusion

Britain, its dispute with the Imam notwithstanding, had successfully confronted Italian expansion on the eastern side of the Red Sea and safeguarded its vital link with the East. Rome had been forced to accept strong limitations on its ambitions there, forcing it to pursue a more pro-British line. The most important of Britain's strategic objectives during this Anglo-Italian debate had been preserved. However, the British effort had not been flawless. Policy had been hampered by conditions preventing a more rapid solution to the problem: namely, the awkward and fluid nature of the political situation in Arabia and the confused nature of Britain's administration of the Aden colony. (101) In addition, the lack of familiarity with Red Sea politics at the highest levels of the Foreign Office had been amply illustrated.

The uncertain and ever-changing nature of Red Sea politics during this period placed a premium upon the effectiveness of the lines of communication and of diplomacy. Unfortunately, Aden's central position in the nexus between a number of different government departments meant that any policy decided upon was formulated and carried out amidst confusion. A lack of diplomatic presence on the ground dictated that the Foreign Office was unable to discern the nature and direction of initial Italian efforts, and the sometimes conflicting interests of the India Office, Colonial Office, and Admiralty only served to promote a degree of sluggishness in Britain's response to the twin issues of the Imam and Italian expansion. But this particular Anglo-Italian debate had also indicated some of Chamberlain's strengths. His ability to assess Italian activity calmly and seek to accommodate it where it did not clash with British interests served to calm the situation. His decision to bring the matter to the negotiating table in 1927 occurred simply when he felt that Italy had overstepped the mark somewhat. Even then, he appeared willing to countenance significant Italian activity in the Yemen, so long as it followed economic rather than political lines. He also felt comfortable in delegating important matters to his trusted officials and illustrated the Foreign Office's reliance on the awareness of such men as Lancelot Oliphant, Francis Osborne, and Victor Mallett. It was these men, the Department head and his subordinates, aided by Sir William Tyrrell, who in the main helped formulate Britain's response to the Italian policy. They operated in the absence of Chamberlain's desire to become fully involved in the situation, and in light of his self-admitted ignorance of the finer points of events in the Red Sea, it was these junior Foreign Office officials who formulated the necessary response to Italian expansion in an area of such vital importance to Britain, without damaging the Anglo-Italian relationship as a whole.

In return, Italian policy was energetic but, ultimately, doomed to fail. Indeed, the question remains: was the Anglo-Italian debate in the Red Sea a failure of a concerted Italian policy, or of Gasparini's single-handed effort to challenge British primacy in the region? It was clear that Italian policy had become more pronounced since the failure of the Clayton-Imam negotiations in early 1926. In addition, Anglo-Italian cooperation in Abyssinia since the spring of 1925 (and cemented by the signing of the Anglo-Italian agreement that December) had drawn Rome's attention to the economic viability of its East African colonies of

Somalia and Eritrea and, by virtue of trade links, its position in both Abyssinia and the Yemen. Its diplomatic and political offensive in the latter had only been encouraged by Britain's difficulties with the Imam. Whether the ultimate failure of this policy was the fault of Gasparini is debatable. Certainly, his underhand methods caused some disquiet on the part of British ministers, and added an unnecessary amount of suspicion to Italian activities. However, his task was rendered almost impossible by the strategic value of the region to Britain. Although interested solely in the commercial benefits to Eritrea of an agreement with the Yemen, his activities guaranteed Britain's unease in a region of vital strategic importance to its wider Imperial interests. No matter how able a diplomat he was, his efforts were guaranteed to encounter resistance from Britain. As to whether he was acting upon the orders of Mussolini, Gasparini's efforts could not necessarily be traced back to either Mussolini or Federzoni, and neither did he appear to be acting to promote wider Italian strategic goals. His main motivation appeared to be the development of the Yemen for the benefit of Eritrea. Any desire on his part to challenge British power really came second to his desire to increase the economic development of his personal fiefdom there.

