Labor and Employment Law--A Deferential Standard for Administrators Within a Statute Meant to Protect Workers--Bard v. Boston Shipping Association, 471 F.3d 229 (1st Cir. 2006)

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was enacted in 1974 to protect the millions of Americans

affected by employer-funded pension plans. (1) The denial of pension and disability benefits to employees by plan administrators has provided fertile ground for litigation, and the courts have struggled to protect participant rights while giving deference to decisions made by pension plan administrators. (2) In Bard v. Boston Shipping Association, (3) the First Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether administrators, running a multi-employer pension plan, abused its discretion by denying an employee's benefit application. (4) Although the administrators had discretion to determine participants' eligibility for benefits, the court determined that they violated ERISA's procedural requirements with regard to notice of denial and appeal. (5)

While an employee at the Boston Shipping Association (BSA), Paul Bard participated in the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) pension plan, which is considered a multi-employer pension plan under ERISA. (6) On July 23, 2001, the BSA terminated Bard after thirty years of service as a crane operator. (7) While employed by the BSA, Bard failed three drug tests, for which he sought treatment post-termination. (8) After being awarded disability benefits under Social Security, Bard applied for disability benefits from the BSA-ILA plan. (9)

Due in part to incorrect interpretations of other recently arbitrated benefit applications, the administrators denied Bard's application on the basis that a terminated employee does not have standing to apply for benefits. (10) The administrators never notified Bard that his application was denied, nor did they provide reasons for the denial. (11) This omission was a direct violation of ERISA regulations, which requires the administrators provide notice to the claimant no later than five days after an adverse determination. (12) Bard eventually learned of the administrators' denial of his benefits application and filed an appeal to challenge the decision. (13) In January 2004, Bard submitted a second application, this time appending medical records and other documentation of his disability. (14) While the board took Bard's appeal under advisement at its February 2004 meeting, it did not act further for approximately four months, again violating ERISA requirements for timely review and notification. (15)

The plan administrators submitted Bard's claim to an arbitrator in August 2004, nearly a year after he first filed a benefits application. (16) Shortly after Bard submitted his claim to the arbitrator, Bard also filed suit in Massachusetts federal district court seeking benefits under the BSA-ILA plan. (17) The district court reasoned that in cases where the plan itself gives deference to the administrator's interpretation, administrator decisions should be reviewed under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. (18) The district court analyzed the administrator's determination that Bard was not permanently disabled prior to his termination under the arbitrary and capricious standard, and the court determined that the administrator's decision was reasonable and within its own discretion. (19 The First Circuit reversed the district court, holding instead that Bard's interpretation of the plan was reasonable and that the procedural mistakes made by plan administrators created a prejudice against Bard. (20)

A significant portion of pension plans in the United States do not belong to just one employer. (21) Multi-employer pension plans differ from single-employer plans in composition and administration. (22) In multi-employer plans, boards comprised of union and management representatives make benefit determinations regarding participants. (23) As a result of the endemic tension between labor and management, the federal government has intervened specifically to regulate multi-employer plans. (24)

ERISA's purpose is to protect the rights of plan participants from unfunded or mismanaged pension plans. (25) As such, courts have construed ERISA as a remedial statute. (26) Paradoxically, when reviewing decisions involving the discretionary authority fiduciaries and administrators possess to make benefits decisions, courts will use the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard. (27) Courts have drawn, as the basis for granting that deferential standard, a comparison between ERISA and trust law. (28)

The Supreme Court held in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch (29) that a deferential standard of review is appropriate where an ERISA plan confers discretionary power on administrators to make benefit determinations. (30) To reach this conclusion, the Court analyzed the legislative intent behind ERISA by focusing solely on similarities in language between ERISA and trust law. (31) Employee protection, which is the basis of ERISA, is not contemplated in trust law. (32) Like ERISA, many laws protect American citizens from unfairness, deception, and overreaching, however, the Firestone Court declined to make analogies between ERISA and laws with a similar posture. (33)

