Early this summer the intelligence community was also involved in discussions regarding the utility of staging attacks from Afghanistan into Pakistan to disrupt the Taliban and al-Qaeda. A number of assessments based on possible scenarios all concluded that the outcome would be very bad if U.S.

troops were to enter Pakistan, or if U.S. aircraft and drones were to step up their bombing. One assessment noted that the United States has no right under international law to attack a country with which it is not at war, and there was general agreement that poor intelligence resources would mean that an increase in forays into Pakistan would neither cripple the Taliban nor eliminate al-Qaeda and would only produce civilian casualties. The analysis of Pakistani politics concluded that politicians supporting the war on terrorism would be marginalized, popular sentiment would become even more violently anti-American and pro-terrorist, and factions within the military and the intelligence service would refuse to co-operate with their American counterparts and even sabotage efforts against the insurgent groups. Pakistan would also certainly cut off the supply line from Karachi that sustains allied troops in Afghanistan. A worst-case scenario saw Pakistan descending into political chaos, with a wave of political assassinations preceding the army's refusal to fight tribesmen or obey orders from politicians in Islamabad. A civil war might ensue and would raise serious questions about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. In spite of the intelligence community's concerns, President Bush personally ordered Central Command to begin attacks inside Pakistan whenever "actionable intelligence" is obtained.

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA Officer, is a fellow with the American Conservative Defense Alliance.