It was the Italo-Yemeni treaty of September 1926 that forced Italy's hand. Asked to clarify Italian intentions, Mussolini appeared pressured into the offer of staging talks in Rome. The possibility of a breach in relations with Britain was not something he could consider at this point. The Rome Talks of January and February 1927 were not detrimental to Italian interests, as they actually served to emphasize that Britain was unconcerned with Italy's economic endeavours in the Yemen as long as they followed certain lines and such endeavours did not touch upon the islands of Kamaran and Farsan. It has been argued that the Rome talks were designed by Italy to be the first exchange of official views between the two governments, prior to an Anglo-Italian share-out in the Eastern Mediterranean. (102) Whether such a share-out was ever envisaged in British minds is highly unlikely. In any case, the Rome discussions were certainly not intended to be the preliminary to any such thing in British minds. They were designed purely to illuminate to Italy the cardinal points of Britain's strategic needs and to illustrate that Britain would in no way tolerate the political ambitions of Italy, or any other power for that matter, in such a sensitive region.

Neither were the Rome talks designed to punish Italian aspirations. The discussions were intended tO preserve the Anglo-Italian relationship rather than damage it. Chamberlain firmly intended to maintain cordial relations between Britain and Italy, and unhindered Italian expansion would only lead to an eventual confrontation between the two. Indeed, it was noticeable throughout this period that Chamberlain sought to accommodate Italy where possible. He believed that by settling the Red Sea question amicably, the only real matter of Anglo-Italian contention during that period could be reconciled. Chamberlain's main concern, as throughout this entire period of wider Anglo-Italian involvement, was to preserve the traditionally cordial relationship between Britain and Italy, due in part to his close relationship with Mussolini, but driven in the main by his understanding of Britain's wider foreign policy objectives and the need to maintain both peace and the status quo for the benefit of British interests.

(1) Relatively few works deal comprehensively with the issue of Anglo-Italian relations during the period under examination. Most tend to concentrate on the period prior to 1924 or after 1930. However, these still contain valuable insights as to the nature of Italian foreign policy in terms of its relationship with Great Britain. Anglo-Italian relations during the early postwar years are examined in D. Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties (London, 1938) and C. Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1940 (London, 1967). The later period is discussed in L. Pratt, East of Malta West of Suez; Britain's Mediterranean Crisis 1936-1939 (Cambridge, 1975), C. Petrie, The Lords of the Inland Sea: A Study of the Mediterranean Powers (London, 1937). Robert Mallett also examined this latter period in Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War 1933-1939 (London, 2003). In his earlier work, The Italian Navv and Fasc'ist Expansionism 1935-1940 (London and Portland, Oregon, 1998) he puts forward the theory that Mussolini intended to challenge British power from the outset of his rule. His efforts to imbue the nation with Fascist qualities were motivated by the prospect of eventual conflict with Britain in conjunction with Germany. However, Brian Sullivan in "A Fleet in Being: The Rise and Fall of Italian Sea Power 1861-1943," International History Review, 10 (1975) pp. 106-24, bel ieves that the Royal Navy was disregarded as a potential opponent, even after the Corfu incident, as Italy knew it would have been suicidal to engage it in terms of numbers, bases and control of Suez and Gibraltar. In support of this, Richard Lamb in Mussolini and the British (London, 1997), p. 32, highlighted Sir Ronald Graham, Britain's Ambassador to Rome, questioning Mussolini on his anti-British statements shortly after the Italian leader had come to power. Mussolini's response was, "There are things one says when one has no responsibility, but forgets as soon as possible when one has." The theory that Italy intended to displace British power in the Mediterranean in conjunction with Germany was originally proposed by J. Petersen, "Gesellschaftssystem, Ideologie und lnteresse in der Aussenpolitik des Faschistichen Italien," Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken, 54 (1974), pp. 428-70 and is discussed in E.M. Robertson, Mussolini as Empire Builder (London, 1977).