In Bard v. Boston Shipping Association, the First Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment motion in favor of BSA-ILA. (34) The court held that ERISA imposes duties on plan administrators to provide applicants both timely notice of an adverse benefit determination and review by an independent appeals board. (35) Although the court applied a deferential standard of review regarding the administrators' decision, it could not overlook the serious procedural failings by BSA-ILA. (36) Relying heavily on the plain meaning of the statute, the court determined that Congress intended procedural safeguards to protect applicants from self-interested appellate review of benefit claims and to ensure timely notice of benefits denial. (37) Further, the court held the plan language was ambiguous as to whether former employees had standing to apply for benefits. (38) After a careful reading of the language, which neither explicitly prohibits former employees from eligibility nor specifically enumerates current employees, the court accepted Bard's interpretation as reasonable. (39) The First Circuit awarded Bard disability benefits, noting the ambiguity in language and the failure of the administrators to adhere to the letter and spirit of ERISA. (40)

The First Circuit declined to negotiate several important issues in concluding that Bard was improperly denied disability benefits. (41) This case presented an opportunity for the court to clarify the issue of stripping benefit administrators of the arbitrary and capricious standard, where procedural missteps occurred. (42) The court's reticence to take up this issue could be attributed to the inconsistent rulings exhibited by other circuit courts addressing the appropriate standard of review. (43) The complex nature of an issue, however, should not serve as a justification for its circumvention. (44)

The First Circuit viewed the procedural errors committed by the administrators as the basis for awarding Bard disability benefits rather than as a basis for reviewing the administrator's decision under a less deferential de novo standard. (45) By deciding the case based only on the narrow facts presented in this case, the court provided no guidance for future decisions. (46) Due to the narrow factual circumstances of this case, the holding is not applicable to any subsequent case. (47)

While the court noted that Bard's situation was, in part, the result of the plan being controlled by multiple employers, they declined to further analyze the issue. (48) When Congress ratified the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, which specifically targeted multi-employer pension plans, it highlighted that employees vested in such plans deserved special protection. (49) Instead of creating a remedy that only benefited Bard, the court should have accepted the invitation to join those circuits that use ERISA violations to strip plan administrators of the deferential standard of review, thus creating a model for First Circuit courts to follow. (50)

Had it not been for egregious procedural failures on the part of the plan administrators, the First Circuit would have upheld the district court's decision and Bard would have been denied disability benefits. The court refused to review the underlying actions of the administrators and thus did not reach the merits of the initial denial of Bard's claim. After Bard, an employee vested in a multi-employer plan that gives interpretive power to administrators is denied an opportunity for meaningful appeal in either the administrative or judicial setting.

(1.) See 29 U.S.C. [section] 1001(a) (2006) (noting wide-ranging impact of such plans directly influenced Congress's decision to enact ERISA). ERISA is a congressional response to American workers being denied benefits they justifiably thought their employers were accruing on their behalf. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. [section] 1001(c) (establishing requirements of minimum funding standards and vesting of accrued benefits); Nancy J. Altman & Theodore R. Marmor, ERISA and the American Retirement Income System, 7 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 31, 35 (1988) (finding ERISA responded to retirement insecurities more comprehensively than any prior legislation).

(2.) See Michael A. de Freitas, Annotation, Judicial Review of Denial of Health Care Benefits Under Employee Benefit Plan Governed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (29 U.S.C.A. [section] 1132(a)(1)(b))--Post-Firestone Cases, 128 A.L.R. FED. 1, [section] 2(a) (1995) (explaining scope of judicial review most frequently litigated issue in ERISA cases).

(3.) 471 F.3d 229 (1st Cir. 2006).

(4.) See id. at 235 (noting multi-employer pension plan administrators entitled to deferential standard of review); see also infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between single and multi-employer plans).

(5.) See 471 F.3d at 245 (finding board's denial would have been invalid even under heightened standard of review); see also 29 C.F.R. [section] 2560.503-1(i) (2006) (outlining timetable under which plan has to notify claimant of decision).