(2) The Foreign Office and its officials have come under some scrutiny by historians. An excellent source, however, is provided by one of their own. Harold Nicolson, a former member of the Central Department of the Foreign Office during the mid-1920s gives a detailed account of the style and methods of British diplomats of this era in Diplomacy (London, 1939). His experience with Italian diplomats over the negotiations for the ceding of Transjubaland from Britain to Italy in 1924 also gave him valuable experience of Italian diplomacy. Corelli Barnett in The Collapse of British Power (London, 1967) is scathing as regards the slow pace and reactive nature of British diplomacy during the interwar period. With regard to Fascist Italy, see P.G. Edwards, "The Foreign Office and Fascism 1934-1929," Journal of Contemporary History, 5 (1970). The author claims that Foreign Office officials displayed a natural tendency to favour the new regime and that a form of internal censorship operated by which sources, critical of the methods employed by Mussolini, were replaced when it came to distribution of more senior officials, with more pro-Fascist leanings. For more information on the Foreign Office and its officials during this period, see D. Dilks, "The British Foreign Office Between the Wars" in B.J. McKercher and D.J. Moss (ed.). Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy 1895-1939 (Edmonton, 1984); E. Maisel, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1919-1936 (Brighton, 1994); and P. Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplomacy; The Background Influences on British External Policy 1865-1980 (London, 1981).

(3) S. Morewood, "Protecting the Jugular Vein of the Empire: The Suez Canal and British Defence Strategy 1919-1941," War and Society, 10 (1992), p. 81.

(4) Public Records Office, Kew [hereafter cited as PRO] CAB 4/700b Secret CID Memorandum: Imperial Defence Policy. Papers relating to the Annual Review of Imperial Defence, 15 June 1926.

(5) Aden consisted of the colony itself, and the Protectorate. The Protectorate was an area of ter ritory designed as a buffer to protect the colony. The Yemeni leader, the Imam of Sanaa, believed that Britain was occupying rightful Yemeni territory, and sought to expand his territory into the protectorate.

(6) For an examination of Aden during the immediate post war period see M. Wenner, Modern Yemen 1918-1966 (Baltimore, Maryland, 1967).

(7) See R.J. Blyth, The Empire of the Raj (Basingstoke, 2003) for more information on the role of Aden as a significant imperial outpost. British interest in Aden had been established during the early part of the nineteenth century. The adoption of an oil-powered fleet during the 1920s reinforced the importance of Aden as a fuel depot.

(8) Sources of information as to the nature of Italian diplomatic methods during this period are limited. This is in major part due to the fact that Italian diplomacy was often, during this period at least, a mixture of idiosyncratic dictatorial initiatives on the part of Mussolini and personal initiatives by trusted lieutenants on the ground. The Italian Foreign Ministry often found itself out of the "loop." Nevertheless, there is much to be round in A. Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy (Princeton, New Jersey, 1970); C. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy 1870-1940 (London and Boston, 1970); D. Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, (Penguin Books, London 1976); and M. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1919-41: Politics and Strategy in Italy 's Last War (Cambridge, 1982).

(9) An excellent example of this can be found in P.G. Edwards, "The Chamberlain Mussolini meetings," Historical Journal, 14 (1971).

(10) See P.G. Edwards, "Britain, Fascist Italy and Ethiopia 1925-1928," European Studies Review, 4 (1974), pp. 359-74.

(11) The Conservative Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, was content to leave foreign policy matters to others, notably Chamberlain.

(12) Numerous sources are available for those wishing fo further examine Britain's external policy making elites of the period. See J. Connell, The Office: A Study, of British Foreign Policy and its Makers 1919-1951 (London, 1958); G.A. Craig, "The Foreign Office from Grey to Chamberlain" in G. Craig and F. Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats 1919-1939 (Princeton, New Jersey, 1953); B.J.C. McKercher, "Austen Chamberlain's Control of British Foreign' Policy 1924-1929" International History Review, 6 (1984); and, by the same author, Transition of Power (Cambridge, 1999). For a comprehensive examination of British military and diplomatic policy-making during this period, see J. Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy 1919-1926 (London, 1989); N.H. Gibbs, "British Strategic Doctrine 1918-1939" in M. Howard (ed.), The Theory and Practice of War (London, 1965); and B.J.C. McKercher, The Transition of Power (Cambridge, 1999).

(13) The Eastern Department contained the Egyptian Department, which was responsible for overseeing British policy in Egypt, Abyssinia, and the Anglo-Egyptian colony of Sudan. The latter possessed a long coastline on the Red Sea and so potentially involved the Egyptian department in the Red Sea question. However, during the period 1924-28 the Egyptian department appeared far more concerned with nationalist activity in Egypt and the separate Anglo-Italian debate in Abyssinia occurring during this period, Italian activity in the Red Sea seemed to merit relatively little attention.

(14) The background and methods of British diplomats is examined in Z. Steiner and M.L. Dockrill, "The Foreign Office Reforms 1919-1921," The Historical Journal, 17 (1974); and Z. Steiner, The Times Survey of the Foreign Ministries of the World (London, 1982). With specific reference to the role played by Austen Chamberlain as head of the Foreign Office during the period examined, sec R. Grayson, Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe; British Foreign Policy 1924-1929 (London, 1997). This also gives a good description of how the various departments in the Foreign Office collated, organized, and disseminated information, and the stages at which the varying levels of senior diplomats within the FO impacted upon the process. Ephraim Maisel, in The Foreign Office andForeign Policy 1919-1936 (Eastbourne, United Kingdom, 1994) gives a similarly detailed impression of how the Foreign Office functioned, and gives a detailed description of some of the key figures present during this period, including Sir William Tyrrell.

(15) Chamberlain's attitude towards Italy can be summed up by his statement in the autumn of 1926 when he stated that "it is essential that we should keep Italy, a growing power, in sympathy with our policy and in co-operation with us. This may be vital in the future either to maintain peace in Europe or to restrain or guide Italy outside Europe." See W. Medlicott and D. Dakin, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-39, Series la Vol II (London, 1968): C10602/10060/18 No 243 p. 425. Minute by Sir Austen Chamberlain 7 October 1926. Chamberlain was consistent in this approach towards Italy for the duration of his tenure as Foreign Secretary November 1924-June 1929.

(16) The Asir was a small principality on the Red Sea coast North of Yemen. Under Ottoman rule it had constituted a Vilayet of the Yemen, thus prompting the Imam to claim it for himself. Having taken the port of Hodeidah in January 1925, the Imam was seeking to conquer the remainder of the Asir.

(17) PRO, E1759/176/91 FO 371 10818 No 11740/25 Colonial Office to FO 21 March 1925. An Italian destroyer had been seen landing ammunition, destined for the Idrisi, at the Farsan Islands on 23 March.

(18) R. Sinclair, Documents on the History of S. W. Arabia: Tribal Warfare and Foreign Policy in the Yemen and Adjacent Tribal Kingdoms. Vol II (Documentary Publications, Salisbury, North Carolina, 1976). Loder-Park, Vice Consul Aden, to Secretary of State Washington. 21 January 1925, No. 58 p. 143.

(19) PRO, E250/176/91 FO 371 10818 No 16858/25 Colonial Office to FO in response to telegram from Resident at Aden, 15 April 1925.

(20) PRO, E4679/2660/91 FO 371 11447 Memorandum by Mr Field: "Italian Claires to the Farsan Islands". FO 27 July 1926.

(21) See R. Quartararo, "L'Italia e 1o Yemen: uno Studia Politica di Espansione Italia nel Mar Rosso 1923-1927," Storia Contemporanea, 10 (1979), pp. 811-73.

(22) PRO, E4679/2660/91 FO 371 11447 Memorandum by Mr F. Fiel& Italian claires to the Farsan Islands. FO 27 July 1926.