   In the case of a multiemployer plan with a committee or board of
   trustees designated as the appropriate named fiduciary that holds
   regularly scheduled meetings at least quarterly, paragraph
   (i)(3)(i) of this section shall not apply, and the appropriate
   named fiduciary shall instead make a benefit determination no later
   than the date of the meeting of the committee or board that
   immediately follows the plan's receipt of a request for review,
   unless the request for review is filed within 30 days preceding the
   date of such meeting. 29 C.F.R. [section] 2560.503-1(i)(3)(ii).

(6.) See Bard v. Boston Shipping Ass'n-Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n Pension Plan, 425 F. Supp. 2d 167, 168 (D. Mass. 2006) (noting Bard's length of service and membership in Longshoremen's union), rev'd, 471 F.3d 229 (1st Cir. 2006). The BSA and ILA created a pension plan which was governed by a board of trustees. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. [section] 1103 (requiring employers set up trust to administer pension fund).

(7.) See Bard v. Boston Shipping Ass'n-Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n Pension Plan, 425 F. Supp. 2d 167, 168 (D. Mass. 2006) (discussing Bard's employment), rev'd, 471 F.3d 229 (1st Cir. 2006). On July 16, 2001, Bard was involved in a workplace accident. Id. at 230.

(8.) See 471 F.3d at 231 (discussing findings of doctor during post-accident drug test). Because of Bard's history of drug abuse, the company forced him to undergo testing following his accident. See id. at 230. Bard's doctor diagnosed him with several mental disorders, including severe depression, anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, and a history of substance abuse. Id. at 231. The doctor concluded that these psychological disorders rendered Bard totally disabled and consequently unfit to work. See id.

(9.) See id. at 231 (describing status of Bard's application for Social Security benefits). Sometime between August and October of 2003, Bard sent written notification to the plan that he intended to apply for benefits. Id. at 232. Bard's letter disclosed both his mental illness and his recent award of Social Security benefits, although it is unclear if he sent any documentation supporting those claims. Id.

(10.) See id. at 232 (reviewing progress of Bard's application for BSA-ILA benefits). At the board meeting in October 2003, Bard's claim was discussed and compared to a recently arbitrated case involving claimant Gerard McLaughlin. Id. Based on the arbitrator's report, the board concluded that an individual had to be a current member of either the BSA or the ILA to apply for disability and the individual had to become totally disabled while employed. Id.

(11.) See id. at 232-33 (finding error in plan's lack of notice and failure to state reasons for denial); see also 29 C.F.R. [section] 2560.503-1(g)(1) (2006) (prescribing mechanism for notice to participant of any benefit denial).

(12.) See 29 C.F.R. [section] 2560.503-1(g)(1) (describing procedure for notice of benefit denial).

(13.) See 471 F.3d at 232 (noting ERISA regulations for independence of appeals board); see also 29 C.F.R. [section] 2560.503-1(h)(3)(ii),(h)(4) (mandating separation between initial determination board and appellate board). Specifically, appeals are "conducted by an appropriate named fiduciary of the plan who is neither the individual who made the adverse benefit determination that is the subject of the appeal, nor the subordinate of such individual." 29 C.F.R. [section] 2560.503-1(h)(3)(ii); see also id. [section] 2560.503-1(c)(3)(iv) (requiring plan administrator provide information about appeal process to claimant). Providing for both independence and notice increases transparency of the process. Id. [section] 2560.503-1(c)(3)(iv).

(14.) See 471 F.3d at 233 (explaining board's distinction between becoming totally disabled while at work and becoming disabled after termination). The letter Bard submitted from his doctor did not state the exact date he became completely disabled. Id. The plan literature did not make it clear to Bard by which date he needed to show total disability. Id. Nor was Bard aware that the board had rejected his first application because, while he may have become disabled during his employment, he failed to show total disability. Id. at 233-34.