(23) PRO, E3743/176/91 FO 371 10819 No 27065/25 Colonial Office to FO 24th June 1925. Between April 9 and 14 May, it was stated that there were seven separate instances of Italian activity at Hodeidah.

(24) Ibid.

(25) C. Segre, "Liberal and Fascist Italy in the Middle East 1919-1939," in U. Dann (ed.), The Great Powers in the Middle East (New York and London, 1988) p. 201.

(26) T. Santoro, The Red Sea in Italian Politics (Rome, 1937).

(27) Gasparini to Ministro di Colonie, Tel no 122, 5 May 1926. Quoted in R. Quartararo, "L'ltalia e lo Yemen," p. 816.

(28) PRO, E7439/176/91 FO 371 10819 No M.O. 3097/25 Secret. 30 November 1925.

(29) PRO, E7459/176/91 FO 371 10819 No. 131, Resident Aden to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, l December 1925.

(30) Sir Gilbert Clayton: ex chief political officer to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 19171919; advisor to Egyptian Ministry of the Interior 1919-1922; and chier secretary of the Government of Palestine 1922-1925.

(31) PRO, E7459/176/91 FO 371 11433 No C 1533/26 Colonial Office to FO 19 August 1926. See minute attache&

(32) PRO, E3198/367/91 FO 371 11442 No. 55 30/4 Secret 1 May 1926. Acting Consul, Jeddah, to Foreign Office. The acting Consul stated that three aeroplanes and 116 cases of equipment were landed at Hodeidah by the Italian steamship Lomedano in April 1926. Britain had decided early in 1925 against supplying weapons to any side in this region due to the volatility of the situation.

(33) Ibid.

(34) PRO, E4215/2660/91 FO 371 11447 No. M.O. 1633/26 Admiralty to FO Urgent and Secret 13th July 1926. The Foreign office was rather unimpressed with what it considered to be Admiralty scaremongering, however, it was unclear as to where the Admiralty was getting its information from. A few months later, the Foreign Office complained again at the confused nature of reports emanating from the region. On 19 October a British source in Jeddah stated that 1500 of the Imam's men were heading towards the Asir. This was followed by news that the Italians had landed large amounts of weapons and ammunition at Hodeidah. Subsequently, the Royal Naval units in the area sent contrary reports, first stating that the Imam's troops were merely carrying out defensive manoeuvres (PRO, E6951/4/91 FO 371 11448 Admiralty to FO 24 November 1926 Report from H.M.S. Clematis), then stating that the Idrisi was preparing to attack the Imam, (PRO, E6608/4/91 FO 371 11448 Admiralty to FO 30 November 1926. Report from HMS Clematis). The confused nature of these reports caused Dashwood. of the Eastern Department, to claim that it was becoming difficult to form an accurate picture of what was happening.

(35) PRO, E4332/2660/91 FO 371 11447 Interdepartmental meeting on the Red Sea situation. Memorandum by Mr Mallett, 15 July 1926. Francis Osborne and Victor Mallett met with the Aden Resident, General Stewart and representatives from the Colonial Office and India Office.

(36) PRO, E4258/2660/91 FO 371 11447 C.12745/26 Colonial Office 15 July 1926.

(37) PRO, E4332/2660/91 FO 371 11447 Memorandum by Mallett, FO 15 July 1926. Results of Interdepartmental conference. Kamaran Island had been taken under British rule from the Turks in 1916. At the treaty of Lausanne in 1923, it had been decided that the future of the Island would be decided by the parties concerned, but Britain maintained control. Indeed, Britain had been unwilling to raise the subject of Kamaran due to uncertainty over the issue of its sovereignty. In essence, Britain was unsure as to whether its presence there was legal. The island was administered from the colony of Aden and Britain did not actually relinquish control until it left that colony in 1967.

(38) For an examination of the concerns of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the Arabian

situation during this period see PRO, Cab 2/4 No 218 25 November 1926. Although Kamaran was under British control and the prospect of relinquishing it to either the Imam or Italy was remote in the extreme, British officials seemed unwilling for the matter to be raised in an international setting, for the reasons given above.

(39) PRO, E4332/2660/91 FO 371 11447 Mernorandum by Mallett, FO 15 July 1926. Results of Interdepartmental conference.

(40) Ibid.

(41) PRO, E4432/2660/91 FO 371 11447 Cabinet Office communicated to FO 21 July 1926.

(42) PRO, E4637/2660/91 FO 371 11448 Minute by Mr Oliphant, 3 August 1926.

(43) Ibid.

(44) PRO, E4253/710/91 FO 371 11448 No 1 Chamberlain minute 29 July 1926.

(45) Otherwise known as the Italo-Yemeni Treaty.

(46) According to some, the Treaty of Sanaa was perceived in Rome as the beginning of a vast Middle Eastern policy that would come to fruition in the early 1930s. Mussolini's intention was to see 1926 as the year when Italy's colonial policy came to the fore: "Have faith in the Fascist Revolution that will have in 1926 its Napoleonic year. Have faith in the Italian people that today starts occupying its proper material and moral position in the world." The main thrust of this effort was to be focused on Africa and the Middle East, which afforded Italy the space to make progress. See R. Quartararo, "L'Italia e lo Yemen," p. 821. However, it seems obvious that such a grand policy was, at this point, beyond Italian capabilities. Rather, it would have to rely upon the natural talent for opportunism possessed by its diplomats, such as Gasparini.

(47) Archivo Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASMAE) No 797 Fasc 853 Tel 108. Gasparini to Ministero Colonie, 2 May 1926. See Quartararo, "'L'Italia e lo Yemen," p. 828.

(48) PRO, E5611/3239/91 FO 371 11448 Daily Telegraph (Extract) September 29 1926.

(49) PRO, E4637/2660/91 FO 371 11448 Tyrrell, FO 9 September 1926.

(50) PRO, E369/2660/91 FO 371 C10124/391/90 No. 1270 Chamberlain to Wingfield (Rome) 13 September 1926.

(51) I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani [hereafter cited as DDI], Vol IV Settima Serie, (1922-35) (Rome, 1952). Conversation between Mussolini and Chamberlain, Livomo, 30 September 1926.

(52) PRO, C/10581/9326/22 FO 371 11401 Chamberlain to Tyrrell, unnumbered Confidential 1 October 1926.

(53) PRO, E5657/2660/91 FO 371 11448 Italian Embassy to FO 40ctober 1926 No Number given.

(54) Ibid. See Minute attached.

(55) See H. Erlich, "Mussolini and the Middle East in the 1920s," p. 206.

(56) PRO, E5657/2660/91 FO 371 11448 italian Embassy to FO. 4 October 1926. See Minute attached.

(57) Ibid.

(58) PRO, E6257/2660/91 FO 371 11448 Sir M. Hankey to FO No. cp. 377 (Secret) 9 November 1926.

(59) PRO, E/6785/2660/91 FO 371 11488 Chamberlain to Clayton, 10 December 1926.

(60) PRO, E6785/2660/91 FO 371 11448 Tyrrell, Foreign Office 10 December 1926.

(61) Raffaele Guariglia, head of Mediterranean and Colonial Section of Europe and the Levant 1926-31.

(62) PRO, E214/22/91 FO 371 12235 No7 Lord LIoyd, (Cairo) to FO Secret, 12 January 1927.

(63) lbid See Minute attached.

(64) PRO, E/229/22/91 FO 371 12235 No. 11 Graham, (Rome) to FO 13 January 1927.

(65) PRO, E266/22/91 FO 371 12235 Clayton to Mr Oliphant 14 January 1927.

(66) Ibid.

(67) Ibid.

(68) When Clayton spoke to Gasparini on the subject, Gasparini told him that recognition of the Saud-Idrisi agreement by agreement would throw the Imam into the arms of those "hostile to British policy." See PRO, E345/22/91 FO 371 12235 Clayton to FO 15 January 1927.