(15.) See id. at 233 (stating board let Bard's claim sit long past ERISA deadline); see also 29 C.F.R. [section] 2560.503-1(i)(3)(ii) (outlining timeframe for plan to respond to claimant). The plan administrator must notify the claimant as soon as possible, but no more than five days after the adverse determination is made. 29 C.F.R. [section] 2560.503-1(i)(3)(ii).

(16.) See 471 F.3d at 234 (noting administrator's decision to send case to arbitration).

(17.) See id. (explaining Bard filed suit because of his frustration with board's delay).

(18.) See Bard v. Boston Shipping Ass'n-Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n Pension Plan, 425 F. Supp. 2d 167, 169 (D. Mass. 2006) (stating board entitled to deferential standard where plan gives board discretionary authority to determine claims), rev'd, 471 F.3d 229 (1st Cir. 2006). The court noted that de novo review is only appropriate when a plan does not give administrators the authority to make decisions about claimant eligibility. Id.

(19.) See Bard v. Boston Shipping Ass'n-Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n Pension Plan, 425 F. Supp. 2d 167, 169-70 (D. Mass. 2006) (determining Bard's documentation of disability inadequate to sustain claim of total disability), rev'd, 471 F.3d 229 (1st Cir. 2006). The district court found that Bard's evidence amounted to self-serving statements and that his medical diagnosis was suspect because it was made only after he stopped working for the BSA. Id. As such, the court determined the board's decision was reasonable and granted summary judgment in favor of BSA-ILA. See id. at 172.

(20.) See 471 F.3d at 244-46 (articulating reason for reversing district court decision). The court characterized the procedural failings of the board as "severe" and noted that they played a large role in the adverse determination. Id. at 244.

(21.) See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 37-38 (2004) (discussing growth of multi-employer pension plans tied to strengthening of labor unions). In the 1950s, many Americans worked in industries typified by transient or seasonal employment. Id. at 37. They worked for small employers and frequently changed employers within the same industry. Id. This discouraged workers from paying into employer-managed pension plans because they were unlikely to work for the same employer while they reached vesting age. Id. Moreover, because of the high costs, employers were resistant to provide such plans. Id. In contrast, multi-employer pension plans formed when labor unions and employers in a given field negotiated to pool their assets and share the risks of a pension fund. Id. Consequently, unions played significant roles in pension plan administration. Id. at 38; see also Harriet Weinstein & William J. Wiatrowski, Multiemployer Pension Plans, COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS, Spring 1999, at 20, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/archive/spring1999art4.pdf (noting size of multi-employer pension plans as contrasted to single employer plans). "According to tabulations complied from forms filed by employers with the Internal Revenue Service, in 1994 multiemployer plans accounted for less than 3 percent of defined benefit pension plans, but covered 20 percent of the 40 million workers with defined benefit pension plans." Weinstein & Wiatrowski, supra, at 20.

(22.) See 29 U.S.C. [section] 1322 (2006) (outlining benefits under single-employer plans); 29 C.F.R. [section] 2560.503-1(i)(3)(ii) (2006) (differentiating timetable for notifying participant of adverse benefit determination in multi-employer plan); see also Weinstein & Wiatrowski, supra note 21, at 20 (noting differences between single and multi-employer plans). Multi-employer plans typically include portability provisions, plan benefits are not based on earnings, and there is no requirement for length of service to any one employer. Weinstein & Wiatrowski, supra note 21, at 21-22. Conversely, single employer plans are tied to the employer which eliminates portability and requires the employee to stay with one employer until vested, typically five years. Id.

(23.) See WOOTEN, supra note 21, at 37-38 (discussing control and function of multi-employer pension administration board). As multi-employer pension plans grew in industries with stable unions, such as trucking and construction, unions exercised unilateral control over pension funds. Id. at 37-38. Likewise, while both union and management representatives comprised plan administration boards, management representation was often ceremonial. Id. at 38. Management representatives often found that by threatening to picket, union representatives stymied negotiation. Id.; see also Weinstein & Wiatrowski, supra note 21, at 20 (asserting unions used control of pension funds to attract and organize members). In the early twentieth century, Congress's lax regulation of union-run pension plans led to overreaching by plan administrators. Weinstein & Wiatrowski, supra note 21, at 20. Because members could only receive benefits if they were in "good standing," they were disinclined to cross picket lines or disagree with union representatives. Id. Also, in the event of a strike, unions controlling these unregulated pension plans could withdraw from a cash reservoir until work resumed. Id.