(69) Ibid.

(70) PRO, E376/22/91 FO 371 12235 No 8 Confidential Chamberlain to Clayton (Rome), 27 January 1927.

(71) Ibid.

(72) Ibid.

(73) Britain bad been unwilling to raise the subject of Kamaran due to uncertainty over the issue of its sovereignty. In essence, Britain was unsure as to whether its presence there was legal. The islands had been seized from the Turks in 1916.

(74) PRO, FO 800 260 No. 145 Lord Birkenhead, Indian Office, to Chamberlain 26 January 1927.

(75) PRO, FO 800 260 No. 146 Chamberlain fo Lord Birkenhead, Indian Office, 27 January 1927.

(76) Ibid.

(77) PRO, E 1132/22/91 FO 371 12236 No. 48004/27 Confidential Colonial Office to FO 8 March 1927.

(78) See C. Leatherdale, The Imperial Oasis (London, 1983) p. 145.

(79) Ibid., p. 146.

(80) PRO, E4203/22/91 FO 371 12237 No48004/27 Immediate and Confidential, Colonial Office October 3 1927.

(81) Ibid.

(82) DDI Vol V Settima Serie No. 481 Mussolini to Federzoni and Rogeri. Rome 21 October 1927.

(83) PRO, E4475/22/91 FO 371 12239 No 804 Graham, (Rome) to Chamberlain, FO 24 October 1927.

(84) Sir Samuel Wilson, Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Colonial Office

(85) PRO, E5343/22/91 FO 371 12239 Foreign Office to Colonial Office 13 December 1927.

(86) PRO, E116/80/91 FO 371 13003 Memorandum from Mr Murray, FO 6 January 1928.

(87) PRO, E279/80/91 FO 371 13003 Sir J. Shuckburgh, Colonial Office to Mr Oliphant, Confidential 11 January 1928.

(88) PRO, J 1509/883/66 FO 371 13154 Graham (Rome), to FO No 338 April 30 1928.

(89) Transjubaland, a region in modern day Kenya, had been officially ceded by Britain to the Italians in 1925 as part recognition, under the Treaty of London, for their entry into the war on the Allied side in 1915. Briefly existing as a separate territory, Transjubaland was incorporated into Italian Somaliland in 1926.

(90) Ibid.

(91) C, Segre, "'Liberal and Fascist Italy in the Middle East 1919-1939." p. 204.

(92) PRO, FO 800a 263 Graham (Rome) to Chamberlain 2 July 1926. See Minute attached.

(93) Still considered a gifted administrator, Gasparini was accepted back into the Eritrean Government by Zoli in 1932, prior to a policy of encroachment in Abyssinia from 1933 onwards.

(94) PRO, E3147/80/91 FO 371 13003 Bordonaro to FO 19 June 1928. Sec Minute attached. For more on Britain's policy of colonial policing from the air, sec D.E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control 1919-1939 (Manchester, 1990).

(95) Ibid.

(96) DDI Vol. VI, Settima serie No. 417 Mussollini to Federzoni 17 June 1928.

(97) PRO, E/4477/80/91 FO 371 13007 Wingfield (Rome) to FO no 663 (216/54/28) 7 September 1928.

(98) DDI Vol. VII, No 79 Mussolini to Federzoni, 24 November 1928.

(99) DDI No. 241 11, Guariglia to Bordonaro, Rome 8 February 1929.

(100) Ibid.

(101) The effect that Britain's complex system of departmental administration had upon its foreign policy is illustrated by D. Dilks, "The British Foreign Office between the Wars," in B.J.C. McKercher and D.J. Moss (eds.), Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy 1895-1939 (Edmonton, 1984), pp. 184-88.

(102) R. Quartararo, "L'Italia e lo Yemen," p. 829.

Dr Christian Tripodi is a lecturer at the Defence Studies Department, part of the War Studies Group of Kings College London. He is presently employed at the Joint Services Command and Staff College at the UK Defence Academy.