(24.) See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. [section] 186 (c)(5)(B) (2006) (codifying new regulations governing administration of multi-employer plans). The LMRA, often called "Taft-Hartley" in recognition of the bill's main sponsors, established rules on the internal boards that governed pension plans. Id. Under the LMRA, multi-employer plans must have boards of trustees that represent management and labor equally and provide for annual audits of pension funds. Id.

(25.) See 29 U.S.C. [section] 1001(a) (declaring ERISA's primary purpose). Congress wanted to ensure "that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness." Id. [section] 1001(a); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 720 (1984) (finding Congress carefully studied retirement landscape before enacting ERISA ensuring employees not deprived benefits); WOOTEN, supra note 21, at 37 (noting ERISA provides retirement security). LMRA pension plans provided security for workers who had given long-time service to an employer by making sure that the pension plan conformed to minimum standards of funding and fiduciary obligations. WOOTEN, supra note 21, at 38.

(26.) See S. Rep. No. 93-127, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 4639, 4655 (stating intent of ERISA is to provide broad remedy). The congressional record indicates that Congress was principally concerned with providing plan participants "broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of the Act." Id.; see also Brock v. Gerace, 635 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.N.J. 1986) (citing Marshall v. Kelley, 465 F. Supp. 341, 349 (W.D. Okla. 1978)) (stating ERISA should be given liberal construction consistent with legislative intent). Congress enacted ERISA to protect employee interests and can only be useful if the courts construe the protections it affords broadly. Brock v. Gerace, 635 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.N.J. 1986) (citing Marshall v. Kelley, 465 F. Supp. 341, 349 (W.D. Okla. 1978)); Marshall v. Snyder, 430 F. Supp. 1224, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting remedial nature of ERISA). But see Sarah Beth Spisich, The Aftermath Of Davila: Are Healthcare Enrollees Now in a Sinking Ship Without a Paddle?, 17 No. 4 HEALTH LAW. 22, 22 (2005) (arguing ERISA scheme limits practical remedial effect).

(27.) See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (declaring standard of review for administrator decisions in adverse benefit determination cases); Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding Firestone decided question of standard of review in benefits determination cases); Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 406 F.3d 98, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating more deferential standard appropriate when plan confers discretionary authority on administrators).

(28.) See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (comparing language in ERISA to trust law). The Court noted that ERISA did not prescribe the standard of review for actions challenging benefits determinations. Id. at 108-09. To determine a standard of review, the Court used trust law to fill the gap. Id. at 112. The Court posited that Congress's "general intent [was] to incorporate much of [the Labor Management Relations Act's] fiduciary law into ERISA." Id. at 109; see also de Freitas, supra note 2 (noting ERISA does not speak to issue of judicial review).

(29.) 489 U.S. 101 (1989).

(30.) Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989) (analogizing plan administrators to trustees for purposes of determining deferential standard). The Firestone Court noted that, similar to trust law, plan administrators functioned as fiduciaries charged with acting under a duty of loyalty. Id. at 110.

(31.) See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109-10 (1989) (confirming trust analogy appropriately based on ERISA's language and legislative history); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining congressional intent to conform to trust law). But see supra note 25 and accompanying text (finding legislative intent to provide broad remedy and advocating judiciary adopt least restrictive construction).

(32.) See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1330 (2003) (positing trust law pervades ERISA, although courts often unevenly and incorrectly apply its principles). In deciding Firestone, the Court was persuaded by trust law principles because plan administrators are in a fiduciary relationship with beneficiaries. Id. While trust law guides the actions of administrators, it should not govern judicial review applied to those decisions. Id.; see also Spisich, supra note 26, at 29 (urging Congress to adopt federal body of common law for ERISA remedies).

(33.) See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989) (holding courts should not disturb reasonable interpretations of trustees); c.f. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. [section] 6101 (2006) (stating consumers need protection from fraud and abuse of telemarketers); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601 (2006) (declaring disclosure rules for financial institutions to protect public); Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. [section] 1331 (2006) (establishing federal program to protect public from dangers of cigarettes). See generally Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission: A History, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/ftchistory (last visited Jan. 17, 2008) (discussing history of FTC and outlining primary role of safeguarding public).

(34.) 471 F.3d at 246 (describing Bard as totally disabled and entitled to benefits).

(35.) Id. at 244-45.

(36.) See id. at 244-46 (upholding deferential standard for administrators but ruling for Bard based on procedural defects); see also Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 406 F.3d 98, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (deciding inaction on part of administrator not discretionary); Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 37 (D. Mass. 1998) (affirming arbitrary and capricious review notwithstanding minor procedural defects). When administrators are granted discretion by a plan they are entitled to deferential review. Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 406 F.3d 98, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). However, inaction of administrators "is not a valid exercise of discretion and leaves the court without any decision or application of expertise to which to defer." Id. at 109; see also Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 349 F.3d 1098, 1106 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding administrator inaction undeserving of deferential standard). But see Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir. 1993) (declining to apply different standard based on adverse determination of claim).

(37.) See 471 F.3d at 237 (discussing ERISA requirement plan language must have clear notice of denial written in lay terms). "The need for clear notice pervades the ERISA regulatory structure." Id. The court noted that both ERISA and the corresponding regulation stressed the need for timely notice of claim denial and mandated that the language of the denial "set[s] forth 'specific reasons for such a denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the claimant.'" Id. at 237 (quoting 29 C.F.R. [section] 2560.503-1(g)(1) (2006)).

(38.) See id. at 238 (noting Bard's reading of plan language was as reasonable as administrators interpretation).

(39.) Id. at 237-38 (observing plan documents used terms "participant" and "employee"). The BSA plan included a summary plan description (SPD), which granted benefits to any participant that had both accrued a certain number of service years and had become totally disabled. Id. The plan did not address whether the participant has to be a current employee or whether the disability must have occurred while the participant remained employed. Id. at 238.

(40.) See id. at 244-45 (resting decision on plan term ambiguities and procedural failures). Based on the severity of the procedural irregularities and their connection to the board's denial of Bard's claim, the court concluded that under any standard of review the denial was invalid. Id. at 244.

(41.) See 471 F.3d at 236 (declining to take up circuit split issue while acknowledging complex nature of the issue). Ultimately, because the circuit split is founded on cases decided before the revision of ERISA, the First Circuit declined to address the split and instead focused on the specific facts of this case.

(42.) See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing split among circuits regarding appropriate level of judicial review); see also Langbein, supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining judicial review of administrator decisions should not be constrained by trust law considerations).

(43.) See supra note 33 and accompanying text (finding Firestone grappled with appropriate standard of review in "deemed denied" situations).

(44.) See 471 F.3d at 236 (tailoring ruling to facts presented rather than offering opinion on circuit split).

(45.) See id. at 245 (dismissing need for standard of review discussion based on severity of procedural nonconformity).

(46.) See id. at 237 (stating ruling applies only to this case). "The result is limited to this case. We do not reach hypothetical questions about future applicants under this Plan...." Id.

(47.) See supra note 33 and accompanying text.

(48.) See 471 F.3d at 236 (highlighting special nature of multi-employer plan); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text (tracing evolution and inherent danger in union controlled pension plans).

(49.) See supra note 23 and accompanying text (explaining vulnerability of workers pensions controlled by self-interested union representatives); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing history of LMRA and overarching concerns it addresses).

(50.) See 471 F.3d at 230 (declining to expand scope of ruling).